Malaysia’s Policy Responses to the Panic of 1997: An Islamic Perspective by Shahar, M. & Shahar, M.
 
 
   
 




MAZATUL AINI SHAHAR 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the         
University of East London for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 






Abstract    
This thesis explores the rationale behind the decisions of the Malaysian policymakers in 
response to the Panic of 1997, as Malaysia is the only country that had rejected the 
Washington Consensus while the rest of the crisis-affected countries pursued the 
orthodox policies. The thesis is to investigate whether the reasons behind the policy 
responses were due to adhering to the underlying principles of Shariah or mere political 
pragmatism.  
Identified by the World Bank as a newly industrialising economy (NIE), Malaysia 
symbolises a developing country with an impressive growth rate in the last thirty years 
prior to the Panic of 1997. The transformation to a rapid economic growth in the 1980s 
and 1990s resulted from a change of policies regarding social and economic development. 
It was a widespread perception that the reason for Malaysia’s rejection of IMF’s 
involvement was primarily due to prevent any intervention in its existing social 
affirmative action policy known as the New Economic Policy (NEP). Concurrently, 
Prime Minister Mahathir’s strong advocation towards the Islamisation policy had also 
made a significant impact in the development of Malaysia’s policy framework. 
The Washington Consensus via the IMF delegitimised the prevailing economic system in 
Southeast Asia by blaming the structural deficiencies in the financial and corporate 
sectors of the countries as the root cause of the Panic of 1997. The IMF believed that the 
Washington Consensus presents a model for institutional transformation. However, 
Malaysia had adopted the unorthodox capital control policy as a policy response, while 
the rest of the crisis-affected countries had accepted the Washington Consensus. The 
thesis adopts a historical institutional analysis in explaining the significance of the 
Islamisation policy and the importance of upholding the NEP and the likely impact of its 
reversal or revocation.  
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Arabic and Malay terms and its meaning in English 
Note: All Arabic or Malay terms that are used in this thesis will be italicised for ease of reference. 
Arabic/Malay terms Meaning in English 
Allah 
 




Treasury, exchequer, administration of vacant estate 
 
Bumiputera (Malay) The indigenous people of Peninsular Malaysia and East 
Malaysia (Borneo), literally means the 'sons of the soil'  
 
Fatwa Legal ruling issued by Mufti 
Fiqh 
 
Fiqh is based principally on interpretations of the Quran 
and the Sunnah and secondarily on Ijma’ and Ijtihad by 
the fuqaha (Islamic jurist). While the Quran and the 
Sunnah are undisputable, fiqhi judgements may be 
modified to be adapt with different conditions. 
 
Hadith The term applied to specific reports of the Prophet 
Muḥammad's ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص words and deeds as well as those of 




The final and fifth pillar in Islam, for the pilgrimage to 








Forbidden by Shariah 
 
Ijarah (Leasing)* Refers to an arrangement under which the lessor leases 
equipment, building or other facility to a client at an 
agreed rental against a fixed charge, as agreed by both 
parties 
 
Ijma  Consensus or agreement of the Muslim community 
 
Imam A religious leader in a Muslim community and the one 








Submission to the will of God. Islam also means peace  
 









Refers to an agreement made between a party, who 
provides the capital and another party (entrepreneur), to 
enable the entrepreneur to carry out business projects, 
which will be on a profit sharing basis, according to a 
pre-determined ratios agreed upon earlier. In the case of 
losses, the losses are borne by the provider of the funds.  
Mufti 
 




Refers to the sale of goods at a price, which includes a 
profit margin as agreed to by both parties. Such a sales 
contract is valid on the condition that the price, other 
costs, and the profit margin of the seller are stated at the 
time of the agreement of sale. 
 
Musharakah* 
(partnership or joint venture) 
Refers to a partnership or joint venture for a specific 
business with a profit motive, whereby the distribution 
of profits will be apportioned according to an agreed 
ratio. In the event of losses, both parties will share the 
losses on the basis of their equity participation. 
 
Qard-al-hasan* Refers to an interest free loan. The borrower is only 
required to repay the principal amount borrowed, but he 
may pay an extra amount at his absolute discretion, as a 






Central religious text of Islam, believed by Muslims to 
be a revelation from God (Allah) 
Sunnah Collection of the words or acts of the Prophet or the 
Hadith which Prophet Mohammad   ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص used to give 
moral guidance on many issues 
 









Ummah means "community", the entire community of 
Muslims bound by ties of religion 
 
Zakat Obligatory charity taken from wealthy Muslims and 
distributed among a specified category of people 
 
Note:  
*Definition as provided by BNM’s Islamic Interbank Money Market 





BismillahirRahmanirRahim, in the name of Allah the Most Compassionate and the Most 
Merciful. First and foremost, I am indebted to Allah the Al-Mighty for granting me the 
patience and strength to finish this challenging project. 
I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my distinguished supervisor, Professor 
Vassilis Fouskas, whose encouragement and expert supervision helped me complete this 
thesis. Thank you, Vass, for being my mentor and friend – I will cherish our coffee 
sessions at the cosy little café near the train station. 
I would also like to thank my colleagues and friends at UEL for your support during the 
tough times in London - the year 2020 had overwhelmed us in many ways, good and bad. 
And a very special thanks to Avinder for just being there. 
Invaluable gratitude goes to my father, Maj. Gen. Abdul Malek Shahar and mother, Datin 
Aishah, and my siblings Ali, Dilin, Amcik and Jimin, whose thoughts and prayers 
materialised into my good health and perseverance to complete this thesis. 
Last but certainly not least, I would like to thank my wonderful husband of 18 years, 
Razdamsha (Adam), for his insurmountable patience of putting up with me and taking up 
the role of a single parent to our children during our unexpected separation in my final 
year. It seems customary for authors to thank their patient partner, but it is through 
Adam’s love, unwavering support, and relentless encouragement that I was able to 
complete this thesis. And to my four lovely children Zara, Tisha, Masha and Ozil, thank 
you for being brave and patient during my “absence”.  








This thesis is dedicated to my parents. 
Also, to my husband and children. 




CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
1. Overview 
The last century saw a significant transformation in economic philosophy from the 
principles of command to open market economies, that has reached its zenith with 
headway towards liberalisation and international integration of domestic economies. 
Gradual transformation from national to global markets had shaped the finance and 
business landscape with considerable challenges stemming from the requests for good 
economic management. The difficulties in economic management had shifted from 
straightforward policy responses in domestic crises to the more severe regional crisis that 
involved the entire global economy. The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 (the “Panic of 
1997” or the “Crisis”), which to a certain extent affected the world economy1, has its roots 
in the period of financial turmoil that set off speculative actions in the foreign exchange 
market. These events indicated a defining moment for the Southeast Asia countries were 
praised for their swift economic growth, their rapid industrialisation progress and 
consequently improvement in their living standards. The spurt of industrial growth in the 
Southeast Asia region had also enhanced these countries to become models for other 
developing nations (e.g. South American countries). These countries had made 
surprisingly little growth despite being backed by the World Bank and IMF for many 
years for economic reform and structural adjustment (World Bank, 1997). 
The Panic of 1997 could not have been anticipated because countries such as Thailand, 
Indonesia and Malaysia had displayed a remarkable track record of commercial growth, 
reinforced by economic stability and modest inflation rates, high savings rates, and a good 
growth in export. The potential incidence of a foreign exchange glitch in Asia was thus 
an absolute anathema as the state of their economies were believed to be profoundly 
stable. Table 1.1 shows the Southeast Asia countries with an average growth rate in terms 
of GDP per capita at 4-6%, for the period between 1960s to mid-1990s. 
 
 
1 Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999) suggested an enlightened observation on the Panic of 1997, which 
triggered substantial changes in real exchange rates in the Southeast Asia, which led to worsening in the 




Table 1.1: Growth in Southeast Asian countries  
 Real GDP per capita  
(USD1990 international) 
Percent pa (%) 
Country/Year 1950 1973 1996 1950-1973 1973-1996 
Malaysia 1,696 3,167 7,764 2.8 4.0 
Philippines 1,293 1,956 2,369 1.8 0.8 
Indonesia 874 1,538 3,464 2.5 3.6 
Thailand 848 1,750 6,112 3.2 5.6 
Singapore 2,038 5,412 20,983 4.3 6.1 
Source: Asian Development Bank (1997) as adapted in Abu Bakar (2000). 
1.1 Background and objective of research 
The aim of this research is to work out whether Malaysia’s policymaking decisions on 
the policy responses to the Panic of 1997 were influenced by the Islamic principles. This 
study shall seek to ascertain if the Malaysian policymakers were guided by certain rules 
that corresponded to Islamic principles or whether their decisions were solely due to 
political pragmatism.  
There are many studies conducted on the policy responses to the Panic of 1997, 
particularly comparing Malaysia’s policy responses to other crisis-affected Southeast 
Asia. Most of the researches were focused on the analysis of the capital control policy as 
well as the effectiveness of the IMF’s intervention in countries like Indonesia, Thailand, 
and Korea. However, there are limited studies on the rationale of Malaysia’s rejection of 
IMF’s involvement in its economic recovery from the Panic of 1997.  
There are several studies done on Malaysia’s social and political landscape prior to the 
Panic of 1997. For instance, the work of Hashim (1995), Jomo (1999; 2004b), Noh (2012) 
and Yasin (1994) provided this research with valuable insight on the background of the 




that was introduced by the government as a response to tapering down ethnic disharmony 
in Malaysia. This policy is known as the New Economic Policy (NEP) and will be further 
analysed in a slightly different context in chapter four of this thesis. The NEP is an 
important element of this research as it was commonly understood by Malaysians that 
one of the main reasons for Malaysia’s rejection to any intervention by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) was due to upholding the NEP, a policy that was created as a 
response to a violent ethnic riot in 1969. The NEP had a two-pronged objective of 
“eliminating poverty and restructuring society to ensure economic and social fairness for 
the less fortunate ethnic community in Malaysia” (Rasiah and Shari, 2001). Pramanik 
(2002) had argued that the NEP is an affirmative action policy that is crucial for the 
unification of the multi-ethnic and set the groundwork for a contemporary Malaysian 
society for all ethnic background.  
The Panic of 1997 initially began as a huge liquidity crisis but subsequently deteriorated 
into an economic and social catastrophe, caused by the withdrawals of substantial foreign 
capital from Southeast Asia. The attack on the Thai Baht in July 1997 turned into 
contagion and spread to the rest of the region. Preceding to the Panic of 1997, the capital 
flow into Asia grew abnormally, stimulated by both the requirement to deal with the 
access investment over savings and the prospect of greater returns for as well as the image 
of ‘miracle’ Asia. This sudden capital flight out of Asia aggravated the situation to the 
extent that was even more devastating to people’s well-being than the Latin America 
1980s crash (Wade, 1998a). Malaysia, including its neighbouring countries, namely 
Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, were the worst hit by the Panic of 1997. 
Wade (1998)  and Jomo  (2006) had argued that Malaysia’s neighbouring countries were 
coerced in accepting IMF’s bailout and with it came harsh policies that had to be 
implemented by its recipient. 
Malaysia had chosen to single out itself in the recovery from the Panic of 1997 by 
choosing an alternative method, while the rest of the Southeast Asia countries had 
accepted the aid from IMF, guised as austerity package (Wade, 1998a, 1998a, 1998c). 
There were mixed views on whether the approach adopted by Malaysia was more 




across the political spectrum, as many believed that the IMF had misdiagnosed the 
situation and had lost credibility in the region (Jomo, 1998b; Wade, 1998a). 
1.2 Research Design and Methodology 
This thesis had adopted the historical institutional approach to explain Malaysia’s 
political economy and understand Malaysia’s policy response logic. Pierson’s (2000, p. 
251) definition of the historical institutional approach is the most relevant to this thesis. 
He summarised it as “specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; a wide range of 
social outcomes may be possible; large consequences may result from relatively small or 
contingent events; particular courses of action, once introduced, can be almost impossible 
to reverse; and consequently, political development is punctuated by critical moments or 
junctures that shape the basic contours of social life”. 
There a several definitions of institutions in historical institutionalism. North (1990, 
1991) describes institutions as “humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interaction” and that institutions involve both “informal constraints” 
like sanctions, tradition and taboos, plus formal rules “like law and property rights.” He 
presents the metaphor that institutions are the rules of the game, and organisations are 
actors that give some form of sense to institutions. North regards the “kinds of information 
and knowledge required by the entrepreneur are in good part a consequence of particular 
institutional context.” As such, the key to interpret institutions and institutional 
transformation lay in examining state’s institutional traits (North, 1990, pp. 4–8). 
Nonetheless, there are several other descriptions on institutions. Taking a somewhat 
different viewpoint, Hall (1986, p. 19) describes institutions as “formal rules, compliance 
procedures and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between 
individuals in various units of the polity and economy.” Streeck and Thelen (2005, p. 9) 
define institutions as “building-blocks of social order.” These building blocks of social 
order are social restrictions that impose expectations on actors with respect to behaviour 
and conduct. Institutions then form “mutually related rights and obligations for actors, 




impossible actions, and thereby organising behaviour into predictable and reliable 
patterns.” (Streeck and Thelen, 2005, p. 9) 
This thesis adopts North’s (1990) interpretation of institutions because it covers a wider 
description of institutions. North further explained that public policy is a set of institutions 
because they design, modulate, and provide stability to interaction between actors. This 
is important because the affirmative action policy and capital control policy are central to 
this thesis. By applying the historical institutional argument, the thesis will show how 
public policies remained constant over time and helped establish multi-ethnic groups with 
independent sets of institutions.  
Why does historical institutionalism approach the most fitting methodology to be adopted 
by this thesis? Mahoney (2001), Pierson (2004) and Thelen (2015) claim that historical 
institutionalism approach focuses to the historical process and emphasis on the theories 
of path dependence, increasing returns, timing and sequencing. There are 3 fundamental 
hypotheses to historical institutionalism.  
First, the historical institutional approach believes that “political processes can best be 
understood if they are studied over time.” (Pierson, 1993, p. 596). My research is an 
examination of the historical processes that led to the decisions behind the policy 
responses, which included the political framework prior to Malaysia’s independence in 
1957, the NEP as a consequent to the ethnic riot of 1969, and Mahathir’s Islamisation 
policies since 1985 up until the Panic of 1997. 
Second, a historical institutional approach treats “structural constraints on actors”, 
especially those that derive from the state as “important sources of political behaviour.” 
(Pierson, 1993, p. 596).    
Third, the historical institutional approach deems that “detailed investigation” of 
vigilantly selected case studies provides a “powerful tool for uncovering the sources of 




A notable work that discusses the historical institutionalist approach in considerable detail 
is Pierson’s (2004) Politics of Time. Pierson (2004) points out that a state’s differentiated 
political, social and economic nature is an output of the state’s distinctive historical 
experience. Pierson suggests that a state’s social, political, and economic transformation 
arises from gradual or incremental change. He elaborates that social processes undergo 
minor changes which may be insignificant when viewed from a short duration but could 
prove no less transformational when viewed from a longer time horizon. Pierson’s 
contention is linked to concepts like path dependence, sequence, and timing. This is 
explained below.  
1.2.1. Path Dependence, Timing and Sequence 
A key concept in historical institutional analysis is path dependence, but this term has 
several various definitions. Mahoney (2000, p. 507) sees path dependence as “specifically 
those historical sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns 
or event chains that have deterministic properties.” Sewell (1990, p. 263) defines path 
dependence as “that what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible 
outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time.” Levi (1997, p. 265) 
perhaps give a more cogent definition of path dependence - “Path dependence means that 
once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. 
There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional 
arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice”.  
Despite the different interpretations, a path-dependence analysis must have three major 
characteristics. First, the term implicitly includes the review of causal processes that are 
extremely susceptible to incidents that occur in the initial stages of an overall historical 
sequence (Mahoney, 2000, p. 510). Second, “path-dependence analysis subscribes to the 
idea that initial conditions do not guide the predictability of the final outcome” (Mahoney, 
2000, p. 511). Third, a path-dependence analysis “takes the view, that once a contingent 
event takes place, the event sets into motion a series of processes and track a particular 




is made, a self-reinforcing mechanism kicks in where “each step in a particular direction 
makes it more difficult to reverse course” (Pierson, 2004, p. 21). 
The research inquiry had two major concerns. One primary concern was to establish the 
relevance of path dependence - which is central to the historical institutional argument. 
As mentioned above, path dependence refers to causal processes that are sensitive to 
events that take place in the early stages of a historical sequence (Mahoney, 2000; George 
et al., 2005). The other concern of this research was to account for the development of 
Malaysia’s plural society after nearly one and half century of colonial rule in the 
Peninsular Malaysia. This is not wholly a novel question as scholarly works on Malaysia 
such as Esma (1991), Gomez and Jomo (1999), (Hashim, 1995), Jomo (2003, 2004b) and 
Yasin (1994) all agree on the presence of Malaysia’s plural society and the existence of 
ethnic politics. The difficult question is whether these works differ, and how does one 
explain the policy responses that correspond to Malaysia’s plural society.  
To address the above questions, this thesis suggests that ‘path dependence’ cannot be 
construed simplistically and that the Mahathir administration had some sort of short-term 
coherent policy to enable Malaysia’s different ethnic communities to develop exclusive 
governance systems that would have allowed for the creation of autonomous 
communities. This thesis argues that the Mahathir administration had a long-term plan 
for Malaysia. The administration was conscious that it was developing two autonomous 
races, the Malay and Chinese, with exclusive sets of institutions.  
Reconciling the historical evidences and accounting for the formation of Malaysia’s 
plural society required moving away from a simplistic version of path dependence. It 
required questioning current literature on Malaysia regarding state formation. It also 
required an examination on the affirmative action policies, the NEP, and its subsequent 
variants. It further required piecing together works from various disciplines, namely 
history, politics, economics, public policy and even sociology. It was obvious that if there 
was a way out of this conundrum, understanding the affirmation action policy was central. 
One of the initial stages of this research was to understand the NEP. Works by Gomez 




Yasin (1994) offer initial insights to Malaysia’s social and political landscape in the 
period prior to the NEP.  
The research hypothesis is based on the two main policy responses that were unique and 
very crucial to Malaysia’s recovery, which were the capital control policy and the 
restructuring of the entire financial system. Based on these two hypotheses, the research 
designed was focused on the following work:  
i) The restructuring of the financial system was via the setting up of three companies 
i.e. Pengurusan Dahanarta Nasional Bhd (Danaharta), Danamodal Malaysia Bhd 
(Danamodal) and Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC). Even 
though Danaharta was wound up in 2005, its operations were transferred to a 
newly set-up wholly owned government company known as Prokhas Sdn Bhd2.  
ii) A detailed analysis of the capital control policy that was constructed based on the 
policy dialogue between Mahathir and his unofficial economic advisor, Nor 
Mohamad and other members of the National Economic Action Council (NEAC). 
Apart from the collection of unofficial notes from the policy dialogues between 
Mahathir and Nor, minutes of meetings and the working papers of the Ministry of 
Finance (MoF) and Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) were also analysed. Nor was 
appointed as Mahathir’s unofficial economic advisor during the Panic of 1997. He 
was picked by Mahathir to help him with the Panic of 1997 as Nor was previously 
involved in a similar foreign currency deal while working with BNM. Chapters 5 
and 6 detail the findings and analysis on the policy responses i.e. restructuring of 
the financial system framework and the capital controls policy. 
The adopted methodology of this research is qualitative because of the epistemological 
and ontological assumptions of this study, which are exploratory in their nature. There 
are three rationale for a qualitative method. Firstly, practical issues will occur in the 
 
2 Prokhas’ main function was the management and disposal of the residual assets transferred from 
Danaharta. Subsequent to 2005, Prokhas has been engaged by the Ministry of Finance to undertake special 
government projects. The access to data gathering that was provided during the research at Prokhas’ office 
had made a significant impact to the researcher’s understanding of the political manoeuvring and 




employment of quantitative technique because the data quality fairly often disputable. In 
the Southeast Asia countries including Malaysia, credible statistical indicators are 
sometimes omitted or unavailable and the dimensions of some statistical data were 
frequently modified (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2003). Additionally, there is 
widespread scepticism over fiscal and monetary data as the statistical criteria were 
modified during the Panic of 1997 (Lee, 2004). Many analysts have uncertainties over 
the integrity of the data on the commercial and corporate sectors3 (Duriau, Reger and 
Pfarrer, 2007). 
Secondly, the effects of policy decisions cannot be impartially evaluated because these 
responses were in essence subjective in nature. It is usually challenging to quantify these 
responses that affect changes in policy and therefore, the political or religious influence 
of policy responses are often described in relative terms and not absolute (Lee, 2004). 
And lastly, the ‘small N (n)’ issue4 is an interference in its application using the 
quantitative method. The small N applications are susceptible to bias or selection effect 
in certain cases and exceedingly challenging to derive to a statistically valid outcome 
from a low frequency of small N, even when applied in the simplest linear regression 
model (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994). With regard to the Panic of 1997, the maximum 
number of small N cases are four or five at best, which is not sufficient to ascertain a 
robust empirical finding. 
Given this, the research methodology that was chosen for this thesis is via the qualitative 
method and it involves the critical analysis of the policy responses during the Panic of 
1997. According to Pierce (2008, p. 45), “In the main, qualitative method is preferred 
because it is considered best suited to the study, understanding and explanation of the 
complexities of social and political life… researchers are better able to ‘see the world 
through the subject’s eyes’”. 
 
3 For example the NPLs data in Malaysia. BNM had relaxed the rulings for NPL, adjusting it from 3 to 6 
months.This was the BNM/NEAC’s attempt to rescue banks with debts from bankruptcy threats. 




The approach was to build up a historical narrative on critical elements prior to the Panic 
of 1997, elements that were unique to Malaysia as compared to its neighbours affected 
by the Crisis, especially Indonesia and Thailand. These elements consist of the evolution 
of the affirmative policy - the NEP, Mahathir’s Islamisation approach and the NEAC. 
Data for this has been drawn predominantly from secondary sources and cross-checked 
by data from primary sources such as speeches and minutes. The collection of secondary 
sources included policy documents, economic reports (IMF, World Bank, MoF) and 
annual reports (BNM and Danaharta) that were sourced from the Malaysia government 
(ministries and agencies) and the National Archives in Kuala Lumpur. The primary reason 
for this is the data collected by governments and international organisations were of high 
quality as the data were compiled by experts using rigorous methods (Ghauri, Grønhaug 
and Strange, 2019).  
Documents of historical nature such as annual reports, economic reports, press releases 
and minutes were obtained from Malaysia’s national archives in Kuala Lumpur. 
Secondary sources are the official documents of the Economic Planning Unit (under the 
Prime Minister’s department), the central bank (BNM), the Treasury (MoF) and the 
relevant government agencies set-up as the response to the Panic of 1997. Main data 
gathered consisted of the relevant policies and working papers, specific Statutory Acts 
enacted post Crisis, minutes of meetings, annual & operational reports, economic reports, 
and other official reports. These were reviewed and analysed to construct the narrative of 
the reaction to the Crisis. The aim is to construct a historical narrative of the policy 
responses based on the historical institutional analysis and the subsequent actions 
undertaken by the appointed agent of the Malaysian government. 
The thesis will also attempt to explain or account for Malaysian government’s or rather 
Mahathir’s perspective on Islam by looking at the steadily growing political space that a 
particular understanding of Islam has occupied the Malay society over the previous 
century. The focus is the last twenty years prior to the Panic of 1997 years in particular, 
which coincide with the bulk of Mahathir years5, but also with the period of 
 




crystallisation of Islam as the major ethnic and even national political signifier in 
Malaysia.  
1.3 Research Questions 
In seeking to explain Malaysia’s policy responses to the Panic of 1997, the research will 
attempt to answer the following questions:  
1. What was the exact framework of economic policies in Malaysia?  
2. What were the cultural and other motivations of the policymakers (in implementing 
the NEP) in response to the ethical riot and (in implementing the capital controls 
policy) in response to the Panic of 1997?  
3. How did the different motivations of the different actors affect the policies in 
Malaysia?  
4. How did the underlying principles of Shariah, if any, contribute to the eventual 
decision-making process in response to the Panic of 1997?  
5. Were there any alternatives to the policy response logic? If so, did they fail? 
1.4 Significant contribution of the Research 
Whilst it has been established that the body of knowledge on financial crisis is as 
extensive as it is contentious, and the analysis on the Panic of 1997 is as voluminous as 
it is recurrent, not much analysis were completed prior to this thesis that relate particularly 
to the rationale behind the policy responses. Hence, this thesis focuses on the thought 
process of the policymakers and analyses them to see if the rationale behind their actions 
were due to the guiding principles of Shariah or merely political pragmatism.  
As of to date, there is no discussion on the policy responses from the Islamic point of 
view and the examination of the rationale behind the policy decision makers’ decision on 




that shortfall in the literature by adding value to the existing knowledge in the areas of 
the policy responses of the Panic of 1997 from the Islamic perspective. 
This study is not an attempt to solve long-standing debate concerning the risks of capital 
account liberalization, the virtues of capital controls, or the sources of Southeast Asia’s 
remarkable growth. The assessment of these contentious issues is merely suggestive, and 
it draws rational conclusions based on data and available scholarly work. 
1.5 Outline of Thesis 
This thesis is divided into two main parts with six chapters. The first part is the 
groundwork of the thesis which consists of the theoretical framework and literature 
reviews (Chapters 2-4), while the second part presents the empirical analysis, 
contextualisation of the findings, and conclusion (Chapters 5-7). The outline of the thesis 
is laid-out below for ease of reference: 
Chapter Two summarises the globalisation phenomena and its impact on developing 
countries before considering their relevance in the Malaysian setting. It also deals with 
the globalisation experience in Southeast Asia, comparing Malaysia to its neighbours. 
The second part explores Malaysia’s globalisation experience and the backdrop of 
Malaysia’s political situation that had led to the unique policy responses. Overall, this 
chapter outlines the evolution of the international political economy prior to considering 
the assimilation of Southeast Asia’s economies in general and Malaysia, in particular. It 
also studies various processes of globalisation that were adapted corresponding to the 
individual country’s unique social and political surroundings. 
Chapter Three analyses the fundamental background of the Islamic principles applied 
to the economic system. The first section of the chapter reviews the ideological 
underpinnings in working out the social, economic, and financial system based on the 
doctrines of Islam and its challenges. It will then analyse the divine legislative 
framework that regulates the Islamic finance system in Malaysia that distinguishes it 




the significance of the law to the general Muslim community. The second half of this 
chapter gives the narrative on the history and early development of Islamic finance in 
Malaysia. It points out the importance of Islam in shaping Malaysia’s social and 
economic policies as well as BNM’s role in the establishment of a full-fledge Islamic 
financial system. 
Chapter Four examines the rationale behind the creation of the NEP and its relevance to 
the Malaysian people. The first half of this chapter provides the fundamental background 
in understanding the social and political landscape in Malaysia. It analyses Malaysia’s 
social structure preceding the NEP and the important historical events that compelled the 
ruling government at that time to establish an affirmative action policy which was the 
NEP.  
The second part of this chapter is the process of legitimisation and implementation of the 
NEP throughout different phases of development plan. It continues further to analyse the 
seriousness of NEP’s withdrawal, to the extent that the Malaysian government had 
resolved to defend such a policy at the risk of foregoing financial aid from IMF. Malaysia 
took the risk of going against the flow, while its neighbours took the much-needed support 
from the IMF. 
Chapter Five analyses the findings on the banking reform initiatives initiated by the 
NEAC under the National Economic Recovery Plan (NERP). It will examine the rationale 
behind the NEAC’s decision and the process of undertaking this strategy in stabilising 
the financial system in Malaysia. It will study in detail the establishment of the three 
special purpose government agencies that was set up to undertake this special task–
Danaharta, Danamodal and the CDRC. The latter part of this chapter will briefly analyse 
the banking reforms that were undertaken by the other crisis-affected Asian countries as 
a comparative review. However, the banking reforms in these countries were part of the 
IMF’s conditions for the financial aid that it had provided. The analysis will summarise 
the similarities and differences of the banking reforms approaches undertaken by these 




Chapter Six explains the events that led to the decision on the policy in response to the 
Panic of 1997 and the restructuring of Malaysia’s banking system. It examines the 
rationale based on events that took place behind the decisions that Malaysia took in its 
policy responses. It then continues to analyse selected policy responses that were in 
contrast to the responses to other Asian countries, such as Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia. 
While these countries carried out orthodox policies6, Malaysia employed unconventional 
policies. In terms of macroeconomic stability, these countries stood to a pro-cyclical 
policy while Malaysia followed a countercyclical policy and the utmost distinction is in 
its foreign policy. Malaysia enforced capital controls policy with the establishment of a 
pegged system, whilst the rest of the affected Asian countries relaxed their regulations on 
capital account activities, switching to a free-floating system. 
And finally, the concluding Chapter Seven, ties the thesis together. This chapter revisits 
the research questions and reviews the answers to those questions by summarising the 





6 Orthodox policies are a set of policies that are initiated by the Breton Woods institution to restore 
macroeconomic stability. Such policies typically comprises of drastic cuts in public spending, curbing of 





CHAPTER 2:  MALAYSIA’S GLOBALISATION 
“Asia's experience of globalisation has not convinced it that 
this is the answer to economic ills or the vitamin for 
economic growth, at least the kind of globalisation that is 
being promoted by the rich western countries. Globalisation 
need not be about free capital flows only. There can still be 
globalisation, but it should not be absolutely free, it should 
not be purely market driven. Regulated globalisation can 
still be compatible with the idea of globalisation.” 
Mahathir (2002a) 
2. Introduction 
This chapter outlines the characteristics on the phenomena of globalisation and its impact 
on developing countries before deliberating their significance in the Malaysian context. 
This analysis is important in providing the understanding to the rationale behind 
Malaysia’s policy decisions. Despite being a relatively small economy, Malaysia had 
risked the wrath of dominant world organisations like the IMF whilst simultaneously 
agitating the increasingly influential global financial players. This chapter then briefly 
reviews the World Bank’s special report on the East Asia miraculous economic growth 
since the 1960s up until the early 1990s, a period just before the onset of events leading 
to the Panic of 1997. It also covers the globalisation experience in Southeast Asia, 
comparing Malaysia to its neighbours. The second part examines the Malaysian 
globalisation experience and the background of Malaysia political landscape that had 
resulted in Malaysia’s distinctive policy responses, albeit the criticism, externally and 
domestically. Though the motivation behind Malaysia’s economic policy responses were 
controversial, yet the fact that such reactions are feasible at all indicates a significant 
insurgence in the outlook of political economic progress.  
Overall, this chapter outlines the metamorphosis of the global political economy prior to 
considering the integration of East Asia’s economies in general and Malaysia, in 




phenomena had brought onto the developing economies. The concept of globalisation has 
immediately developed into an accepted part of academic discourse, and its 
ubiquitousness is a manifestation in the absence of an alternative perspective. Although 
there is a universal understanding that dramatic developments have transpired in the 
international framework, the scope and magnitude of such transitions are much more 
controversial. It also looks at certain processes of globalisation that were adjusted 
according to the individual country’s distinctive social and political environments. 
Globalisation has different meaning to different people. For the majority of Muslim 
communities, globalisation is often categorised as the process of Westernisation as the 
dynamic force behind it are the Western countries (Murden 2002). Whilst, for the 
developing countries, globalisation typically means economic colonisation by the 
hegemonic powers that control organisations like the IMF and World Bank. As Stiglitz 
(2002, p. 7) pointed out that “even when not guilty of hypocrisy, the West has driven the 
globalization agenda, ensuring that it garners a disproportionate share of the benefits, at 
the expense of the developing world.” However, the definition of globalisation that is 
relevant in this analysis is globalisation of the financial markets or financialisation. As 
explained by Lapavitsas (2013, p. 13), “financialization is reminiscent of globalization’ 
and globalisation refers to ‘the growth of the world market, the expansion of international 
financial markets, the increasing interpenetration of economies via foreign direct 
investment, the rise of global flows lending, and a host of related phenomena in the world 
market during the last three decades.” Whilst, Fouskas and Gokay (2012, pp. 16–17) 
supports the claim by Albo et al. (2010, pp. 34–35) that “financialization gives rise to 
such financial volatility that crises actually become one of the developmental features of 
neoliberalism, and this reinforces rather than undermines the central position of financial 
interest in capitalist power structures.”  
Given this, Malaysia’s viewpoint on globalisation as a developing country in Southeast 
Asia with a majority Muslim population was skewed towards the negative effect that 
globalisation would bring to the country and its people, especially under the Mahathir 
administration. Mahathir stated that “the globalisation of the world has changed the whole 




no way we can do this. One way or another the process of globalisation, of breaking down 
borders will take place and become a fact of life” (Mahathir, 1997b) Despite this, 
Malaysia had not closed its doors to global progress and growth, as the benefits of 
international trade were embraced via the economic and financial liberalisation in the 
1980s. The BNM, the Malaysian central bank authorities were generally more cautious 
on financial liberalisation, both domestically and internationally as compared to its 
neighbouring countries (Jomo, 2005, p. 3). Equally, the Mahathir administration had been 
quite sceptical of the globalisation agenda because of the close relationship between the 
West and globalisation (Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 316).  
Time after time, Malaysian policymakers have defied the conventional wisdom about the 
most fitting measures of dealing with the Crisis and its domestic economies, especially in 
a time pigeonholed by intensified global integration. Under Mahathir’s leadership, the 
Malaysian government had initiated economic policies which safeguarded the social 
harmony of its citizens whilst lessening the pressure from foreign influences, and declined 
to strictly abide by the neoliberal doctrine of financial liberalisation. Stiglitz (2002, p. 
122) states that “Malaysia was severely criticized during the Crisis by the international 
financial community. Though Mahathir's rhetoric and human rights policies often leave 
much to be desired, many of his economic policies were a success.” Hence, in this regard, 
Malaysia has drawn special attention amongst countries afflicted by the economic disaster 
in Southeast Asia. Mahathir highlighted several major concerns on the states and markets 
relationship and about Malaysia’s ability to pursue distinctive policy responses. After the 
riots in Indonesia7, Mahathir had mentioned his concerns to Stiglitz8 (2002, p. 120), that 
he knew “that all the gains in building a multi-ethnic society could be lost, had he let the 
IMF dictate its policies to him and his country and then riots had broken out.” For him, 
preventing a severe recession was not just a matter of economics, it was a matter of the 
“survival of the nation.” 
 
7 The riot in Indonesia was the result of food and fuel subsidies were drastically cut back for the poor, when 
the Indonesian government adopted IMF’s draconian policy response in exchange for a USD23billion 
financial package. 
8 This was during a meeting attended by IMF's managing director Michel Camdessus, and G-22 finance 




2.1 East Asian Miracle 
In 1993, the World Bank had produced a report titled “The East Asian Miracle: Economic 
growth and Public Policy” (East Asian Miracle report) which highlighted the 
achievements of eight high performing Asian economies (HPAEs) and the HPAEs were 
divided into three categories:   
i) Japan; 
ii) Four Northern Asia countries: Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore and 
Taiwan; and 
iii) Three newly industrialising economies (NIEs): Indonesia, Malaysia & Thailand. 
According to Wade (1996), the study was undertaken by the World Bank at the insistence 
of Shiratori, the Japanese Executive Director of the World Bank. For many years, the 
Japanese government had been frustrated with the neoclassical economic doctrine and 
free market orthodoxy that had come to dominate the World Bank’s thinking and policy 
recommendations, especially with the revitalisation of neoliberal economic 
fundamentalism in the 1980s (Jomo, 2001c). The World Bank had assumed that a 
standard policy framework for all developing countries. Shiratori had highlighted that 
East Asia’s fast development and structural adjustment was a significant departure from 
the World Bank’s structural adjustment programmes in Latin America, Africa and other 
parts of the world. The Japanese government wanted the World Bank to study and learn 
from the East Asia experience as the eight HPAEs had grown at average rates of over 6% 
since 1965 up until early 1990s (World Bank, 1993; Wade, 1996; Jomo, 2001b) and it 
even offered to fund the East Asian Miracle report. 
Eventually, the Japanese-funded East Asian Miracle report was undertaken and 
concluded that the three NIEs, namely Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand had achieved 
rapid export-led growth via state intervention (Stiglitz, 2001; Keating, 2015). The World 
Bank had recommended that these NIEs were to be models for other developing countries 
with an obvious message that external liberalisation not only meant faster growth but also 
greater equity. However, Jomo et al. (1999) criticised the World Bank’s claims on the 




discrepancies to highlight the inadequacy of Southeast Asia’s economic achievements. 
This was supported by Yoshihara’s (1988) argument that NIEs were described as ersatz 
capitalism due to the weakened and inferior position of their states, their inability to 
establish further technological proficiencies and their inequitable handling of indigenous 
Chinese. 




















1970 1980 1995 1980 1995 1980 1995 
South 
Korea 
9700 10.1 7.7 21 29 27 15 7 45 50 
Malaysia  3890 7.9 5.7 12 21 33 22 13 40 44 
Thailand 2740 7.1 8.4 16 22 29 23 11 48 49 
Indonesia 980 7.2 6.0 10 13 24 24 17 34 41 
Source: World Bank (1997) from Tables 12, 13 and 15, adapted in Jomo (2001a). 
Table 2.1 exhibits the crisis-affected countries, which consist of three NIEs and Korea, a 
Northern Asia HPAE, included for comparison purposes. All four countries have seen 
unprecedented growth and structural revolution in the last few decades–the highest 
growth rates in the world (Jomo, 2001a). During the period, average annual GDP growth 
rates surpassed 6% and manufacturing became the main contributor to growth and exports 
grew annually at double-digit rates between 1980 and 1992 and average per capita income 
increased greatly (Jomo, 2001a).  
However, the Panic of 1997 had completely changed international opinions and sentiment 
towards the East Asia capability, from admiration into harsh condemnation (Jomo, 1998b; 
Wade, 1998a). This was highly evident with respect to the matter of business-state 
relationships, which had formerly been described as fundamental to the East Asian 
miracle. On the contrary, the usually closed business dealings have since been criticised 
as “crony capitalism” accountable as the root as well as the gravity of the Panic of 1997 




have since described the Panic of 1997 as the reaction to global financial liberalisation 
coupled with the readily reversible foreign capital flows. These accounts have also 
highlighted the significance of the IMF in its role of policy instructions and 
conditionalities in worsening the economic situations (Jomo, 2001b).  
The Malaysian government believed that the Panic of 1997 as being a “conspiracy of 
Western hedge funds, Western governments and the IMF to impoverish East Asia” by 
creating the conditions for the crisis (Athukorola, 2001, pp. 6346; Mahathir, 1998). It also 
viewed the Panic of 1997 as being the “result of the Treasury-Wall Street Complex theory, 
whereby the Federal Reserve Bank collaborated with Wall Street” by making cheap credit 
available for hedge funds to invest in East Asia to create a bubble which they could profit 
from by being the first one to ‘sell and run’ (Sivalingam, 2008, p. 2). This viewpoint had 
received some academic credibility from the works of Stiglitz (1998), Bhagwati (1998) 
and Wade and Veneroso (1998).  
2.2 The Globalisation Experience in Southeast Asia 
Balancing the benefits against cost, risk and the possible social hazards of globalisation 
is one of the key challenges to developing nations. Intensified competition that drives 
production shifts in a nation will bring to better resources allocation and better energy 
and productivity. However, the net benefits were not distributed equally because some 
regions or states develop much quicker than others. Globalisation has many merits, but it 
has been a bone of contention on its societal effect, particularly in the dealing with the 
costs and risks.  
Liberalisation of economies to global trade had stimulated rapidly many nations’ progress 
much more than they would have. When a country's economic expansion is pushed by its 
exports, international trade stimulates economic progress. Export led growth was the 
heart of the industrial strategy that enriched many Asian countries and resulted in 
providing millions of people increased better job opportunities. Many communities 
around the world now have better medical facilities which decrease mortality rate and 




depend on which end of the spectrum that it is viewed from. For example, the Western 
society may consider Levi’s low-paying jobs as exploitation, but on the other end, being 
a paid factory worker is a much better choice than cultivating rice on the field for many 
communities (Stiglitz, 2002). 
2.2.1. First Phase: Initial Liberalisation (1970 to mid-1980s) 
The NIEs - Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand were rich in natural resources and were 
agricultural based exporters until the 1970s. They had relied on a few essential 
commodities exports to secure foreign exchange. During the mid-1980s, these countries 
began to industrialise by import substitution and then gradually converting to exporting, 
generally goods that were labour intensive as unskilled labour were economically 
available, whilst continuing with import substitution to protect the domestic market. 
Import substitution was crucial to develop the industries that can source domestic 
consumer products, that gradually progressed into intermediate and capital goods. These 
countries had imposed tariffs on finished products as well as the gradual adoption of non-
tariff barriers. 
However, the barrier that created protective measures on domestic goods had resulted in 
the manufacturing process of goods to be inefficient and expensive. In addition, the 
manufacturing of import substitutes was clustered in urban areas and capital-intensive 
industries did not benefit the majority of the unskilled workforce. Concurrently, all three 
NIEs began promoting export-oriented goods because import substitute goods were 
restricted by a small local market. Furthermore, globalisation had compelled the 
developing nations to engage in foreign trade. The focus was initially on the export of 
manufactured goods, which required largely unskilled labour due to the significant 
competitive advantage.  
Malaysia implemented a moderate import substitution policy much earlier than the other 
Southeast Asia countries, and most of the factories were located on the edge of a major 
urban area in Peninsular Malaysia with proximity to the final market. By 1970, Malaysia 




substitution strategy. Malaysia had focused on industries such as electronics (semi-
conductors) and textiles because of the competitive advantage of cheap labour. The 
government’s primary objective was to attract foreign investors via granting investment 
incentives, tax-breaks and subsidising export credits. In addition, industrial estates and 
free trade zones were created in to encourage foreign companies to set-up manufacturing 
plants in export processing zones such as Penang, Selangor and Melaka (Leinbach, 1982, 
p. 464). 
2.2.2. Second Phase: Rapid Globalisation (1980s onwards) 
The Policy Shift 
The fundamental industrialisation swing in the mid-1980s to the export-oriented goods in 
the NIEs occurred when there was a drastic price drop of their commodity exports. Global 
recession, preceded by the drop in oil prices in 1986, had pushed the NIEs to diversify 
exports and shift to export-oriented industrialisation. Compared to the Northeast Asian 
nations such as Korea and Taiwan, the NIEs were able to prolong their import substitution 
policies further because they could make profit in terms of currency exchange from 
exporting of commodities, though dependence on a limited range of these commodities 
made them susceptible to fluctuations in price and demand (Pangestu, 2001). For Korea 
and Taiwan, the export-oriented goods was reasonable for economic advancement as they 
are not rich in natural resources (Masuyama, Vandenbrink and Yue, 1997). 
The policymakers and business communities in Thailand realised that the political 
transformations in Indochina9 were an opportunity to establish Thailand as a hub for the 
region, specifically in finance. The bigger international investment flows of the 1990s 
coupled with the unrelenting high funding cost from an inefficient local banking segment 
rendered it attractive to draw funds from international capital markets (Blendick, 2007). 
 
9 The three countries of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam represent Indochina, located in Southeast Asia to 




In 1985, Malaysia also saw a contraction of its economy by 1% due to an alarming decline 
of foreign direct investment in addition to a banking crisis (Khan, 2011).  
The role of government has been extremely important in providing social infrastructure 
and services in East Asia. Compared to the Northeast Asian economies, the NIE’s 
industrialisation model, also emphasised education. The World Bank seemed to recognise 
this, but nonetheless it proposed a more moderate role for government in the provision of 
social framework. For example, the World Bank advocates comprehensive and free 
primary education, but did not endorse the subsidisation of education beyond the primary 
level (World Bank, 1993). This would have had very major repercussions in terms of 
human resource improvement if it was compared to East Asia’s actual experience. The 
significance of government support for tertiary education was critical in its human 
resource development. In 1993, for instance, Korea had approximately 48% of its youth 
attending universities, with Thailand close to 20%, Indonesia at 10% and Malaysia at 7% 
(Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, 2000; Jomo, 2001a).   
During the 1950-60s, the growth of global trade led to great prospects for export-led 
expansion and more industrialisation opportunities were created by the 
transnationalisation in manufacturing activities. The establishment of General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had led to a global environment favourable for trade 
development. Although world economic expansion has scaled down since the 1970s, 
global environments have remained encouraging to industrialisation. At the same time, 
the restoration of trade barriers and the improvement of new global economic governance 
had led to less promising circumstances (Jomo, 2001c). The formation of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) has increased transnational corporate control and enforced further 
costs on new industrial development efforts, particularly under the patronages of domestic 
investment. However, prospects still reside within the developing global economic 
setting. After the mid-1980s recessions in the Southeast Asia, economic revivals were 
primarily maintained by better prices for main commodities, currencies marked 





Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
The East Asian Miracle report did not highlight the importance, type, and repercussions 
of FDI in the HPAEs, even though the World Bank had been worried that countries 
continued to be exposed to foreign investment. Controls on FDI have permitted globally 
competitive local manufacturing companies to develop in certain East Asian countries, 
normally with state protection. Such control has also improved the profits and cut down 
the losses to the domestic economy from the manifestation of FDI. As illustrated in Table 
2.2, amongst the HPAEs, the annual averages of FDI as a percentage of gross domestic 
capital formation is wide ranging, as only Singapore and Malaysia have depended 
considerably on FDI. The higher adoption of FDI would likely be an interim feature of a 
relatively initial development phase, when aggregate internal capital, technological 
readiness, and access to external market are limited. For instance, Korea had depended 
on FDI in the early 1970s and gradually reduced its reliance in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Chang, 1996). 
Table 2.2: FDI as % of Gross Domestic Capital Formation in HPAEs, 1991-97  
  
Source: Jomo (2001c Table 12.1) 
The significance of FDI at a specific point in time may also be principally dependent on 
the investment outlook of foreign investors. East Asians’ industrial relocation within the 
region were consistent with the FDI product-cycle as described by the “flying geese” 
theory10. However, the design and rate of industrial reformation in East Asia were not 
 
10 Akamatsu’s “flying geese” model was the development orthodoxy among Japanese economists and 
intellectuals in the early and mid-1990s (Akamatsu 1962). The basic theory is a “follower” country first 
imports a product from a more “advanced” country, then it produces the good for itself, and finally, it 
exports the product to other countries. A follower country ascends the technology ladder sequentially, 
learning to produce goods of increasing value, sophistication, and complexity. In trying to do so, it may 




merely market driven, but influenced by home-host country industrial policies that have 
urged industries to reposition out of the country (Jomo, 2001c). 
Financial liberalisation in Southeast Asia 
The financial liberalisation of the Asian economies occurred throughout the 1990s, urged 
by domestic business leaders as well as supported by the IMF and World Bank. The 
liberalisation of the financial systems included their external capital account, had allowed 
domestic agents to obtain finance on external markets and provided foreign agents entry 
to the national financial market. Consequently, residents have access to foreign bank 
accounts; credit facilities in foreign currencies were made available domestically; resident 
companies were able to borrow abroad; share ownership of national listed companies 
were accessible to foreigners; better accessibility of domestic banking market to foreign 
banks and off-shore financial institutions had access to financing abroad and provided 
credit domestically (Islam, 1998). Hence with liberalisation, governments were able to 
relinquish their function to organise foreign private borrowing. Financial liberalisation 
and easing restrictions on capital account is risky when the domestic banks have 
insufficient global financial markets experience and when private companies also borrow 
overseas (Wolf, 1998a). In Asia, rapid external financial liberalisation with non-regulated 
banks and fixed exchange rates undermined the earlier structure of industrial and banking 
collaboration and leave delicate debt structures unprotected against unbuffered shocks 
(Wade, 1998a). 
In the Southeast Asia region, financial liberalisation had considerable ramifications, 
owing to the external influence of mainly internationally competitive activities in the 
region. Therefore, there were several manifestations of macroeconomic matters which 
had turned up by the mid-1990s from the swift expansion of the preceding decade. Firstly, 
the substantial dependence on FDI and external loans to fund the savings-investment gap, 
when both FDI and foreign loans led to investment revenue flowing out of the country. 
In the 1990s, the current account deficit was progressively funded by short-term capital 
inflows, as in 1993 and 1995, with subsequent dire consequences with the reversal of the 
inflows (Jomo, 2001a). Measures of confidence renewal were taken to promote the 




in the medium to long term. Although it was not in the mainstream in the 1990s, external 
portfolio investments gradually swayed the region’s stock markets. The regional 
existence of these foreign banks was susceptible to herd mentality, caused by insufficient 
information aggravated by restricted transparency. The naturally biased character of fund 
managers’ remuneration and incentives, combined with the short-termism of their 
investing perspectives, had thus caused most intense regional contagion.  
Secondly, in the 1990s there was a surge of debt from the private sector notably from 
abroad, as foreign loan pushers were eager to gain higher profits from the HPAEs. 
Commercial banks’ external loans also rose rapidly as the ratio of loans to GNP grew 
faster during the phase. The current account deteriorated due to the over-investment of 
investible non-tradeable assets, specially from overseas. Only a minor percentage of bank 
loans were extended to manufacturing projects, and with even a smaller proportion of 
foreign loans because most of the debt consisted of collateralised assets such as real 
properties and shares. Thus, considerable inflow of external savings gave to the hike in 
asset price, mainly involving real estate and share prices. Such investments did not build 
up the production of trade products, but they did the opposite by worsening the current 
account deficit, rather than mitigate it. Consequently, they exacerbated the issue of 
“currency mismatch”, with US dollars loans spent in projects not spawning foreign 
exchange, as a significant share of these foreign loans were short term but used to fund 
medium to long-term projects. It was reported by the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) in January 1998 that more than half of the foreign loans by commercial banks were 
short-term with 56% in Malaysia, 66% in Thailand, 59% in Indonesia and 68% in Korea 
(Chang and Velasco, 1998, p. 30).  
Trade Liberalisation and Foreign Investment Policy 
The aim of trade policies was predominantly to eliminate protection in phases, first by 
adjusting the non-tariff barriers to tariff equivalents and then gradually streamlining and 
diminishing them. In addition, exports were reinforced by rationalising customs measures 
and eliminating administrative bottlenecks, as well as removing additional costs on 
imported inputs for affected exporters. The gradual eradication of trade barriers allowed 




Malaysia then launched a vigorous second phase of import substitution by promoting 
heavy industries such as automobiles, steel, and cement industries. Protection was yet 
comparatively strong, but export-oriented industries was strengthened by duty-free 
import inputs for exporters and establishment of export-processing zones. 
The NIEs fought for foreign investment as it was considered to be critical for export 
market access and to gain the laissez-faire for export-oriented industries. The deregulation 
of foreign investment with the lessening of controls as well as increasing incentives for 
foreign investments were to encourage the development of export-oriented industries. 
Deregulation also included permitting nearly complete foreign control in export-oriented 
investments. Malaysia also initiated financial and new incentives for R&D activities. In 
Thailand, the government launched investment opportunities were linked to export-
oriented activities in the provinces (Athukorala, 1998).  
Capital and Financial Sector 
The NIEs undertook the liberalisation of their capital account and financial sector and in 
somewhat distinctive approaches. Indonesia’s capital account was opened since 1969, 
with few restrictions on its reporting requirements, and in the late 1980s, it was also the 
country that went furthest in the liberalisation of its financial sector. While Thailand’s 
prolonged restrictions on the banking sector led to the establishments of non-banking 
financial businesses, which grew to be the central channel of capital inflows (Athukorala, 
2000). In Thailand and Indonesia, these inflows were funnelled through defective systems 
and stimulated growth, but it was growth in non-producing products, essentially real 
property and infrastructure (Abu Bakar, 2000). Whilst Malaysia's issue was expansion of 
internal credit. 
Growth and structural change 
The rapid globalisation among the HPAEs led to high growth of GDP and exports, and 
made these countries become an integral part of the global economy. It also led significant 
structural transformations in GDPs, for instance, in Indonesia, the proportion of the 




For the NIEs and Korea, exports peaked in the first quarter of 1995. However, the 
subsequent collapse was severe and unprecedented. According to a later World Bank 
report (1998, pp. 20–23), growth in export for the HPAEs dropped from 21% in 1995 to 
merely 4% in 1996. Thailand’s exports declined by 1%, while Malaysia’s exports grew 
just over 6% (World Bank, 1997). Only Indonesia had a modest growth of 9% due to the 
appreciation in oil price. The report further analyses that two-thirds of the economic 
slowdown were caused by cyclical factors such as significant decline in global trade, 
depreciation of the Japanese yen, and a large decline in primary export prices. Apart from 
experiencing fast growth, East Asian exports were also shifting significantly from 
agricultural based and unskilled labour-intensive products towards skilled and capital-
intensive products and services (World Bank, 1998). 
In the mid-1980s, the rapid integration of East Asia with the global trade was stimulated 
by the HPAE’s drive to push for their export-oriented industries by establishing more 
locations for manufacturing and export. This factor is also reinforced with the external 
investment drive of firms in Japan and Northern Asian countries like Korea and Taiwan, 
caused by rising costs of production due to currency appreciation, rising wages and labour 
shortages. These investments were mainly meant for export but worked out to support the 
domestic market as well. Other factors such as segregation of process into various 
components and stages of production and the increasing competition from cost effective 
producers such as China had spurred the swing from unskilled labour-intensive exports 
into specialised high-tech exports (World Bank, 1993). Export structures became more 
specialised and were more inter-reliant, consequently exposing these economies to higher 
risks of market recession and surplus capacity as well as contagion (Wade, 1999). 
The improved investment environment and liberalisation of the financial sector drew 
unprecedented foreign investment into NIEs. They grew higher than ten-fold in Indonesia 
in the 1990s, from approximately USD1 billion in 1989 to nearly USD11.5 billion in 1995 
(Pangestu, 2001). Thailand became the primary beneficiary of the fresh FDI, which rose 
15-fold between 1985 to 1990, while other capital flows increased substantially with a 




and other loans started to grow in 1989 and developed into the largest component in the 
capital account (World Bank, 1993). 
The substantial inflows of foreign capital had led to infrastructure development stimuli, 
the comparative price inflation, the hike in asset value and liquidity excess in the financial 
structure. There was also a preference towards non-tradable products such as 
construction, property, and infrastructure. In Malaysia, capital inflows were funnelled via 
the stock market, and financial institution funded the increasing current account deficit 
created by the mounting production of non-tradable commodities utilising imported 
goods (Jomo and Lee, 1999). 
2.3   Malaysia's Globalisation Experience 
Malaysia officially began its industrialisation initiative after its independence in 1957 and 
advanced stage by stage through the path of economic advancement to achieve its goal of 
turning into a 'fully developed' country by 2020. However, globalisation of its economy 
essentially began from 1970 and the momentum increased gradually up until 2007. 
Malaysia approached its economic globalisation very cautiously and selectively and only 
dealing within significant markets in Europe and North America. 
Globalisation is unquestionably a complicated, multidimensional universal experience. 
Mahathir had clearly recognised that it is not only crucial to uncover its integral 
components, but it is imperative to identify that certain ‘flows’ outlined above are 
probably much more beneficial and favourable than others. This insight explained his 
violent condemnation on another crucial component of globalisation: the financial 
markets’ growing influence on global economy. The integration of financial markets is 
perhaps the utmost far-reaching accomplishment in globalisation. The efficiency and 
agility with the flow of capital across state borders make them symbolic of the new global 
order. The narrative of the rise and pervasiveness financial markets influence, 
technological advancement and political vigour played essential roles. The key point to 
emphasise here is the utter size of financial transactions in comparison to domestic 




touched approximately USD2 trillion of capital flow per day (Lietaer, 1997) compared to 
Malaysia's annual GDP of USD98 billion in 1997 (World Bank, 2000). Compounding the 
risk given by such immense capital movements, with up to 97% of capital flows may be 
speculative, exceedingly liquid and very distinctive from the long-term FDI linked with 
the development and shift of real productive activities (Beeson, 2000). Even though the 
causes for the Panic of 1997 were complicated, the majority of Asian countries would 
concur that financial markets played a significant part that was intensified by their sheer 
scale. It is worth indicating that Malaysia's execution of currency controls were given 
noteworthy support from esteemed conventional economists like Paul Krugman 
(Krugman, 1997). 
Traditionally, the financial markets especially within the NIEs were tightly controlled, 
thus protecting them from foreign intervention. The policymakers of the NIES consider 
the opening up of the domestic financial markets to be a risky undertaking. Even though 
this may provide domestic business with the access to bigger and probably cheaper 
funding, it may come at the price of weakened control over the financial system, and 
hence greater vulnerability to the sorts of disruptive financial flows that led to the Panic 
of 1997. Despite the attempts of policymakers in Southeast Asia, the liberalisation of the 
financial market has often occurred, for instance, in Japan, the initial home of the typical 
state-led development, as an effect of a complex combination of internal and foreign 
forces. External pressures particularly coming from the U. S, combined with the changing 
priorities of national corporations and banks, resulted in further liberalisation despite 
opposition from the state government.  
Asian leaders such as Mahathir had considered that the economic liberalisation, 
specifically in the financial segment, to be fundamentally risky to the HPAEs’ economic 
structure. He had depicted it as partly an attack by "the West" created to hold back Asia’s 
economic progress and ensure their subordinate status. Take into account the pace at 
which Asia was advancing, the region turned out to be on its path for global economic 
dominance. The HPAEs were seen as a threat to Western hegemonic powers, whether 




concerns have allowed the chance to push for opening up of their economies and allow 
control by more influential communities.  
The evolution of financial markets is not known solely as part of a broad process of 
secular change motivated by scientific modernisation and economic reorganisation, but 
as a process which distinct internal welfare is being followed. Mahathir understands such 
evolutions as a progression that not only emanated from the West, but which heavily 
supports particular interests there. Furthermore, he believed that the rising influence of 
powerful inter-governmental institutions like the World Bank or the IMF as purely a 
diplomatic feature of globalisation, and that any international intervention would witness 
the weakening of national sovereignty. In summary, the NIEs especially Malaysia were 
witnessing a hegemonic form of neo-colonial political control created to reinforce the 
interest of the West. Undoubtedly, there are few drawbacks with such broad-brush 
interpretations of either "Asia" or "the West." However, in spite of the ambiguity, it is 
essential to recognise that not entirely do Mahathir's perspectives often find a responsive 
Malaysian audience, but they also unearth matters with much wider significance. Before 
examining the allegations and the unique reaction they have spawned in Malaysia, the 
underlying foundation of Mahathir's perspective and his policies must be deliberated in 
further detail. 
2.4 The Impact of Neoliberalism  
Methodically, Malaysia was tightly governed but sanctioned neoliberal measures in 
accordance to regions, developments, and communities. These precursory policies akin 
to neoliberalism were not described as neoliberal policies because they were instituted at 
an earlier time or justified as merely ‘pragmatic’ policies. The government in Malaysia 
was recognized for being exceedingly sympathetic in favour of the Malay business 
community and this was demonstrated via the implementation of the NEP. But the 
government also differentially safeguarded and controlled specific segments of the 




The Malaysian government had encouraged the EOI segment, primarily dominated by 
multi-national companies (MNCs) by giving financial incentives and other form of 
support but had allowed the MNC to be free of any red tapes. However, the government 
did not show any support for the Chinese dominated small medium enterprise (SME) 
segments. It was only much later in the 1980s during Mahathir’s government that the 
SMEs played essential role to Malaysia’s heavy industries development. For instance, the 
government had initiated under its national car project (Proton car), a vendor development 
program.  
During Malaysia’s recession 1985/86, the initiatives under the NEP were put on hold to 
attract more FDIs and domestic capital. Mahathir via the MoF had initiated privatisation, 
cut budget allocations for public organisations, established tighter budgets, and early 
repayment of external debts, policies that had similar characteristics of neoliberalism. 
After the recession, Malaysia’s development continued rapidly, and the government had 
liberalised and privatised public services that had formerly stayed within the government 
control. Public service such as energy production, communications, utility provider, 
healthcare services, and higher education were privatised, and these were typical 
neoliberal course of actions.  
Up until the Panic of 1997, Mahathir’s economic nationalism seemed to be consistent 
with the framework of neoliberalism. Indeed, his neoliberal shift could be rationalised in 
nationalist terms. The neoliberal practices reconciled national and certain group welfares, 
such as the transfer of national assets to Malay capitalists through privatisation and the 
deregulation restored the government’s relationship with local Chinese entrepreneurs 
hindered by bureaucratic boundaries.  
2.5 The Malay Dilemma 
Malaysia's unique multi-ethnic demographic structure had historically defined and 
constrained its social and economic policy as Malaysia's demographic consists of a 
contentious mix of native Malays, a significant Chinese group, and an Indian minority. 




Malay and other ethnic communities were approximately equalised. By 1990, the 
proportion of Malay population was nearing 60%, the Chinese had dropped to about 30%, 
while the Indian to roughly 10%. Although ethnologically based economic sectors and 
politics are less relevant than they previously were, it is crucial to recall that Mahathir’s 
reputation originally grew by his strong opinions expressed in his book, the “Malay 
Dilemma” (Mahathir, 2010)11 verbalising an ethnic reaction to the current social 
condition and that the “new ethnic Malay capitalist class is predominantly a formation of 
the state”. 
Subsequently, the Malaysian administration had pursued defensive economic policies 
with complicated amalgamation of social and economic objectives, intervened by 
Malaysia's ethnically segregated political parties. One of the primary objectives of the 
NEP was to increase the share capital of Malay in businesses by 1990 via the setting-up 
of government trust agencies to acquire shares in favour of the Malay community, with 
the implied aim of reallocating them in the future. Accordingly, public-owned enterprises 
increased considerably during the 70s and early 80s, providing the base for the 
combination of state and corporation gains which is now a trait of the political economy 
in Malaysia. The pursuit to safeguard Malay interests for the benefit of social harmony 
were much linked to the genesis and the propagation ‘crony capitalism’, which has 
brought much widespread critique of Southeast Asia systems of capitalism and industry 
procedures in the aftermath of the Panic of 1997. 
In distinguishing Malaysia’s globalisation experience, it is necessary to establish some 
comparative arguments and emphasise the distinctive political and social conditions 
through which the globalisation have been filtered. Firstly, Malay capitalists are 
effectively a conception of the state, traditional differences between the political and 
commercial affairs are totally irrelevant. The dominance of Malaysia's politico-ethnic 
administration to preserve the ethnic balance via the establishment of an indigenous 
 
11 In The Malay Dilemma, former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad examines and analyses the make-up 
of the Malays and the problem of racial harmony in Malaysia. First published in 1970, the book seeks to 
explain the causes for the 13 May 1969 riots in Kuala Lumpur. It was first published in Singapore in 1970 




capitalist group, had brought Malaysia’s economic landscape to a synthesis of political 
and commercial interests. The ruling party United Malay National Organisation 
(UMNO)12, the primary vehicle of Malay political authority is itself deeply engaged in 
commercial transactions, as UMNO had established ‘mega conglomerate’ of businesses 
and commercial investments which cover most areas of the economy. Accordingly, key 
people in both the government and UMNO have attained substantial financial enrichment 
principally as a direct result of their political affiliations. For instance, Daim Zainuddin 
the director of the NEAC has been a leading beneficiary of Malaysia's affirmative 
discrimination concerning the Malays. Gomez and Jomo (1999) have described how 
Daim’s political relations have granted him to grow widespread business profits and 
considerable personal wealth. Undeniably, they argue that the "ethnic cudgel of Malay 
progression has facilitated influential Malay officials and capitalists with close 
relationships to UMNO” to systematically accumulate vast personal gain (Gomez and 
Jomo, 1999). 
While the abuse of political relationships for personal wealth is scarcely uncommon to 
Malaysia, there are features of the Malaysian example that are peculiar as well as 
conflicting, as compared to the other HPAEs. Malaysia does not simply fit into the usual 
reverent of miraculous Asian tigers descriptions, in which a comparatively autonomous 
bureaucracy is known to have influenced the course of economic development. In 
addition to the fact that the ruling Malaysian government was a powerful actor compared 
to HPAEs like Japan, Mahathir also showed little affinity for the administrative 
procedures and has methodically waned its independence and power. Mahathir has 
revealed to be highly contradictory, yet relevant, opinions of both the market forces and 
bureaucracy. The Prime Minister was eager to capitalise on the potential of market forces 
to revamp inefficient bureaucratic procedures and to an extent certain Malay value. But 
his administration also promoted a structure that would transform Malay values and 
facilitate the Malays into becoming more credible entrepreneurs, be less reliant financial 
support or links with Chinese entrepreneurs. This positive discrimination towards the 
 
12 During Mahathir years, the Malays was a majority ethnic group and was divided by different ideology 




Malays in achieving the goals of the NEP had put pressure on Mahathir and were severely 
criticised against at the international front (Chin, 2000). 
In essence, Mahathir pursued on capitalising on transforming the Malay economy without 
foregoing any authority or supervision. This paradoxical position is evident in Malaysia’s 
political landscape as plenty of the UMNO's request has been achieved from what Crouch 
(1996, p. 37) calls its "patronage-dispensing function". The preservation of UMNO's 
leading political stand is yet conditional on its capability to handle and administer 
economic resources, to some degree which could be jeopardised by the kind of extensive 
transformations that have been recommended, and to some extent carried out. And still 
Malaysia validated that it is feasible to respond to supposedly universal forces in fairly 
idiosyncratic approaches. For instance, the privatisation methods which have developed 
into such a pervasive part of public policy turned into an instrument for the amalgamation 
of political and financial strength for a certain group of predominantly privileged Malay 
elite. As Searle (1994, p. 108) notes, whatever the economic arguments for privatisation, 
the raison d'tre for the program in Malaysia has been primarily political. Alternatively, 
when mediated throughout the filter of Malaysia's highly distinctive ethnic and political 
arrangements, even privatisation, one of the characteristics of globalisation was 
acknowledged to be profoundly distinct from the usual conventional description. 
But it is noteworthy to acknowledge that privatisation strategies were successfully 
realised within the bounds of domestic economic spaces, no matter how hypothetically 
ambiguous and reasonably porous such a notion may be. Apart from privatisation, 
alternative processes more immediately linked with globalisation have brought even 
bigger challenges for other world leaders. However, for smaller countries like Malaysia, 
the distinct character of the Malay leadership's response rendered it remarkable and shed 
light on the boundaries of domestic sovereignty in the present-day global political 
economy.  
A couple of additional reasons also deserve emphasis. Firstly, the “Malaysian economy 
is highly liberalised by global standards”, and had become progressively more so. 




1998, an increase from 105% as reported in 1988” (BNM, 1999c). This means that 
Malaysian policymakers are highly reliant on controlling access to the broader global 
economy. Moreover, not simply has Malaysia's coverage to the global market system 
considerably increased, but the kinds of products that Malaysia trades with the world have 
also improved. Next, there has been a profound secular shift in the architecture of 
Malaysia's economy: manufacturing had flourished to more than 33% of GDP by the mid 
1990s, up from less than 7% at the time of independence in 1957 (Jomo et al., 1999, p. 
89). It has been this growth of the manufacturing sector, coupled with the corresponding 
decrease in the agriculture sector, that has strengthened the GDP growth rates and the 
increasing standards of living that have been linked with HPAEs industrialisation. 
Essentially, it has been strictly the plan of "substantive performance and material benefits 
that has underpinned the validity of, and prominent backing for, recent Malaysian 
governments” (Case, 2010). In an atmosphere in which states appear powerless to give 
on such a guarantee and appear vulnerable to shield society from foreign provocation, the 
security of governmental rule is unavoidably emasculated. 
The possibility for commercial issues to spread out into the “political sphere was 
apparently manifested in the overthrow of Mahathir’s deputy, Anwar Ibrahim” who was 
also the Finance Minister then (Case, 1999). There is no purpose here to analyse that 
matter in detail other than to remark that the Panic of 1997 aggravated existing leadership 
pressures, and that foreign agencies such as the IMF sought to persuade “Malaysian 
domestic politics in favour of Anwar, who was regarded to be an advocate of the market-
friendly policies the IMF” was seeking to restore throughout the crisis-affected region 
(Calomiris, 1998). This national and foreign political tussle makes any objective review 
of Malaysia's responses to the situation exceptionally challenging. More fundamentally, 
in the Malaysian case the experience helps to prompt us just how closely related politics 
and economics were. Nevertheless, a review of Malaysia's response to the Panic of 1997 
in specific and to globalisation in general, are of significance as they highlight various 




2.6 Mahathir and Middle Power  
Malaysia only truly entered the international scene in July 1981 when Mahathir was 
appointed to office as Malaysia’s fourth Prime Minister. The introduction of this strong 
charismatic leader who aspired to witness this Southeast Asia country accomplish greater 
sovereignty and reach its rightful position on the world arena, corresponded with the 
evolution of a global and national setting favourable to a country undertaking initiatives 
on the international arena (Hilley, 2001).  
As the head of state, Mahathir immediately saw the political prospect of profit from the 
Division of the North–South preferably than the Eastern-Western divide, so he pushed 
for the establishment of a South-South Commission in 1986 (Dhillon, 2009). When the 
Cold War ended, it allowed middle dominions to eventually have a voice without 
considering choosing sides between the two superpowers. In the pursuit for a 
contemporary position in the era after the Cold War, Mahathir also sought to revitalise 
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as an avenue to fault a world order regarded as 
unjust. In 1992, he blamed the North accountable for international environmental 
problems at the Earth Summit in Rio. His candid viewpoints had caught international 
attention and the Far Eastern Economic Review had regarded Mahathir as the ‘new voice 
of the Third World’ (Saravanamuttu, 2010, p. 116).  
Malaysia, being economically independent, was no longer considered the state of the 
former British colony. Any development support fund previously received is replaced by 
FDIs. However, regardless of his requests for a new global order, Mahathir realised that 
Malaysia had limited influence over the regional development or politics. He was aware 
that Malaysia could not exercise more control than the de facto dominance of Indonesia 
within ASEAN13, owing to the scope of its large province and vast population. This 
 
13 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, “was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, 
Thailand, with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) by the Founding Fathers of 
ASEAN, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam then joined 
on 7 January 1984, Viet Nam on 28 July 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 





motivated him to favour either a more focused or dedicated global organisation in 
promoting the country’s international evolution. The Organisation of the Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) presented an alternative venue for Mahathir’s objectives where 
Malaysia could present as an example of an industrialised Muslim nation.  
Nonetheless, from the 1980s in Malaysia’s domestic political landscape, Mahathir faced 
heightened opposition from Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS or the Malaysia Islamic Party). 
PAS had jumped into the opposition coalition after the collapse of its short-lived 
participation of the governing coalition between 1974 until 1978 (Yasin, 1994). The 
reinforcement of the strategic affiliations with the Islamic world was also intended to 
secure the Muslim Malay constituency. Similarly, additional support was gained via his 
outspoken solidarity for the Palestinian cause, an exemplary international affair for the 
mainstream Muslim Malays. On the other hand, this constraint associated to awareness 
of the Malay constituency ran in correspondence to the increasing resentment of ethnic 
minorities. Mahathir’s Look East Policy, along with the significance placed on 
Malaysia’s heterogenous identity with the slogan ‘Malaysia, Truly Asia’, granted its dual 
purpose while also leading to domestic economic progress by branching out Malaysia’s 
economic alliances (Muhamad, 2008).  
Mahathir’s administrative era was manifested by fluctuations between controversial 
outbursts and political pragmatism. At the pinnacle of his anti-American remonstrations, 
Mahathir still continued the strategic collaboration with the USA and commercial 
associations with the West. Though Malaysia remained as a member of the 
Commonwealth, Mahathir launched the ‘Buy British Last’ drive, encouraging Malaysian 
to buy Malaysian products and boycotting products from the UK. Mahathir’s pragmatic 
characteristic despite his vehement stance against the West enabled Malaysia to retain an 
acceptable level of global integration. Mahathir acknowledged that Malaysia’s progress 
depends on its successful assimilation into the global market and consequently, Malaysia 
joined the WTO in 1995. However, Mahathir’s provocative statements, his anti-semantic 






provoking consequences on its socio-economic development. While Malaysia’s status 
within NAM and OIC improved, Mahathir’s image worsened gradually in the Western 
states.  
On the international front, pressure multiplied with its closest neighbour and former 
federation member, Singapore. For the first time they retorted on the diplomatic facade 
in 1986 when the Malaysian government deemed the visit of Israeli President Herzog to 
Singapore as an insult to its anti-Israeli stance, while the Island republic saw it as an 
excuse to affirm its sovereignty from its neighbour. The pressure concluded with the 
termination of military collaboration after the revelation of an espionage scheme in 1989 
(Acharya, 2007, p. 23). Nonetheless, confrontational situations have resurface from time 
to time around conflicts over specific issues such as the water supply which Malaysia 
contractually sells at an absurdly cut-price rate to Singapore, territorial disputes about 
jurisdiction over the atolls in the Straits of Johor, or the position of the Malaysian-
Singaporean boundaries (Smith, 2004).  
Despite these many arguments, several bases of Malaysia’s diplomatic savoir faire were 
established or strengthened during the Mahathir administration, for instance, the 
broadening of the country’s global collaborations, South–South cooperation and solid 
relationships with other Asian countries and the Islamic nations (Masuyama, 
Vandenbrink and Yue, 1997). Mahathir’s vehement ambition for autonomy, signified by 
his defiance to accede to IMF’s restrictive offered during the Panic of 1997, positioned 
Malaysia on the international chart and granted it the recognition of being a middle power. 
2.7 Debating the IMF response 
There were voluminous academic discourses on the IMF response during the Panic of 
1997 but the works of Wade and Jomo are most relevant to this thesis to provide a good 
understanding of the Panic of 1997 from scholars of the “West and East.” Being a 
Malaysian and an economist at the UN, Jomo had the advantage of domestic knowledge 
of the political and economic issues in Malaysia and its neighbours. However, Jomo is 
more critical than Wade in his criticism of Malaysia’s policy responses, possibly from the 




benefited the ruling elite party. According to their assessment, both scholars criticise 
IMF’s diagnosis or rather misdiagnosis of the Asian situation and agreed to a certain 
extent made the situation worse than it should be, turning a currency crisis to a real 
economic crisis. Rather than strengthening its role in the Asian region, IMF had lost its 
credibility and the Panic of 1997 became a crisis of IMF legitimacy.   
Wade (1998a) had candidly labelled ‘Miracle Asia’ to ‘Cronyism Asia’ as a gestalt shift 
in the world view of Asia, and more importantly the minds of capital owners. The gestalt 
shift was not just detrimental to Asia but set off a cycle of adverse events in other 
countries. This was due to commodity prices dropping to their lowest level, making it 
hard to maintain economic growth and promote public spending. Commodity producers 
from the emerging markets especially the Asian producers are experiencing downward 
pressures on their currency against the US dollar. Wade discusses the dichotomy of real 
and financial causes of the Asian financial turmoil and outlines the recovery strategy from 
the Panic of 1997. It employs the interpretative account of the different world views based 
on the rationality and non-rationality of the markets. Wade further outlines the scale of 
the Crisis and likened it to the Great Depression of 1930s.  
Wade (1998a) suggests that the Panic of 1997 was caused by a sudden withdrawal of 
funds by investors, evident by the swing within one year of USD105 billion, with 
substantial outflow in the last quarter of 1997. The outflow based on a percentage to the 
combined GDP was even worse than Latin America’s experience in the1980s. However, 
in contrast to Latin America, the large majority of the Asian household are net savers i.e. 
high domestic saving allowed the investment to be financed domestically. He further 
indicates that the IMF and the World Bank had encouraged the Asian governments to 
liberalise their financial sectors and opening of the capital account. Wade (1998a) points 
out that it was dangerous as the local banks have limited international experience and 
high debt-equity ratio corporate sectors. 
Prior to the Crisis, capital inflow grew extraordinarily into Asia, driven by both the need 
to accommodate access investment over savings and the opportunity for foreign investors 
to get higher returns as well as the image of ‘miracle’ Asia. Excessive capital inflows 
combined with cheap foreign debts had resulted in the appreciation of the domestic assets. 




speculative ventures such as property and land. Consequently, productivity and profits 
began to suffer. There was a massive accumulation of currency mismatch as borrowers 
receive returns in local currency and paid debts in foreign currency.  
Mahathir had suggested that it would make more sense for the governments of the 
affected countries to apply their own economic policies without the interference of the 
extravagant country analyst and fund managers from Wall Street or the City. It is in the 
governments’ interest to maximise returns on labour, technical progress and provide 
public goods that contribute to development rather than just maximising returns on 
capital. Jomo (1998) highlights that IMF agreed that the attack from currency speculators 
played a role in the downfall of the Thai baht but denies this for the collapse of other 
currencies. However, Jomo debated that currency speculation in isolation may have not 
brought down the other currencies, but the contagion effect unquestionably did. Foreign 
portfolio investors panicked and made anxious decisions to withdraw investments, which 
quickly escalated into massive capital flight (Jomo, 2006).  
Wade and Veneroso (1998) provide an overview of the capital control approach that was 
adopted by the Malaysian government. This article analyses the support for capital control 
approach that was undertaken by the countries affected by the Crisis, in particular in the 
emerging markets. Wade (1998b) initially highlights the detrimental impact of the Panic 
of 1997, which eventually affected the rest of the world, one way or another. The Crisis 
had widened the gap in social deficit as spending on social welfare were cut in emerging 
countries, withdrawal of funds from Latin America, and the collapse of commodities 
prices. 
The IMF’s monopoly of the situation in the Panic of 1997 and the poor coordination of 
the World Bank and Asian Development Bank was highly criticised. This argument was 
further backed by the unsuccessful bid of Japan’s USD100 billion Asia Monetary Fund, 
shot down by the US Treasury, which did not want any competitor to the IMF outside its 
jurisdiction. IMF’s two-prong strategy was to promote the idea that the Crisis represent 
punishment to Asia for the government’s mismanagement and to mobilise its ‘policy 
reforms’ to the affected government in exchange for funds (Wade, 1998a). It supported 
the argument that IMF’s strategy was criticised from across the political spectrum as it 




region. Wade (1998c) further demonstrates that China escaped the direct impact of the 
Crisis because its currency was non convertible, hence stopping the inflows and outflows 
of hot money but without discouraging FDI. This analysis is important to this thesis as it 
highlights the reasons for Malaysia’s enforcement on currency control based on China’s 
model. Western financiers criticised Malaysia to the point of stating that Malaysia is 
uninvestable, despite Malaysia having the highest saving rates in world. Wade (1998b) 
concludes that capital controls are needed to make the economies less vulnerable to the 
vagaries of the portfolio managers and to restore growth. A new political landscape is 
emerging as East Asia nations will not simply accept further urge to liberalise capital. 
Wade (1998b) emphasises that the East Asians have more savings to be used productively 
and not depend on the capital injection from Wall Street.  
Table 2.3:  Percentage Change in GDP in East Asia, 1996–2001 
Region 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000a 2001b 
NIEs       
Indonesia 8.0 4.5 -13.7 0.5 3.0 5.0 
Malaysia 8.6 7.5 -7.5 5.4 6.0 6.1 
Thailand 5.5 -1.3 -10.0 4.0 5.0 5.5 
Philippines (not defined as NIEs under the 
World Bank report) 
5.8 5.2 -0.5 3.2 4.0 4.8 
Transition economies       
China 9.6 8.8 7.8 7.1 7.0 7.2 
Vietnam 9.3 8.2 5.8 4.7 4.6 4.5 
Small economies       
Cambodia 7.0 1.0 1.0 4.0 5.5 6.0 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 6.8 6.9 4.0 4.0 4.5 5.0 
Papua New Guinea 3.5 -4.6 2.5 3.9 4.7 4.5 
Fiji 3.4 -1.8 -1.3 7.8 3.5 3.0 
Mongolia 2.4 4.0 3.5 3.3 4.3 4.5 
Solomon Islands 0.6 -0.5 -7.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 
North Asia HPAEs       
Korea 6.8 5.0 -5.8 10.2 6.0 6.1 
Hong Kong, China 4.5 5.3 -5.1 2.0 5.2 4.4 
Singapore 7.6 8.4 0.4 5.4 5.7 5.8 
Taiwan, China 5.7 6.8 4.8 5.5 6.5 6.1 






1996 1997 1998 1999 2000a 2001b 
Japan 5.0 1.6 -2.5 0.3 0.9 1.6 
United States 3.7 4.5 4.3 4.1 4.3  n/a  
Source: Stiglitz and Yusof (2001) 
Stiglitz and Yusof (2001, p. 4) debated that “the economies of East Asia growing by close 
to 6 percent in year 2000, after attaining a growth rate of 4.1 percent in 1999 (Table 2.3), 
is there any need to rethink the East Asian miracle?” They further questioned if a year of 
low growth in 1998 during the Panic of 1997 be treated “as an inevitable bump on the 
road to globalization.”  
2.8 Globalisation to the Ummah 
Globalisation to the Muslim communities or the Ummah had caused a lot of concern 
based on the majority perception that it would continuously serve as a tool to manifest 
the process of ‘Westernisation’ of Muslim communities. Westernisation is described as 
the supremacy over the international political economy via international establishments 
such as the IMF and World Bank. Nonetheless, the multi-facets of globalisation as 
hypothetically highlighted by many scholars is that the monetary attribute holds 
dominance in any globalisation discourse. In this situation, Muslim states have 
questionably been on the losing ground for many generations. Muslims have had hostile 
experiences with earlier stages of globalisation linked with colonialisation and the 
subsequent injustice felt under the controls of Western forces. This injustice is heightened 
by the vast vacuum between the wealthy West and the oppressed Ummah. Many secular-
based studies have attributed the present Islamic revolution to this glaring inequality in 
material affluence, provoking resentment and dissatisfaction among unsatisfied urban 
Muslim adolescence (Amin, 2012; Achmad and Hamzani, 2016). Some of them have 
quoted statistics from Arab Human Development Report presented by Middle East social 
analysts for the United Nations to justify their opinion (Friedman, 2006; Singer, 2006). 
The Muslim scholars or Ulama have persevered to present justifications for the endless 
regression of the Ummah, who were accustomed with the condition that secular 
accomplishments were alongside with and emblematic of Islam’s divine faith (Camroux, 




doctrine of Islamic values, releasing a distinctive but corresponding path of globalisation 
highlighting Islam’s universal principles. As the debate continues, with the pervasiveness 
of transnational economic structures indicating the effective outcome of the nation’s 
globalisation efforts, the nature of Islamic harmony recommends Muslims the finest 
interface in their essential confrontation with an externally inflicted predicament of a 






The concept of the Islamic state is a dynamic global notion among Muslims. As a whole, 
Malaysia’s political Islam had prevailed over alternative political beliefs. At the 
conceptual level, Southeast Asian Islam has the potential to govern with the diverse 
concepts that are presently globalised. Islam bears the inner abilities to maintain an 
effective reaction to such perceptions as democracy, human rights including women’s 
rights, civil society and free trade (Bakar, 2010).  
The concept of globalisation is not a concern for the Ummah as Islam is pro-globalisation. 
From the Islamic perspective of Southeast Asia Muslims, the principle of trade and 
business transaction should be just and fair, however the prevailing phenomena of global 
trade displays numerous unjust elements, especially the rapid growth of financialisation. 
Even the controversial Mahathir, despite his anti-West rhetoric, is not anti globalisation. 
He is merely against what he and many Muslims recognised as the exploitations and 
transgressions in the current practice of globalisation principally in the financial markets. 
The ultimate goal of an Islamic nation is the provision of universal goods for all people, 
not just what is known to be beneficial by one or two states. The Islamic viewpoint as 
interpreted from the Quran and Hadith, the nature of independent commerce in relation 
to globalisation and distribution of wealth, “wealth should not only circulate between the 
rich amongst you” (Quran, 59:7) and “Only a sinner hoards”, a Hadith narrated by a 
Muslim (Drew, 2018). 
Mahathir’s depiction of “Islam cannot be described as merely the response to a stout 
challenge from oppositional Islamist”; and that the Malaysian state perhaps “didn’t so 
much co-opt Islamists as it became Islamist.” (Liow, 2009, p. 12). Whether or not 
Mahathir truly believed in or was “in any sense genuine about this representation is 
difficult to establish” and one can “merely identify core themes in his articulation of 






CHAPTER 3: ISLAMISATION IN MALAYSIA 
“UMNO would like to state outright that Malaysia is an Islamic state. 
This opinion is based on the opinions of many ulama’ in the past who 
have explained what Islamic state is.” 
Mahathir Mohamad (2001) 
“When it is properly understood, and its true precepts are followed, it 
offers a path to enlightenment, to harmony, to stable and responsible 
government, to progress and to prosperity. Malaysia is an Islamic state. 
At the same time, and without contradiction, it is democratic, diverse, 
tolerant, peaceful, economically and politically stable, progressive and 
forward-looking. There is no inherent conflict between Islam and any 
of these achievements. In fact, we believe that the way we adhere to the 
essential or fundamental teachings and practice of Islam in Malaysia 
has contributed to our success as a nation.” 14 
Mahathir Mohamad (2002) 
 
3. Introduction 
This chapter explains the essential background of the underlying Islamic principles and 
the extent of its relevance in Malaysia’s policy-making process. Muslims believe Islam 
advocates the guiding principles and lays down a set of rules for all facets of human life, 
including the economic aspect. How and to what extent would an economic and financial 
system constructed in compliance with the Islamic principles be diverse from a modern, 
conventional system?  
 
14 Martinez (2001) argued that the “issue of the Islamic state has been at the forefront of Malaysian public 
discourse, but even more so since the announcement by Mahathir that Malaysia was already an Islamic 
state. The issue has evoked consternation and debate that is not reflected in the mainstream media, and 





Efforts to explain the Islamic economic and financial principles and rules in modern 
analytical terms were only made in the past few decades. Iqbal and Mirakhor (2011)15 had 
stated that despite considerable published research, there is still some misconception 
pertaining to the application of a precise definition to various social sciences prefixed with 
the word “Islamic”, such as Islamic finance or Islamic economics. One of the key causes 
for confusion is the inclination to perceive various aspects of such a system in isolation, 
without considering it in its entirety.  
The first half of the chapter examines the ideological underpinnings in devising the social, 
economic and financial system based on the tenets of Islam and its challenges. It will then 
analyse the legislative framework that governs the Islamic finance system in Malaysia that 
differentiates it from conventional banking and finance. This analysis is vital in 
understanding the significance of the divine law to the general Muslim in Malaysia. Given 
that the most distinctive feature of Islamic finance is the restriction on interest, it is 
necessary to give special attention to the analysis of this prohibition. The prohibition of 
interest or usury (Riba) is the ethical core of Islamic banking and not presented with any 
regulation based on human intelligence, but divine wisdom based on Islamic law, better 
known as Shariah. Riba is a term literally meaning “an excess” and interpreted as “any 
unjustifiable increase of capital whether relating to loans or sales”. More precisely, any 
positive, fixed, predetermined rate tied to the maturity and the amount of the principal (i.e. 
guaranteed regardless of the performance of the investment) is considered Riba and is 
prohibited (Abdi, 2011). 
The second half of this chapter gives the narrative on the history and early development 
of Islamic finance in Malaysia. It explains how the bloodshed caused by the ethnic riots 
in 1969 had enthused the need for an affirmative policy to alleviate the economic gap 
between the financially challenged Muslim Malay majorities and the wealthier Chinese 
 
15 Iqbal headed World Bank’s Global Islamic Finance Development Center in Istanbul, with earlier 
assignments in the World Bank Treasury and the Finance and Markets Global Practice. Mirakhor was the 
Executive Director of the IMF from 1990 until his retirement in 2008. Both of them had authored many 




minorities16. The affirmative policy known as the NEP had laid out the groundwork for 
Mahathir’s Islamisation policy during the 1980s17. It further analyses the different phases 
of the development in Islamic finance, which will provide the crucial background in 
analysing the findings of this research (chapters 5 and 6).  
Malaysia’s Islamic banking milestone is described from the humble beginnings of a mere 
savings corporation for pilgrimage fund, that eventually transformed into a significant 
national investment corporation. It then focuses on the Mahathir administration18 and the 
approach that he took in implementing the Islamisation policy. The series of events that 
took place, i.e. the establishment of NEP, the Islamic insurgence among the Muslim 
community and Mahathir’s pro-Islamic approach in his administration had provided 
Malaysia with a firm foundation to grow into an Islamic finance hub in the region. 
Malaysia also became the first country to implement a dual banking system, where Islamic 
banking system operates in parallel with the conventional banking system (Ahmad 
Mokhtar, Abdullah and Alhabshi, 2008). 
3.1 The Quran  
Muslims believe that the Quran is the eternal words of God (Allah), containing revelations 
received by the Prophet Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص via the angel Gabriel (Jibreel). The strong belief 
for Muslims in the divinity of the Quran was due to the eloquence of its language, the 
scientific facts it unravels  (Bucaille, 2003) and the depth in its meaning (Pickthall, 1930). 
Muslims believe that all the prophets mentioned in the Holy books of Judaism and 
Christianity are messengers of God and that Prophet Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص is the last messenger, 
with the Quran as the final guidance to all humankind to follow the correct path. The 
fundamental notion of Islamic finance is as old as Islam itself. Makkah, where Islam 
 
16 In 1970, Peninsular Malaysia had a population of 8.8million people, with 53% Malays, 36% Chinese, 
11% Indian and less that 1% of other races (Department of Statistics, Malaysia, 1972 as cited in (Hirschman 
and Suan-Pow, 1979)).  
17 The NEP will be analysed in detail in Chapter 4 as it formed a crucial reason for Malaysia’s policy 
decisions. 
18 Mahathir was the fourth Prime Minister after Malaysia reached its independence in 1957 and the Prime 




originated in the 7th century was at the commercial crossroads of precious metal and spice 
market. Prophet Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص was a merchant and a caravan trader before he was 
commissioned as the Messenger. 
3.2 Prophet Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص and early Islamic Economy 
The revelation of the Quran to the Prophet Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص took place in the midst of two 
trade cities of Makkah and Madinah, which had previously prospered through both local 
and international commerce. At that time, the financial needs of the merchants were 
mainly met via a framework of interest-based loans. After the evolution of Islam, there 
was an significant transformation in the financial system of these cities after the revelation 
of the Quranic verses that prohibit the dealing in usury/interest, the utilisation of certain 
goods and the rules of trade. These revelations had laid the groundwork of Islamic finance 
transactions. These principles were practiced effectively in the two cities and spread to 
other parts of the world for centuries. Baitulmal which was the central Islamic treasury 
intended for the benefit of the poor and needy in Prophet Muhammad’s ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص government 
indicated that the development of the Islamic financial system was established during that 
era. The Prophet Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص had the Madinah mosque to operate as the treasury but 
Sayiddina Omar, the second caliph, set up and managed Baitulmal as a separate entity.  
Apart from the establishment of the Baitulmal, “historical evidence confirms the 
existence of Islamic financial transactions via the bill of exchange and cheques in the 
early days of Islam. For example, Ibn Abbas19 received the silver dirhams and sent an 
acknowledgement to Kufa, a city in Iraq” (Nuhu Tahir, 2016). Similarly, “Abdallah Ibn 
Az Zubair20 received cash in Makkah and wrote to his brother in Iraq who repaid the 
depositors when they arrived in Iraq” (Abdi, 2011). This is a brief account of simple 
Islamic financial transactions during the early era of Islam between the years 650 A.D to 
750 A.D. The history and background of the Prophets, especially the Prophet Muhammad 
 are crucial elements in following his Sunnah 21. It is because Muslims believe that Islam ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص
 
19 Ibn Abbas is Prophet Mohammad’s ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص cousin and close companion. He is also an Islamic scholar. 
20 Abdallah Ibn Az Zubair is a close companion of Prophet Mohammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص and a caliph during the Umaiyyad 
reign between 680 and 692. 
21 The Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص is the second fundamental source of Islamic law. It embodies 




is not just a religion but a holistic faith and is governed by the divine law from Allah. The 
understanding of Shariah was initially direct from the knowledge of the Quran and 
Sunnah, then the knowledge was imparted authoritatively to later generations via the 
system of Fiqh which had been analysed in detail and is ultimately based on the reliable 
Ijma and Qiyas (consensus and analogy) (Imamuddin, 1991). All entities in the financial 
system must function in conformity with Shariah and decisions cannot be profit-oriented 
on an entity’s interest alone. However, Islam encourages trade and does not restrict profit-
making so long as it is not against the best interest of the community (Maslahah). The 
overarching concept of Shariah is based on the believe that men are appointed as Khalifah 
and do not have absolute ownership of their properties but act as custodians. 
3.3 Understanding the “Islamic Economy” 
Muslims believe that Islam is a religion that applies to all facets of one’s existence, and 
it holds a high value to the admission of just and fair to all individuals. An Islamic 
Economy’s key attribute is the intention to produce a just, true, good and harmonised 
community as seen by Islamic ethical sense. Shariah affirms that Islamic dealings must 
be managed and built on ethical models and social duties, and further must be prepared 
on Shariah’s moral groundwork (Grassa, 2013). The teachings in Islam have been broadly 
described and support all the conventions behind corporate governance, by underlining 
the importance of qualities, integrities, and ethics for the benefit of a community ‘‘Each 
one of you is a guardian, and each guardian is answerable to all under his care’’22. Shariah 
is an Arabic word that means a waterway that leads to the main river or a road to the right 
path. For a Muslim, it is the principal guidance and the way of life, filled with intent and 
just as prescribed by God through the Quran and Sunnah, and extends to every aspect of 
daily life including commercial and financial undertakings. 
 
conduct and his attitudes whether explicit or implicit. Every aspect of his life and conduct has been reported 
in a vast collection of Hadiths and every Muslim believes in the Sunnah of the Prophet, in addition to the 
Quran (Mackeen, 1984). 




3.4 Sources of Shariah 
The Quran and the Sunnah are the primary sources of Shariah. They are thought to contain 
God’s infallible and immutable will, or Shariah in a narrow sense. However, the Quran 
and the Sunnah are silent on certain contemporary issues. It was Imam al-Shafii in the 
early ninth century (the founder of Shafii school of law, see below) who “authoritatively 
insisted on human reason as the final judgement on matters not regulated by the Quran” 
(Hallaq, 1997, p. 21). Imam al-Shafii stated that there are two secondary sources of law: 
ijma, or consensus, and qiyas, or analogy. Together with the primary sources, there are 
the other principals of Usul al-Fiqh or Fundamentals of Jurisprudence (Figure 3.1 and 
3.2). 
Figure 3.1: The Sources and Techniques of Shariah  
Primary Sources 
The Quran (the book containing the message of Islam). Muslims believe that it is the 
word of God as conveyed to the Prophet Mohammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص. 
Sunnah (collection of the words or acts of the Prophet or the Hadith which Prophet 




Secondary Sources & Techniques 
✓ ijma (consensus) 
✓ qiyas (analogy) 
✓ istihsan (juristic preference) 
✓ istislah/maslahah (public interest) 












Ijma   
(consensus) 
It means the educated consensus of Ulama (learned Muslim scholars), on the 
application of Shariah to worldly affairs. In Islamic finance, this is crucial as 
models and products of Islamic banking are not discussed in either the Quran 
or in the Hadith, the primary sources which govern the system. 
Consequently, the evolution of Islamic banking has been based to a 
substantial degree on the consensus of modern Muslim scholars and 
jurisprudence at both national and global levels. Hence agreements formed 
were based on ijma, i.e. the joint consensus of the Ulama.  
Qiyas    
(analogy) 
Analogical deduction i.e. additional sources of law are qiyas (analogy from 




Ijtihad (from the root jahd, meaning “struggle”) plays a critical role in 
deriving rules for resolving issues arising from time-dependent challenges. 
Ijtihad refers to the efforts of individual Ulama and scholars to find solutions 
to problems that arise in the course of the evolution of human societies and 
that are not addressed specifically in the primary sources. Ijtihad is based on 
the earlier consensus of Ijma’, Qiyas, Istihsan, Maslahah and customs (Urf). 
Secondary sources of the  Shariah must not introduce any rules that are in 
conflict with the main tenets of Islam (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007, p. 8) 
Istihsan   
(juristic 
preference) 
It points to exceptions that a jurist can make to a strict or literal legal 
interpretation (Yavuz and Esposito, 2003)). Istihsan can be applied to Qiyas, 




Literally means ‘seeking the good’ (Ramadan, 2003), or taking the public 
interest, Maslahah into account. However, some Ulama have differed over 
the scope of Istihsan or Maslahah as a source of law. 
Source: Hassan and Lewis (2007) and author’s research 
3.4.1. Schools of Islamic jurisprudence 
The English term “Islamic Law” masks a vital difference between Shariah (divine law) 
and Usul al-Fiqh (the human apprehension of that law) as Fiqh can be slightly inaccurate, 
diverse, vague, and evolving. The norm is that Fiqh rulings have ambiguities and only 
probable assumptions as to what God’s law actually is and consequently certain doctrine 




Classical Islam had no ecclesiastical hierarchy nor a central authority to publicise official 
doctrine as compared to Christianity (Abdi, 2011). The closest to priesthood in Islam are 
the jurists known as the Ulama, who to some extent differ in their functions and degree. 
Islam is divided into two main sectarian divisions that separate Sunni and Shiite believers, 
which arose in 661 AD on the question of the rightful leadership of the community. 
Shi’ism, which has various sub-sects, is predominantly in Iran, and has a significant 
number of followers in Iraq, India and many of the Gulf States. However, the majority of 
Muslims are from the Sunni believers (85%) and the Sunni legal doctrine has four main 
schools of thought or Mazhabs, each with its own ideological system and applications of 
law, but acknowledges the validity of each other’s judgements. The four orthodox schools 
of thoughts (Mazhabs) are: 
Mazhabs Founder or Imam Key characteristics Geographical 
location 
Hanafi Imam Abu Hanifa, 
a Persian who 
taught in Iraq and 
died in 767. The 
earliest of all four 
schools. 
The most flexible of the four Mazhabs, 
emphasising private interpretation 
(Ray’), Istihsan, and Qiyas. Ijma is also 
accepted. 
India and the 
Middle East. 
Maliki Imam Malik ibn 
Anas, died in 795 
in Madinah. 
The Maliki school accorded preference 
to Qiyas over weak Hadith23 (Al-
Mukhtar Al Salami, 1999, p. 22). The 
Malikis firmly rely on both the Hadith 
and on Ijma of the Ulama of Madinah. 
Mostly in North, 
West and Central 
Africa. 
Shafii Mohammad ibn 
Idris al Shafii 
(Imam Shafii), an 
Arab who died in 
819 or 820 in 
Egypt and was a 
pupil of Imam 
Malik. 
Imam Shafii is considered being the 
most distinguished of all imams as he 
was recognised for his modernisation 
and balanced judgment. He refused to 
accept any independent reasoning i.e. 
the personal opinion of scholars 
(Ijtihad bil al-ray), Istihsan and 




Yemen, Egypt and 
Somalia. 
 
Hambali Disciples of 
Ahmad ibn Hanbal 
(Imam Ahmad), 
The Hambali base themselves 
exclusively on the Quran and the 








Mazhabs Founder or Imam Key characteristics Geographical 
location 
who died in 855 in 
Baghdad. 
accepted is the consensus of the 
Companions of the Prophet, among 
whom the rightly guided Caliphs. 
Source: Hassan and Lewis (Hassan and Lewis, 2007) 
3.4.2. Relevant principles from the Quran and Hadith 
Muslims strongly believe on the concept of being accountable for your own actions in 
this life and this belief has strong implications on how corporate governance is observed, 
notably in financial services. The Islamic financial industry’s primary challenge was the 
transforming of traditional financial products into Shariah compliant clones, especially 
matters relating to the ban on usury or ‘‘Riba’’. There has also been an inclination to 
integrate corporate governance principles as Shariah provisions, and to the guidance of 
the Quran and Sunnah. The AAOIFI24 and IFSB25 have intervened and published 
corporate governance guidelines for Islamic financial institutions (Magalhães and Al-
Saad, 2013).  
The term Islamic economics relates to the science and study of the rules and regulations 
of the Shariah in the procurement and removal of resources in bringing gratification to 
individuals and facilitate them to carry out their duties and responsibilities to Allah and 
the Ummah. Islam assumes a unique nexus of contracts among the Creator, man and 
society on the basis of the divine law that directly affects the workings of the various 
social, political, economic and financial systems (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011). Therefore, 
in understanding the way that an economic system be structured under the Islamic 
principles, it is necessary to appreciate the nature of this relationship. In the Quran, Allah 
says: “But seek, through that which Allah has given you, the home of the Hereafter; and 
[yet], do not forget your share of the world. And do good as Allah has done good to you. 
 
24Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOFII) is a Bahrain based 
non-profit organisation that was founded to retain and promote Shariah accounting standards for Islamic 
banks, participants and the overall industry. 
25 The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) is a Kuala Lumpur based non-profit organisation that sets 




And desire not corruption in the land. Indeed, Allah does not like corrupters” (Quran 
28:77).  
3.4.3. The underlying principles of Islamic banking and finance 
Islamic finance is distinguished from conventional banking by its predominant 
requirement that every transaction under Islamic finance must be Shariah-compliant. 
Even though the general perception of what makes up Islamic finance is the ban on 
interest, there are other guiding principles that must be strictly followed to be in 
compliance with Shariah (Shaikh, 2010; El-Galfy and Khiyar, 2012, pp. 944–945; 
Elasrag, 2014; Vicary Abdullah and Keon, 2014, pp. 4–7; Franzoni and Allali, 2018, pp. 
3–4; Habib, 2018, pp. 3–4). 
i) Believe in divine guidance, is the most crucial and forms the foundation of a 
Muslim’s core belief. In Islam, the believers (Muslims) via self-regulation will 
conduct their trade and finance in accordance to the general teachings of the Quran 
and Sunnah. The Islamic economic system requires the community to uphold 
Islamic values and given that Islamic banks and other Islamic financial institutions 
are part of this economic system, the rules of Shariah is strictly complied. In 
contrast, religion and government are kept separate and independent of each other 
in the conventional financial system as the Western culture puts a high value on 
religious freedom and secularity in the state (Vicary Abdullah and Keon, 2014). 
ii) Prohibition in interest—this is the fundamental characteristic that distinguishes 
it from conventional banking and will be discussed in greater length in the next 
section. 
iii) Financing is linked to real assets. This principle will curtail excessive credit 
expansion and speculation as all Islamic financial instruments must be based on 
real assets, which can only expand with the rise of the real economy. There will 
be an exchange of goods and services and any unwarranted asset price inflation 
will be minimised. On the contrary, traditional financing activities can magnify 
faster than the real economy as there are no real assets attached to the transaction. 
Financial products can grow exponentially leaving the real economic growth far 




of debts or loans not based on real assets would have not been allowed under 
Shariah. 
iv) Prohibition of Haram26 and unethical investments. Shariah forbids any 
investments in companies that are involved in Haram products such as alcohol, 
tobacco, pork, weaponries or pornography. Investments should be for a well-
intentioned purpose and are very similar to the conventional concept of corporate 
socially responsible investing with the aim to maximise both financial gain and 
social benefits. 
v) Prohibition of speculative or extremely risky investments. The Quran clearly 
prohibits profit based on speculation (maysr), maysr is directly translated from 
Arabic to mean easy and effortless earnings. This involves the restriction on taking 
unreasonable risks or the undertaking to gain wealth by speculating on a probable 
event. An equally crucial restriction for the legality of a transaction is uncertainty 
(ghàrar). The prohibition on ghàrar predominantly involves the components and 
essence of contracts of the Islamic financial products. Islamic finance requires the 
contracts not to incorporate components of uncertainty to the fundamental parts 
of the contract, for example, uncertainty in the structure of the contract and 
aleatory contracts. Comparing this prohibition to ghàrar, maysir is more focused 
on the human behaviour and the relative impacts on the community. Transactions 
that involve speculation, gambling or wagering bets are prohibited as they are 
considered as an enhancement due to chance, for example, speculative contracts 
such as hedging transactions and derivative products such as swaps are not 
permitted under Shariah.  
vi) Profit and loss sharing. Islam advocates a system based on risk-sharing, fair 
trade and fairness, both in the financial and social-justice sense. Some Islamic 
scholars even to the extent believe that the practice of risk-sharing is superior on 
 
26 In Arabic, Haram refers to anything that is forbidden under Islam. It is the opposite of Halal, which 





several counts as it leads to more cautious lending by encouraging banks to invest 
directly in an entrepreneur’s ventures (Useem, 2002).  
3.4.4. The religious ban on Riba 
Islam is a monotheistic religion and shares the same historical origins as Christianity and 
Judaism. There are many common beliefs among these three religions, and mutual 
veneration for the biblical prophets is one of them. Muslims believe that Jesus (Isa) is a 
prophet of Allah but strongly reject that he was the son of God. Muslims believe in the 
oneness of God and strongly reject the concept of the Trinity. Muslims also believe that 
the Prophet Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, Jesus and Moses are prophets of God and occasionally known 
as the Abrahamic religions that continued to spread the message on the oneness of God 
(Calder, 2016). One distinct message that was initially brought up by all three religions 
is the prohibition of usury, with variation in context from setting the rules of borrowing 
and lending to the description of both positive and negative consequences of the practice 
of usury (Abou-Zaid and Leonce, 2014). 
These three monotheistic religions have an extremely distinct viewpoint on the practice 
of charging interest on loans or funds borrowed. In their religious books, the Talmud 
(Oral Torah), the Torah 27, the Bible and the Quran, the prohibition on interest /usury is 
evident and mentioned multiple times. One would instantly conclude that the practice of 
usury is dreadfully forbidden by these three religions and the severity of the warnings 
were expressed explicitly against any engagement in usury (Abou-Zaid and Leonce, 
2014, p. 220). 
“But love your enemies, and do good, and lend, expecting nothing in return, 
and your reward will be great, and you will be sons of the Most High, for he is 
kind to the ungrateful and the evil.” (Luke 6:35). 
 




“Then I consulted with myself, and contended with the nobles and the rulers, 
and said unto them, Ye exact usury, every one of his brethren. And I held a 
great assembly against them” (Nehemiah 5:7). 
However, the ban on usury had survived resiliently in Islam as there were still significant 
numbers of Muslims who still considered it to be impious. However, in Judaism and 
Christianity the ban on usury had significantly diminished and not considered as 
irreverent. Calder (2016) concluded in his study that the survival of the ban on usury 
depends on the fate of its clerics and amongst the three Abrahamic religions, only the 
Muslim Ulama had endured the test of time and the challenges of modernity. Despite the 
fact that both pre-Islamic Abrahamic religions severely forbid interest-based contracts, 
the prohibition has been wielded over time and was ultimately repealed. The holy books 
of the Judaism were the first to introduce the interest prohibition and the Old Testament 
indicates that all Jews are “brothers” and that interest-based activities are only forbidden 
among them (Ahmad, 1981). However, a study of the relevant parts of the Old Testament 
indicates that it literally refers to all forms of lending although the clerics claimed that the 
restriction only involves the Judaic brotherhood. 
Whilst in Christianity, the Church remained adherent to the ban for a long time and 
continued in effect up to the Medieval Age. This was due to the clear prohibition as 
revealed in the Gospel of Luke. However, after the upsurge of Protestantism, the ban was 
abolished gradually as “the church was forced to endorse interest-based transactions” 
(Bayindir and Ustaoglu, 2018, p. 283). The financial system reached an institutional 
framework with the advent of the industrial revolution and subsequently became 
prevalent and efficient in the economy (Persky, 2007). Bayindir and Ustoaglu (2018) 
claimed that interest had developed into an essential part of the system to the extent that 
without it, the system would undoubtedly fail. 
3.4.5. Interest free banking (Riba-free banking) 
The promoters of Islamic finance’s primary concern on Riba is that interest exemplifies 
financial exploitation and injustice. Given that Islam upholds fairness and is against any 
type of oppression, the archetypical argument is that any form of Riba is forbidden. Thus, 




conventional interest-bearing activities and channel activities on an alternative approach 
consistent with Shariah rules. 
The Quran: “O you who believe! Have fear of Allah and give up what remains of 
what is due to you of usury. ... If you do not, then take notice of war from Allah and 
His Messenger.” (Quran 2:278) 
The Hadith: The Prophet said, "Avoid the seven great destructive sins." They (the 
people!) asked, "O Allah's Apostle! What are they?" He said, "To join partners in 
worship with Allah; to practise sorcery; to kill the life which Allah has forbidden 
except for a just cause (according to Shariah); to eat up usury (Riba), to eat up the 
property of an orphan; to give one's back to the enemy and freeing from the battle-
field at the time of fighting and to accuse chaste women who never even think of 
anything touching chastity and are good believers."28 
Riba is considered one of the greatest sins that can be committed by a Muslim as both the 
Quran and Hadith had clearly warned the believers of its severity. Riba in Islam means 
lending to those who needed money to meet their basic requirements and charging them 
“interest” on the amount given out as loan. It means taking advantage of the poor and 
benefiting from it financially. Usury/interest is the foundation of the conventional 
banking system as it permits the charging of interest as well as minimising the risk to the 
banks via the holding of collateral. For banks, the downside risk is limited by the value 
of the collateral held and the benefits are almost guaranteed. Riba literally means increase, 
extra or addition (Cagatay, 1970) and in the financial sense, Riba is any increase of 
earning or income obtained from a loan.  
In a verse revealed in Makkah, “And whatever you give for interest to increase 
within the wealth of people will not increase with Allah. But what you give in 
Zakat29, desiring the countenance of Allah - those are the multipliers.” (Quran, 
30:39).  
 
28 A hadith compiled by Sahih Bukhari 82:840, narrated by Abu Huraira RA. 
29 Zakat in Arabic means ‘that which purifies’ and is a form of alms giving. In Islam, it is a religious 




3.4.6. Conceptual differences between Islamic and conventional banking 
Conventional banking is based upon financing profitable projects with interest lending. 
Islamic banks avoid Riba and instead invest on a profit or loss basis. Typical types of 
contracts include leasing (Ijarah), purchase and resale transactions (Murabahah), profit 
and loss sharing (Mudharabah), trust financing or limited partnership or joint venture 
investment (Musharakah). 
The primary conceptual difference between an Islamic Bank is its social objectives. For 
instance, conventional banks normally expect potential borrowers with a business 
proposal to have some collateral before funding is given. Irrespective of the project’s 
profitability, interest will continually be charged. The objective of a conventional bank is 
to finance the most economical and profitable projects. Clearly, from the perspective of 
developing ‘banking-relationship’, the banker would prefer the project funded to turn out 
well.  
On the other hand, Islamic banks financing can be designed so that the bank takes on a 
more active role with the customers via profit and loss sharing arrangement. Islamic 
current accounts do not pay any reward and are only used for liquidity purposes, hence 
there are no profits to share. Savings accounts holders may accept a return on investment 
called Hibah. While an investment account draws a bigger dividend, but they also bear 
the risk of any loss in their investment if the bank suffers a loss and money must be 
invested for a minimum time range. For larger investors, advance investment accounts 
would be available. Similar to “conventional banks, Islamic banks can run a banking and 
a trading book. This means that they can also deal with off-balance sheet contracts such 
as letters of credit, foreign exchange and financial advisory” (Hassan and Chowdhury, 
2004). Another feature in contrast to conventional banks, Islamic banks have an ethical 
charter i.e. unethical activities such as gambling, alcohol or pornography are prohibited 
as outlined by the Quran. As part of their social obligation, Islamic banks will assist with 
the payment of Zakat. Normally Islamic banks have a Shariah board to ensure that 
 
importance. Zakat is an obligation for all Muslims who meet the necessary criteria of wealth, and the 
beneficiary shall be ‘the poor, the needy, the Amil, those whose heart are inclined towards Islam, the slaves, 




banking activities and bank practices comply with Shariah. A greater social status is 
expected of Islamic banks in a Muslim society as compared to conventional banking (see 
Table 3.1). Ahmad and Hassan (2005) indicate that as Shariah principles demand social 
justice, Islamic banks correspondingly take on the obligation below: 
i) Islamic banking has certain philosophical missions to achieve. That is, since God 
is the Creator and Ultimate Owner of all resources, institutions or persons have a 
viceregency role to play in society. Therefore, Islamic banks are not free to do as 
they wish; rather they have to integrate moral values with economic action;  
ii) The ability to provide credit to those who have the talent and the expertise but 
cannot provide collateral to the conventional financial institutions, thereby 
strengthening the grass-root foundations of society; and  
iii) The duty to create harmony in society based on the Islamic concept of sharing and 
caring in order to achieve economic, financial and political stability. 
Table 3.1: Fundamental differences between Islamic & conventional banking 
 Islamic banking Conventional banking 
1.  
Interest or any usury based transactions 
are prohibited in financial transactions  
All financial transactions are based interest 
and high-level usury 
2.  
Depositors bear the risk, no need for 
deposit insurance  
Depositors do not bear any risk, moreover 
the bank is obligated to repay principal 
with a guaranteed amount 
3.  
Try to fulfil the objectives of Shariah in 
ensuring social justice and welfare  
Not Applicable 
4.  
Monitor the legitimacy criteria fixed by 




Islamic banks work under the supervision 
of the Shariah Supervisory Boards 
No such supervision 
6.  
Carry out investment schemes to promote 
the income of the people below the 
poverty line, under the principles of 
Mudharabah and Musharakah. 




 Islamic banking Conventional banking 
7.  
Islamic banks become partner in the 
business of the client, risk and rewards 
sharing 
Loss is solely clients’ responsibility 
8.  
Speculative financial activities is 
prohibited 
Some functions are speculation-related 
9.  
Bank pays Zakat on income and inspires 
clients to pay Zakat, which ensures 
redistribution of income in favour of the 
poor 
No Zakat system 
10.  
The basis of business policy is the socio-
economic uplifting of the disadvantaged 
groups of the society  
Profit is the prime target of business, or the 
prime duty is to maximize the 
shareholders’ value 
11.  
Dual target: implementation of the 
objectives of Shariah and profit 
Profit making is the sole objective 
12.  
Islamic banks sell and purchase foreign 
currency on a spot basis, not on forward 
looking or future basis 
Spot and forward are both used 
Source: Hassan and Lewis (2007, p. 98) and researcher’s analysis 
3.5 Islam in the world today 
Currently there are approximately 2 billion Muslims globally30, making Islam the second-
largest religion in the world behind Christianity, with the majority living in the Indian 
subcontinent and Southeast Asia (Devetek, Burke and George, 2008). Countries with 
Muslim majorities are generally identified as Islamic States, irrespective of state and 
political structure (Al-Turabi et al., 1983). The Muslim migration in the late 20th century 
had contributed to the rise of Muslim population in the US, Europe and Australasia. The 
movement to Europe was strongly connected to colonial legacies as the largest Muslim 
 
30 The global population increased from 2.53 billion (1950) to 7.88 billion (2020). In the same period from 
1950 to 2020, the Muslim population increased from 0.43 billion (17% ) to 2.04 billion (26%) with the 
majority of Muslims live in Asia (71%), Africa (23%) and Europe (6% ). The largest Muslim country is 
Indonesia, with an estimated population of 232million in 2020, about 13% of the world’s population of 
Muslims, followed by Pakistan (1 1.1%), India (11.1%), Bangladesh (9.3%), Egypt and Nigeria (5%) 




population in the UK are from South Asia, while Algerian Muslims currently comprise a 
significant group in France. The rapid growth of Muslim minorities in non-Muslim 
countries is becoming progressively heterogeneous in ethnic tradition and ideology.  
Islam arrived in the Saudi Arabia in the 7th century and rapidly expanded to other parts 
of the regions. The civil wars and World War 2 had caused the diaspora of Muslims to 
Europe and afterwards to Northern America and Oceania (Akbarzadeh, 2008). Whilst the 
rising phenomenon of present-day conversion to Islam (Neumueller, 2012) now forms an 
ethnically diverse international society of faith. Today, we see the development of Islamic 
finance into formal institutions in most of the Muslim countries and countries in Europe 
and North America. There were 505 Islamic banks in 2017 (including 207 Islamic 
Banking windows) with Islamic banking assets worth USD 1.72 trillion or 71% of the 
total Islamic finance industry (Research and Markets, 2019, p. 16). Its evolution is 
considered a significant Islamic phenomenon that had gradually gained global 
momentum.  
3.6  Malaysia: Islamisation Policy 
The root of Islamisation policy in Malaysia goes back to the civil disturbances in the late 
1960s between the Muslim Malays and ethnic Chinese. During that time, the Muslim 
Malays were against the monopolistic control of the commercial sector by the Chinese 
and were also displeased with the increased Western influences in what was seen as 
corrupting the moral and cultural life of the nation (Venardos, 2005). After the ethnic riot 
in 1969 between the Malay majority and Chinese minority, the NEP was established to 
rectify the economic imbalance of the Malays as compared to other communities, 
especially the ethnic Chinese. The NEP’s ultimate objective was to foster national unity 
and nation building via the eradication of poverty and economic restructuring through the 
removal of ethnic identity with economic function and geographical location (Rasiah and 
Shari, 2001; Doraisami, 2005a). 
The earliest record of a formal Islamic banking and finance in Malaysia can be trailed 
back to 1963 when the Pilgrimage or Hajj Fund or better known as Tabung Haji was set 
up by the government. Tabung Haji is a dedicated investment fund that offers Muslims a 




pilgrimage (Hajj) to Makkah31. The establishment of such an institution would assist 
Muslims to engage in Shariah compliant investment opportunities that they would 
otherwise miss out. Subsequently, Tabung Haji’s outstanding achievement had motivated 
the government to set-up a National Steering Committee on 30 July 1981 to analyse the 
concept of building an Islamic financial framework in Malaysia.  
The introduction of the Islamic Banking Act of 1983 was the entry point of a formal 
Islamic banking infrastructure into Malaysia and had simultaneously established Bank 
Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB). The act was a part of the Malaysian government’s policy 
to help Muslim Malays who were regarded as financially disadvantaged to the more 
commercially inclined Chinese32. However, the approach towards a more Islamic 
economy and its actual reform plan only started in 1981 when Mahathir became Prime 
Minister. The Mahathir administration had called for an Islamisation policy to capitalise 
on the tenets of Islam as a positive ingredient in the development of the nation and its 
people. This approach was taken in order to restore economic imbalances and social 
disparity between ethnic groups, in particular the Muslim Malays and the more 
prosperous Chinese community. 
As part of the Islamisation policy, Islamic establishments were set up to encourage 
savings and investment of Muslim Malays, especially those who opposed to conventional 
banking. From 1980s onwards, Islamic banking and Takaful (Islamic insurance) was 
developed in Malaysia since the establishment of the Islamic Banking Act in 1983. This 
was a result of the manifestation of the Islamisation policy under the Mahathir 
administration (Billah, 2007). The Islamic Banking Act gave Malaysia’s BNM the power 
to regulate and supervise all Islamic banking activities, while the separate Islamic 
legislation and banking regulation existed in parallel with the existing conventional 
banking framework.  
 
31 The performance of Hajj is the last pillar of the five pillars of Islam. 
32 It is the Chinese who control the business sector and played a prominent role in the industrial development 





3.7 BNM: The Dual Banking System 
The Central Bank of Malaysia, known as BNM was instituted on 26 January 1959 via the 
Central Bank of Malaya Ordinance, 1958 (CBO). The CBO was revised in 1994 and is 
now the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 1958 and defines BNM as the apex of Malaysia’s 
monetary and banking framework with the interdependent objectives (BNM, 1999c): 
▪ Issue currency and keep the reserves safeguarding the value of the currency;  
▪ Act as a central banker and financial adviser to the Government;  
▪ Promote monetary stability and a sound financial structure; and  
▪ Influence the credit situation to the advantage of Malaysia. 
Due to its function as currency issuer, BNM has the principal obligation to safeguard the 
stability of domestic prices to ensure that the economic development benefits are 
preserved. Monetary stability is reliant on the existence of a sound financial system for 
the effective conduct of monetary policy. In comparison to sophisticated industrial 
economies like the HPAEs that have sophisticated financial structures, BNM has a 
broader function in improving the financial framework which includes establishing the 
necessary monetary procedures in the capital markets. BNM’s function is also to improve 
the solidity of the financial system to support the efficiency of the intermediation process 
so that national savings are mobilised and transmitted to investors, thereby adding to the 
overall development in investment and productivity (Khiyar, 2012).  
Meanwhile, the Islamic Desk under BNM which was first set up in 1990 under the domain 
of the formerly Banking Unit (now Investment and Treasury Unit), was moved to the 
Bank Regulation Department in order to serve as a one stop centre to formulate policies 
and to process applications pertaining to Islamic banking operations. Previously, two 
separate sections handled the Islamic banking operations, namely, the Banking 
Operations Section in Bank Regulation Department and the Islamic Desk in the Banking 
Department. Currently, the Islamic Banking Section is responsible for planning and 
developing strategic and prudential policies on Islamic banking as well as monitoring the 
Islamic banking operations of banking institutions and Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad. The 
section's role has now expanded to serve as the secretariat for the National Advisory 




BNM as the governing body for the financial institutions in Malaysia must ensure that the 
Islamic financial institutions’ operations and activities are in compliance with Shariah 
rules and thus it had instructed all Islamic financial institutions to establish a Shariah 
Supervisory Board. The Board’s key role is to review and endorse that newly launched 
products and services are in compliance with Shariah. The fundamental aspiration of 
BNM was to set up an Islamic banking system to operate correspondingly with the 
traditional structure. A complete banking system would expect 3 essential elements 
before it can be defined as a system, as an individual bank does not represent an entire 
structure (Laldin, 2008; Khiyar, 2012). These three elements are:  
i) a considerable number of participants (financial institutions); a wide range of 
financial products; 
ii) an Islamic money market; and 
iii) a system that manifests the socio-economic values in Islam and must be Islamic 
in both substance and form. 
Identifying the above requirements, the Malaysian government embarked on a steady 
method to reach the goal of firming up an Islamic banking system to supplement the 
conventional banking. Yielding from nearly 20 years of experience with Tabung Haji, the 
Malaysian government gained more confidence in proposing a further structured 
blueprint of developing the Islamic financial framework via the central bank. BNM 
adapted several principles and approaches in developing the blueprint and had decided to 
use the dual banking system approach. The blueprint to create a new full-fledged Islamic 
banking and financial system can be broken down into four phases (Ahmad Mokhtar, 
Abdullah and Alhabshi, 2008; Laldin, 2008; Khiyar, 2012): 
i) Phase One - Foundation years  (1963 -1982) 
ii) Phase two - Development phase (1983-1992) 
iii) Phase Three - Take-off phase (1993-2002)  




3.7.1. Phase One (1963 -1982): The Pilgrimage Fund 
The birth of Tabung Haji signals the early attempt in developing Islamic banking in 
Malaysia. The inspiration for a pilgrimage fund began by a working paper titled, ‘‘Plan 
to Improve the Economy of Prospective Pilgrims’’ presented by the Ungku Aziz33 in 1959 
(Sa’ari and Borhan, 2005). The Tabung Haji project started at the end of 1962 and Tabung 
Haji was formally launched in 30 September 1963, providing Shariah compliant saving 
facilities. The idea was advocated out of the requirement to foster a way to aid Muslims 
to save up for their pilgrimage in a non interest-bearing institution. As the pilgrimage is 
considered a sacred journey, many Muslims previously had refused to keep their money 
in banks and resorted to diverse traditional means, some to the extent of keeping money 
under their pillows and mattresses (Sa’ari and Borhan, 2005). When funds were 
insufficient, some Muslims had resorted in selling their land and other assets (Islahi, 
2018). Such traditions had caused adverse financial impact and undesirable social 
consequences on their financial well-being, especially after returning home.  
As an economist, Ungku Aziz highlighted that the plight of the poor Muslim to perform 
the pilgrimage would not only deteriorate the rural economic structure, but consequently 
endanger the country’s economic development (Laldin, 2008). The task of setting up 
Tabung Haji signified an important milestone not just in Malaysia but in other Muslim 
countries, and a challenging task. When it was deliberated in August 1962, it was 
overlooked until Ungku Aziz put forward the idea of forming a Pilgrims Saving 
Corporation to the government. He highlighted that Muslims with the intention to perform 
the pilgrimage or Hajj should be assisted to ensure that they will not be impoverished and 
safe from financial difficulty on their return. In the proposal, he suggested that future 
pilgrims should save in a bank that yielded profits but free from interest. This suggestion 
resulted in the notion of creating a Pilgrims Saving Corporation, an institution with a 
specific purpose. The concept paper on Tabung Haji was drawn up and presented to the 
rector of Al-Azhar University of Cairo in 1962 during his visit to Malaysia. After 
reviewing the concept paper, he was satisfied and believed that the proposals made were 
 
33 Ungku Aziz, born in London is a prominent Malaysian economist and a reputed academician and an 
authority on rural economy. He is the former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Malaya from 1968 to 




Shariah compliant (IRTI, 1995). Hence, the Pilgrims Saving Corporation was 
incorporated and 6 years later the Corporation was integrated with the Pilgrims Affairs 
Office34 and was instituted into the Pilgrims Management and Fund Board by the Act of 
Parliament35. As the Muslim community in Malaysia expanded, there was demand for an 
institute that can protect their savings and that gives assurance that its activities are 
independent from Riba and are in accordance with Shariah principles. The primary aim 
of setting up Tabung Haji according to the Tabung Haji Act (1969) were: 
i) to encourage Muslims to save regularly to aid their expenses during Hajj and for 
other good purposes;  
ii) to permit Muslims to have dynamic and practical involvement in investment 
schemes acceptable in Islam through their savings;  
iii) and to preserve and safeguard the interest of pilgrims by arranging various 
amenities and services during their Hajj (Laldin, 2008). 
The financial role of Tabung Haji can be segregated into two key considerations. The first 
consideration is the administration of the funds, which includes the depositor’s savings 
and withdrawals, and the second consideration is management of the investment of the 
funds. Tabung Haji has a holistic ambition to encompass all economic activities related 
to Islam, ranging from personal finance to religious tax, as well as from pilgrimage to 
investment. It is important to acknowledge how well it serves and prepares the pilgrims 
throughout the years. From a modest deposit of only RM46,610 (USD15,226) placed by 
1,281 depositors in its first year of operation, Tabung Haji had more than 9.3 million 
depositors with RM73 billion (USD18 billion) funds in 2017 (Tabung Haji, 2017). Table 
3.2 summarises the number of depositors and deposits over the years. 
Table 3.2: Summary of Tabung Haji’s Performance 
Year Total number of 
depositors 
Total of deposits 
(RM) 
1963 1,281 46,610 
1964 6,566 816,146 
 
34 Which had been in operation since 1951 in Penang. 
35 Under the Laws of Malaysia Act 8, the Pilgrims Management and Fund Board 1969 and Act A 168, the 




Year Total number of 
depositors 
Total of deposits 
(RM) 
1990 1.7 million 1 billion 
2008 4.7 million 17 billion 
2009 5 million 23 billion 
2012 8.2 million 38 billion 
2013 8.3 million 45 billion 
2014 8.6 million 54 billion 
2015 8.8 million 62 billion 
2016 9.1 million 67 billion 
2017 9.3 million 73 billion 
Source: Cizakca (2011: 216-217); Handley (1997); Tabung Haji (2017) 
Savings for Hajj 
Tabung Haji’s membership is restricted to only Muslim citizens in Malaysia, with a 
minimum deposit of approximately less than USD3 (RM10) to open an account. To 
facilitate the savings for the Muslim communities, with the majority being outside of 
Kuala Lumpur where Tabung Haji is located, Tabung Haji managed a good network 
across the country. Savings can be made via the following channels: 
i) Tabung Haji branches;  
ii) Post offices nationwide;  
iii) Monthly salary deductions by their employers;  
iv) Deposits via mailing; and  
v) Various programs for dependents of the depositors. 
Tabung Haji uses the Shariah principle of Wadiah al-Wakalah, that involves new 
depositors to agree to an Aqad statement or a statement of consent. The rule of Aqad 
implies that depositors grant permission for Tabung Haji to manage and invest the funds. 
Tabung Haji will distribute any profit received from these investments among the 
depositors as bonus payment. Additionally, Tabung Haji pays the Islamic tax or Zakat on 
behalf of depositors according to the same consent given by the depositors. The Zakat is 







The Tabung Haji manages its investment activities conforming to Shariah rules and 
processes akin to Islamic banks and other Shariah compliant investment companies. 
Tabung Haji governs its investment operations to ensure that they are Shariah compliant 
and do not contain any aspect which is contradictory to Shariah rules, by employing the 
services of the Religious Supervisory Council and the National Fatwa Committee to guide 
Tabung Haji on its investment transactions.  
Tabung Haji has set up a specialised panel, the Finance Advisory Council, to guide the 
administration of Tabung Haji on investment operations, to ensure the viability of the 
investments. Panel members consist of distinguished business executives, bankers and 
senior government officials with expertise in the Malaysian economy. Tabung Haji’s 
investments do not include anything that is contradictory to Islam such as banking, 
insurance, and hotels. Thus, Tabung Haji will not invest in businesses that are engaged 
with projects which are forbidden by Islam. Occasionally, when required, Tabung Haji 
will seek guidance from the Religious Supervisory Council in relation to any doubtful 
companies or potential investments. Tabung Haji continues running to the current day 
with considerable enhancements and varied projects, demonstrating that Islamic banking 
is called for as they can compete with highly formidable competitors in financial markets.  
In 1990, Tabung Haji became the recipient of the Islamic Development Bank’s prize in 
Islamic Banking in recognition for Tabung Haji’s significant contribution in managing 
the funds of Muslims in Malaysia and successfully managing a large investment fund in 
a Shariah compliant manner. Its successful performance had enabled many individuals to 
fulfil their lifelong ambition to perform the Hajj in the Holy Land of Makkah. Tabung 
Haji has invented an effective system to inspire Muslims to save their money to cater for 
their expenditures during the performance of their Hajj.  
Tabung Haji’s achievements are in the ability to mobilise the small deposits in a dynamic 
way and invest these funds back into the economy in industrial sectors, retail, agriculture 
and real estate in compliance with Shariah. Tabung Haji not merely served individuals 
with Islamic services but channelled back the funds into the financial system via a vast 
stake in economy (IRTI, 2015). This particular bedrock of Islamic financial services in 




Islamic option to the Muslim community. This bold move would enable the originally 
financially disadvantaged community to be given the chance towards enhancing their 
social standing and financial well-being. Tabung Haji is recognised as one of the 
prominent investment funds for Muslims as it gives highly competitive dividends to the 
depositors. After the successful creation of Tabung Haji, Malaysia’s progress in Islamic 
finance remained stagnant for 20 years till 1983 when BIMB was set-up. The phase post-
1983 witnessed a significantly rapid evolution in the landscape of Islamic banking and 
finance in Malaysia (Laldin, 2008).  
3.7.2. Phase two (1983-1992):  Development phase 
The remarkable achievement of Tabung Haji had instigated many parties to advocate for 
the government to form a full fledge Islamic bank. Countless requests came from 
discussions and forums, which prompted the government to set up a national council of 
Islamic finance specialists in 1981 to research the plan of forming Islamic financial 
institutions in Malaysia. However, as a country with the majority Muslim population, the 
issues of Islamic banks in the Middle East had hindered their spirit. The first Islamic bank 
was set up in 1963, called Mit-Ghamr Saving House, located in the Mit Ghamr town of 
Egypt. Mit Ghamr town was located in the rural outskirts and mainly served the rural 
community, which consists of mainly pious Muslims. Naturally, the majority of people 
in Mit Ghamr did not place their savings into any bank because interest is banned in Islam 
and practically no banks were accessible to them. Under these circumstances, the task 
was not entirely to comply with the Islamic values concerning interest but also provide 
education on banking facilities to the rural population of Mit Ghamr. The Mit-Ghamr 
bank is a simple bank with 3 different types of accounts (Orhan, 2018):  
i) Saving accounts - No interest was payable to depositors in the saving accounts, 
but they were allowed withdrawals on demand. They were also eligible for small, 
short-term interest-free loans for productive purposes. 
ii) Investment accounts - the funds deposited in the investment accounts were 
subjected to restricted withdrawals and were invested on the basis of profit-




iii) Zakat accounts or social services accounts - Zakat fund for redistribution amongst 
the poor. 
The Islamic banking project of Mit-Ghamr had an unexpected success as saving deposits 
increased from 40,000 Egyptian pounds (EP) in 1964 to approximately 1 million EP in 
1967 (Chachi, 2005). Although the Mit-Ghamr project made a good start, it was 
discontinued due to political and legal circumstances (Islahi, 2018).  
However, in Malaysia, the demand for an Islamic bank increased and in 1981, the 
National Steering Committee composed of 20 Shariah experts performed an assessment 
on the proposal of a new Islamic bank in Malaysia examining various aspects of the plan. 
The positive assessment of the study had resulted in the incorporation of the first Islamic 
bank in July 1983. 
The bank was injected with a small capital of RM80 million (approximately USD21 
million), as the first step in formulating the Malaysia Islamic financial system (Nasser and 
Muhammed, 2013, pp. 82–83). The Committee tabled a report to the Cabinet in July 1982 
and they approved the following proposals:  
i) To set up an Islamic bank based on the rules of Shariah, the bank will be a limited 
company incorporated under the Company Act;  
ii) To legislate an Islamic Banking Act for the supervision of the activities of Islamic 
banks and BNM shall be the regulating body; and  
iii) To require the Islamic banks to establish its own Shariah Advisory Council to 
ensure compliance of its activities with the Shariah requirements.  
Subsequent to the above proposals, the Cabinet enacted the Islamic Banking Act 1983 
(IBA 1983) and consequently established the first Islamic Bank in Malaysia in 1983. The 
bank was named as Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (Islamic Bank of Malaysia or BIMB) 
and was regulated by the IBA 1983.  
BNM played a vital role in the advancement of the Islamic banking system in Malaysia. 
When the government created the above steering committee in planning the concept, 
BNM was tasked to draw up a report on the probability of initiating the first Islamic bank. 




offer Shariah compliant banking business to the public. Since its inception in 1983 and 
up to 1999, BIMB was the one and only provider of Islamic banking services. This 
monopolistic right accorded to BIMB was to grant the bank the opportunity to build up 
their product range and test the market. It was also meant to safeguard the bank from 
strong competition with other more established and experienced conventional banks. 
(Ahmad Mokhtar et al, 2008).  Over a period of 30 years, BIMB had expanded from its 
humble beginnings of 30 staff operating from a temporary office to a pristine headquarters 
which is now located in Kuala Lumpur’s financial district with 133 branches nationwide 
and more than 4,000 employees. BIMB’s initial total assets of RM325.5 million 
(USD85.6 million) in 1984 had multiplied to RM73.4 billion (USD19.3 billion) in 2018 
(BIMB, 2018). 
Takaful (Islamic Insurance) 
The prevalent request of the Muslim society for an Islamic substitute to traditional 
insurance instigated the transformation of insurance industry in Malaysia. The first 
Islamic Insurance or Takaful corporation, Syarikat Takaful Malaysia was founded with 
an initial paid up capital of RM10 million (USD2.6 million) as a private limited company 
in November 1984 and later converted into a public limited company in October 1995 
(Khan, 2016). It was also aimed to amalgamate into the Islamic banking structure in 
Malaysia. Due to the promising response for takaful products, a further three takaful 
companies were added to the industry from the period 1993 to 2003. Since then, the 
Malaysian financial structure scene had endured extensive architectural developments in 
the globalisation age, with various liberalisation procedures being initiated during the last 
decade. BNM had awarded five additional licenses in 2006 for companies to operate 
takaful activities in Malaysia. The licenses were extended to organisations or groups with 
sound financial standing and with extended capability in Islamic banking as well as the 
conventional insurance industry (Saad, 2012).  
Takaful in Malaysia is legally defined as “a scheme based on brotherhood, solidarity and 
mutual assistance which provides for mutual financial aid and assistance to the 
participants” (Malaysia, 1984, p. 6). This interpretation highlights the Islamic doctrine of 
takaful whereby a set of players consent to collectively secure one another against a 




and operations do not involve any element which is not approved by the Shariah.” As an 
Islamic insurance, conformity with Shariah guidelines and regulations is the pillar, as it 
is unquestionably the distinctive attribute that indicates the Islamic identification of 
takaful industry (BNM, 2007). The faith in the product is conditional on two principles–
i) the activities of the organisation must totally observe with Shariah rules and ii), the 
worth and financial performance of the takaful companies is required to be revealed. 
Information on Shariah compliance is crucial in determining the purchasing decisions 
amongst the participants, enhancing their awareness of their doctrine, promoting clarity 
for strengthening governance, and safeguarding the Islamic status of takaful operators 
(Kasim, 2012). 
Government Investment Certificates (GICs) 
The GICs is Malaysia’s Islamic treasury bill. Another component of Islamic banking is 
to complement BIMB was a Shariah compliant investment certificate proposed in 1983. 
These non interest-bearing certificates were issued to facilitate BIMB to satisfy its 
liquidity needs and works similarly as the existing Treasury Bills or Malaysia 
Government Securities i.e. they are essentially loans extended to government, the only 
difference is that GICs do not have a fixed dividend rate. The Ministry of Finance will 
determine the dividend rate when the GICs mature. It enabled BIMB to hold liquid assets 
and to provide as an investment channel for BIMB to briefly place its surplus funds.  
The GICs are issued to the market under the Investment Act 1982 and are accessible to 
any other institutions in the financial system, apart from BIMB. The GICs is guided by 
the rule of Qard-al-Hasan, an Islamic principle which recognises the acquisition of these 
papers as a benevolent lending to the government. The certificates holders thus cannot 
demand any profits on their investment besides the principal sum, which will be entirely 
redeemed when the certificates mature. The dividends payments are solely at the 
government’s discretion. GICs is the first government securities to be issued under 
Shariah principle (Khiyar 2012 p1137).   
Initially, the GICs were being issued on a preliminary basis and their primary function 
was to facilitate BIMB in satisfying BNM’s required liquidity requirement as Islamic 




achieved the attributes of complete financial instruments, Islamic banks demanded further 
GICs to comply with BNM’s statutory liquidity requirement and for short term placement 
of their surplus liquid funds (Ahmed, 1997).   
Labuan International Offshore Financial Centre (Labuan IOFC) 
The Labuan IOFC was introduced on 1 October 1990 with the following purpose: 
i) Strengthen Kuala Lumpur as Asia’s Islamic financial hub; 
ii) Support the improvement of the financial services segment to the GNP of 
Malaysia; and 
iii) Promote the commercial expansion of Labuan and its surrounding regions 
Another key factor is Labuan is the broad outlook of offshore financial businesses and 
commodities extended to regional customers. The range and standard of offshore 
financial transactions in Labuan have steadily risen over time and are bound to build up 
strength for improvement in the future. Consistent with the growth of conventional 
offshore banking, Labuan IOFC had broadened its base by directing its strength on 
turning into an International Islamic Finance hub. Labuan’s new outlook came timely as 
Islamic banking had assumed a progressively prominent role in the international 
landscape. The rise in revenue of Muslim regions, particularly in the Middle East, 
together with a new awareness of Islamic understanding, had boost a great interest for 
Islamic financial products. Labuan offers an offshore banking system that met the needs 
of foreign investors, which is of tax efficiency and proper regulation.  
Labuan is strategically located to reach out to Muslim investors in the Southeast Asia 
region as well as Middle East investors seeking for opportunities to invest in Islamic 
financial products. Consultancy and advisory services are offered by specialist Islamic 
consultants and management firms to offshore investors that intend to trade in Islamic 
products. Islamic financiers have to adjust to meet the needs of the global market and 
develop Labuan into a hub with a niche in offshore Islamic banking is a sensible extension 
of the evolution of Islamic financial framework in the Malaysian domestic market 
(Khiyar, 2012). The need for cross-border Islamic project financing were rising quickly 




These are the high prospect domains for Islamic banking players in Labuan to maximise 
the promotion of Islamic financial products consistent with the practical requirement of 
modern day customers (Khiyar, 2012, p. 1113).  
3.7.3. Phase Three (1993 - 2002): Take-off Phase 
This is the period where the essential components of a comprehensive Islamic Banking 
Framework were established. Malaysia has grown more confident in the growth of its 
Islamic banking system and had a strong notion to be one of the leading global players in 
the industry and this required the enhancement of the Islamic financial system in a limited 
span of time. In order to have an Islamic financial system, Malaysia needed more financial 
institutions in the region as one bank could not suffice. At this point, BNM was expected 
by the public to set-up a comprehensive and robust Islamic banking framework that runs 
parallel with the conventional banking system for all Malaysians. In 1993, BNM initiated 
a steady and piecemeal strategy by introducing an 'interest-free banking scheme’ to the 
traditional banks, later known as ‘Islamic windows’. This scheme allows conventional 
banks to provide similar Shariah compliant products as Islamic banks by using their 
existing infrastructure (Ahmad Mokhtar, Abdullah and Alhabshi, 2008). It had resulted 
in 12 local and 3 foreign commercial banks with Islamic windows. (Nasser and 
Muhammed, 2013).  
The former Governor of BNM (1999a) explained that the distinction between the Islamic 
and the traditional financial structures are those of ideology and virtues.  The Islamic 
financial framework is based on Islamic fundamentals and wisdom and forms an essential 
part of Islam.  On the contrary, the traditional financial system is based on capitalism 
which segregates between religion from financial matters in daily activities. In capitalism, 
it gives an entity absolute ownership of their property and forms decisions based on profit.  
This convention is based on the personal interest and right (IRTI, 1995, p. 13). Five years 
onwards, in 1998, banks with Islamic windows were then requested to replace their 
Islamic units to a proper banking division under an improved scheme called the ‘Islamic 
Banking Scheme’ or Skim Perbankan Islam (BNM, 1998a).  
In the same year, Malaysians also witnessed the establishment of a second Islamic bank, 




Panic of 1997, with the formation of BMMB due to a merger deal between 2 major 
banks36. The deal concluded that the Islamic banking assets and activities of these two 
banks were carved out and transferred to a newly established bank i.e. BMMB. It was 
also anticipated for BMMB to be a healthy competitor to BIMB and to end the continuous 
criticism from the media for BIMB’s overly prudent approach and red tapes (Ahmad 
Mokhtar, Abdullah and Alhabshi, 2008). The Malaysian government had always linked 
its economic and social policy to the progress of Malaysia’s Islamic banking framework.  
The Islamic banking framework is expected to rise the social standing of Muslims and 
narrow the economic gap between the different ethnic groups. Given this, the 
development of Malaysia’s Islamic banking framework received full support from the 
country’s leadership and the corresponding government agencies (Khiyar, 2012).  
An Islamic Interbank Market 
Correspondingly, by the end of 1993, equipped with adequate support by the government, 
the Islamic banking framework had accomplished two of its targeted milestones in 
achieving its ultimate goal for a complete Islamic banking framework.  The 
unaccomplished target was the establishment of a short-term Islamic interbank market 
which allows for Islamic financial institutions to borrow and lend money at interbank 
rates and following the Shariah rules. An Islamic money market was enforced in the 
Malaysian financial system on 3 January 1994 and was the first in the world (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 1994). The Islamic inter-bank money market comprised the following features 
(Khiyar, 2012): Inter-bank trading in Islamic products; Inter-bank Islamic investments; 
and Islamic inter-bank cheque clearing system37.  
 
36 As a response to the Panic of 1997, the NEAC and BNM launched the consolidation of the financial 
institutions, where Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad (BBMB) and Bank of Commerce Malaysia Berhad 
(BOCB) were merged. 
37 A clearing system was introduced at Bank Negara for “Bank Islam Malaysia and the SPTF (Skim 
Perbankan Tanpa Feadah, translated to English, Interest-free Banking Scheme) units of the commercial 
banks. Cheques with respect to these institutions will be segregated from the conventional cheques for 
clearing purposes from January 3, 1994. The Islamic inter-bank cheque clearing system is also based on 
the principle of Mudharabah. At 12:00 midnight, during the automatic cheque clearing at BNM, SPTF 
banks (including Bank Islam Malaysia) having a deficit will automatically be funded from the surplus funds 
of other SPTF banks on the basis of the concept of Mudharabah. If there is still a deficit after such funding, 
it will be funded by BNM on the same principle; i.e., Mudharabah. The profit ratio for this mechanism is 





Malaysia had turned up to be a central hub of Islamic banking and finance in Southeast 
Asia, evident by its continuous expansion from a basic pilgrim’s fund to a full-fledged 
financial system. Since the launch of the BIMB in Malaysia in 1983, Malaysia had 
progressively moved toward the incorporation of an effective and more robust Islamic 
financial system, operating alongside with the conventional system. BNM had set-up the 
internal Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) for Islamic Banking and Takaful on 1 May 1997 
as the highest Shariah authority as part of an effort to assimilate and harmonise the 
Shariah interpretations among banks and takaful companies. The goal of the SAC is to 
function as the sole government agency to inform BNM on Islamic financial institutions’ 
operations. This includes all Islamic banks, Takaful companies and banks with Islamic 
banking windows. Its tasks also include coordination of Shariah matters and assessment 
of new Islamic financial products. BNM via the SAC will from time to time issue 
guidelines and circulars in relation to Islamic banking and finance. All financial 
institutions operating in Malaysia must be informed and strictly be in conformity with 
these guidelines as BNM is bestowed with the special powers to supervise financial 
markets under the Bank Negara Ordinance. 
3.7.4. Phase Four (post- 2004): The liberalisation of Islamic banks  
During the early 2000s, practically all Malaysian financial institutions had set-up separate 
Islamic units, and almost all investment banks had set-up their Islamic capital markets 
departments. Initially there were only two full fledged Islamic Banks, the first being 
BIMB and the second was BMMB. On 1 January 2008, the Islamic banking activities of 
Maybank began to operate as a new subsidiary of Maybank now known as Maybank 
Islamic Berhad. The first to be set up, BIMB operates through 86 offices in the country 
whilst the more later formed BMMB has 46 branches. In addition to the Islamic banks, 
there are further thirteen commercial banks that offer products and services under the 
Islamic banking arrangement.  
Presently, Malaysia is deemed to have one of the most developed Islamic financial 
frameworks in the world. Apart from the ‘Interest-free Banking Scheme’, Malaysia had 
developed an Islamic debt securities market in 1990, operated an Islamic equity markets 
since 1995 and established an Islamic Interbank Money Market in 1994 (Bacha, 1998). 




from the Gulf countries (BNM, 2004). The plan was to bring further competition and to 
open fresh opportunities to further enhanced Malaysia’s banking industry’s performance. 
3.8 Conclusion 
There has never been a true Islamic community in Malaysia although Islam was already 
in existence since pre-colonial eras. The concept of Shariah in theory and practice in 
Malaysia has constantly been inconsistent. During the colonial rule, the Residential 
System was introduced, and it marked the birth of a secular system which removed 
religion from the state. The Shariah law practiced prior to the colonial intervention 
became an entirely personal and family law and did not have any influence on the state 
administration. The modern “English law was used as the law of general application in 
all non-religious aspects of life and was portrayed as the only system capable of effecting 
change and economic development” (Yasin, 1994).  
After independence, especially during the Mahathir administration, the Shariah was 
expanded to economic and finance and used as a tool for economic development, while 
maintaining the adapted English legal system. For instance, under the Malaysian taxation, 
the Zakat paid on income is an allowable deduction against the tax payable. This was to 
encourage Muslims to pay Zakat and avoid double tax payments. It intends to demonstrate 
that Shariah law and Islam is a reasonable religion capable of adapting to change. It is an 
undertaking to strengthen the perception of Shariah law as a policy, similar to its position 





CHAPTER 4: THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY (NEP) 
“It is fundamental to remember that the rights accorded to any minority 
or other non-powerful group in any state depend on the ideal of those 
in power. A state may be democratic in form but unless it is democratic 
also in ideal, unless the majority of its citizens are actively loyal to the 
transcendent principles of democracy, recognizing the ideal validity of 
every man's status as a man, then the arithmetic minority has, through 
the democratic form, no rights at all... If Muslims do in fact treat non-
Muslims unjustly then a democratic framework would merely give 
them as a majority the constitutional authority for doing so without let 
or hindrance.” 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith  
4. Introduction 
Malaysia’s policy responses to the 1997 Panic were unique due to its unorthodox 
approach as compared to the neighbouring countries that had suffered the same contagion 
effect. The NEP is understood to be an important factor that affected the policymaker’s 
decision-making process, especially in response to the Panic of 1997. Therefore, this 
chapter examines the reasons behind the establishment of the NEP and its significance to 
the Malaysian people. The first half of this chapter gives the essential background in 
understanding the social and political landscape in Malaysia. It analyses Malaysia’s social 
structure preceding the NEP and the important historical events that compelled the ruling 
government at that time to establish an affirmative action policy such as the NEP.  
The second part of this chapter is the process of legitimisation and implementation of the 
NEP throughout different phases of Malaysia’s 5-Year Plan38. It goes further to analyse 
the importance of the NEP to the extent that the Malaysian government had decided to 
uphold such a policy at the expense of foregoing financial assistance from the IMF. 
 
38  The Malaysia 5 Year Plan is a comprehensive outline of government development policies and 
strategies. The first plan was introduced in 1965, covering the development agenda from 1966 to 1970. 
Currently Malaysia is at the verge of introducing its twelfth plan (2021-2025) as defined by the Economic 




Malaysia took the risk of going against the current, while its neighbours accepted the 
much-needed fund from IMF.  
The NEP is an affirmative action policy that was created as a response to a violent ethnic 
riot that took place on 13 May 1969. This ethnic riot or better known to the older 
generation of Malaysians as the “13th May Incident or Peristiwa 13 Mei”, was recorded 
as one black spot which cannot be wiped out from Malaysian history. Until today it is 
considered a taboo and the most sensitive issue to be discussed in public (Liaw and 
Moiden, 2017). The 13th May Incident convinced the government that the struggle for 
ethnic harmony could only be achieved by reforming the nation's economy and society. 
The government launched the NEP in 1971 with two broad goals: eradicate poverty, 
regardless of race, and restructure society so that no ethnic group could be identified with 
a specific set of jobs39. An Outline Prospective Plan for the period 1970-90 was 
announced in early 1970 for the implementation of the NEP. The broad objective of the 
20-year programme was to launch Malays who make up slightly more than half the 
Malaysian population into the mainstream of Malaysia's economic life (Hiebert and 
Jaysankaran, 1999). 
4.1 Malaysia’s social structure 
Malaysia is situated in Southeast Asia, a country separated into two regions i.e. Peninsular 
Malaysia and East Malaysia. Peninsular Malaysia is made up of 11 states and the Federal 
Territory of Kuala Lumpur and is separated from East Malaysia by the South China Sea. 
East Malaysia comprises two states, Sabah and Sarawak which are located on the northern 
part of the island of Borneo. Malaysia is an ethnically heterogeneous country, with a total 
population of 32.6 million, of which 25.9 million is in Peninsular Malaysia,  2.8 million 
of the population is in Sarawak and 3.9 million in Sabah (Malaysia, 2019). The 
Department of Statistics Malaysia (2019)  reported an estimated ethnic composition of 
 
39 The British policy of “Divide and Conquer” had resulted in the three major ethnic groups to be identified 
by geographical location and occupation. In addition to the British legacy, the Japanese military occupation 




Malaysia’s population as 69.3% Bumiputera40, 22.8% Chinese, 6.9% Indians and 1% of 
other ethnic background. The Bumiputera ethnic group consists of Malays and other 
smaller ethnic groups found in Sabah and Sarawak. These two Borneo states are also less 
developed than the Peninsular states due to their hostile geographical conditions 
hindering much of economic development. The island of Borneo has vast areas of 
swamplands, impenetrable tropical rainforests and mountainous topography, with towns 
and villages mostly linked by rivers and streams.  
Malaysia has undergone significant economic improvement since independence in 1957, 
with GNI per capita in constant 2010 prices rising from USD1,290 in 1960 to USD6,445 
in 1996 (World Bank, 2020). However, the swift development enjoyed has not been 
without its drawbacks. Despite reasonably stable economic growth and low inflation for 
over a decade after Independence, income inequalities increased and poverty remained 
widespread. The ethnic Malays stayed disproportionately poor and were largely found in 
low-productivity peasant agricultural and the public sector, outside the modern, urban and 
corporate domain (Table 4.1). 










Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 68 21 11 
Mining 25 66 9 
Manufacturing 29 65 6 
Construction 22 72 6 
Utilities 48 18 34 
Transport and Communication 43 40 17 
Commerce  24 65 11 
Services 49 36 15 
Note*: Other ethnic group makes up less than 1% of the composition. 
Source: Snodgrass 1980 as adapted in Gomez and Jomo (1999).  
 
40 The term bumiputera does not refer to one ethnic group but refers to Malays and other indigenous people. 
In today's Malaysia, the bumiputera segment of Malaysian society consists of dominantly Malay Muslims, 




The British’s pursuit of economic interest and strategy had placed or rather displaced 
most of the Bumiputeras41 in rural areas, while the minority Chinese and Indians are 
located in urban areas, a severe regional imbalance which had intensified further the 
political-economic dichotomy while the political sphere were monopolised by the elite 
Bumiputeras. The political “urgency of the inequality problem is not because overall 
income distribution is exceptionally skewed but because the inequalities reflect deep 
ethnic divisions within the Malaysian society” (Hashim, 1995). Furthermore, regional 
inequalities still existed, and certain states are generally populated by one ethnic group, 
exacerbates the circumstances. The assumption is that there is a distinct link between 
ethnicity and poverty.  
Malaysia is not spared from confronting with spatial income inequalities and its 
policymakers were compelled to correspond to the challenges of income imbalances 
within their perimeters, which goes beyond the issue of industrial policies or trade 
strategies. Due to its British colonial heritage, the communities were divided through 
geographical location and occupation. The south-western peninsula was centred on 
entrepot market and the tin and rubber industry, whilst the north eastern peninsula were 
focused on fishing and agriculture. The western coastline and southern peninsular, 
populated by the minority Chinese that were originally brought over by British as tin-
miners, had relatively large urban towns which boasted developed public services and 
enjoyed the benefits of modern projects such as financial services and manufacturing. 
Consequently, the west coast of the peninsular was developed into a higher income 
society surrounded with more developed infrastructure. In contrast, rural areas, vastly 
populated by the native Malay, relied on traditional and less profitable economic projects 
and therefore generally lack the same standard of facilities (Jomo, 2004b).  
This structural social inequality was exemplified in the social barometers of well-being 
such as per capita income and education level. This inequality was overlain with an 
ethnical dimension as distinct immigration rules were relevant to specific areas of the 
country. When the Malaysian Federation was formed via the consolidation of East 
 
41 Bumiputera refers to the indigenous of Malaysia, mainly the Malays of Peninsular Malaysia. Non-





Malaysia (Northern Borneo) with the Peninsular states, the situation was further 
accentuated (Hutchinson, 2017). Apart from the inherent intricacy of these conundrums, 
Malaysia had also transformed over time. Its economy had become progressively based 
on industrial and services, general levels of income have increased, and its populace has 
turned out to be further urbanised. Given this, policy responses had also progressed, 
considering different interpretations of the correlation between economic interest and 
topography, whilst concurrently searching the best approach in lowering domestic income 
inequalities (Hutchinson, 2017). 
4.2 The NEP 
As a multi-ethnic nation, Malaysia needs to radically lessen the poverty incidence and 
lower the income inequality among its population while attaining swift economic 
development and preserving ethnic unity. The period between 1970-2000 was 
complicated and challenging, that required a virtuoso approach by the government to cater 
to the wide-ranging requirements of a heterogeneous population.  
The policy decision-makers created a series of policies which gave guidance to the 
government officials for the national development during 1970-2000. The two 
fundamental policies were the NEP (1970-1990) and the National Development Policy 
(1991-2000), which saw national harmony as the aspiration for economic progress and 
their key components shaped the yardstick for all supplementary policies and strategies. 
Mahathir’s Vision 2020 formulated in 1991 complemented these policies and outlined an 
overview of Malaysia’s development for the next 30 years (World Bank, 2004). 
Additionally, there was the NERP passed by the Malaysian cabinet in 1998 - a special 
policy response to deal with an uncharacteristic economic condition that Malaysia 
confronted due to the Panic of 1997. The policy reponses under NERP shall be critically 
analysed in the next 2 chapters. 
4.2.1. Prologue to the NEP 
Throughout the 1960s, economic progress evidently intensified income inequalities in 
Peninsular Malaysia, particularly the income disparities within each main ethnic group. 




1957-1970, in all ethnicity notably among the Muslim Malays. While the majority of 
Chinese and Indians formed the largest part of the working class, the mainstream Malays 
comprised mainly farmers.  
The governing Alliance coalition42 in the 1960s was principally an alliance of ethnic-
based political parties headed by UMNO. In essence, racialism political doctrines met 
with minor competition. As a result, the worsening socio-economic condition and ethical 
scene in the 1960s were interpreted predominantly in ethnic terms. Even though post 
independence, the economy was largely controlled by non-domestic shareholders, many 
ethnic Malays were of the view that ethnic Chinese economic domination had caused the 
underdevelopment of the Malay economy. On the contrary, many non-Bumiputera 
considered the UMNO-led Alliance ruling administration to be accountable for official 
state prejudice towards them. The majority of business communities were Chinese, while 
most state officers were Bumiputera. Hence, only the elite Bumiputera political group 
together with the wealthy Chinese entrepreneurs benefited the most from the economic 
development in the 1960s.  
During the May 1969 general election43, the governing Alliance coalition managed to 
secure a lower majority in the parliament in spite of winning no more than “50% of the 
vote with the aid of gerrymandered constituency and delineations” (Jomo, 2004b). A 
fraction of the Bumiputera and the bulk of non-Bumiputera voted for the opposition 
(Gomez and Jomo, 1999). Pressure had already been building up before the general 
elections due to disappointments insinuating the inherent ethnic relationships. After the 
elections, riots erupted seemingly due to socially aggressive actions by supporters from 
the winning opposition party. The ethnic riots were initiated in the national capital of 
Kuala Lumpur and was understood to be stage-managed by certain politicians. The 
situation was aggravated by the armed demonstration by young cohorts of an incumbent 
minister who had lost his seat in the state assembly.  
 
42 The coalition consists of the Alliance (1954-74) and Barisan Nasional (1974- 2018). 




After the unfavourable election fallouts and the consequent riots, the incumbent prime 
minister Tunku44 was  forced to resign and was replaced by his deputy, Razak, who was 
second-in-command of the ruling coalition. It was understood that he had “orchestrated a 
‘palace coup’—with the stronger military police function in response to the ethnic riots—
to win over the leadership from Tunku” (Jomo, 2004b). Thus, the “transformation of 
UMNO leadership also revealed the dominance and insurgence of ‘Young Turks’ within 
UMNO who had contested Tunku’s leadership” since the late 1960s (Gomez and Jomo, 
1999).  
After the grim 13th May Incident, UMNO’s domination over the Alliance coalition 
became more prominent as it managed to co-opt the opposition parties. Although they 
were mostly established on ethnicity, dissimilar from the parties in the Alliance coalition, 
they were organised less openly along ethnic boundaries. It is commonly recognised that 
Malaysian economic policy had changed radically as a chain reaction to the ethnic 
uprisings and the UMNO’s palace coup connected with the 13th May Incident (Jomo, 
1990).  
The overview on the background of the origination of the NEP is divided into two 
historical periods, (1) the period before independence when Malaysia was under Colonial 
Rule between 1786 until 1957 and (2), the period after independence between 1957 until 
1969. 
4.2.2. The Colonial Rule (1786-1957)  
The British colonisation of Malaya (1786-1957) had shaped the unique characteristics of 
the multi-ethnic society in Malaysia. The economic legacy inherited from the colonial era 
had ended in a clear partition of ethnic groups based on commercial activity, geographical 
area and political behaviour. The colonial Malayan economy grew around the global trade 
in tin and rubber, which was controlled by the British and to a lesser extent the Chinese 
(Hirschman and Suan-Pow, 1979). 
 





When the Sultan of Kedah45 leased Penang to the East India Company (EIC) in 1786, it 
recorded Britain’s first footing in Malaya soil. But colonial control only began in 1874, 
when the Sultan of Perak46 signed the “Perjanjian Pangkor or Pangkor Agreement”, 
under which a British ‘Resident’47 was appointed as an advisor, but his advice “must be 
sought and acted upon on all matters other than those involving the Malay religion and 
custom” (Tarling, 1962). The EIC’s interest was in the tin industry and this had driven 
them to force control over the neighbouring states. They built railroads connecting the 
minefields to the ports in Selangor and Perak and eventually to states along the coastline 
of west Peninsular Malaysia. Other industries such as rubber plantations also flourished 
because of the good transportation network. 
While the British were aware and recognised the Malay’s special rights as the native 
inhabitants of Malaya, economic advancement and the social wellbeing of the Malays 
were not their priority. The colonial policy was in fact to preserve the Malays in their 
familiar and traditional surroundings while the region developed (Smith, 1995). Since the 
British held a particular legal liaison with the Malay aristocracy, they had preferred that 
the prevailing social structure among the Malays be maintained. Hence, the British 
continued to pursue their commercial endeavours while minimising disruption to the 
society. However, the rising need for labour had led the British to import the workforce 
from mainland China and India. Chinese workers were for the tin mines and Indians were 
for the plantations and estates.   
The effects of these British policies were deep reaching on the ethnic architecture of 
Malaysia, notably on the link between jobs and ethnicity. Noh (2012) revealed that the 
British government had constantly passed short-term rational decisions that spurred the 
advancement of two autonomous races, Malays and Chinese. The British resolution to 
safeguard Malay de jure sovereignty while integrating a Chinese commercial existence 
formed two divergent communities that increasingly fought for access to both political 
 
45 Kedah is a state north of the Peninsular and historically Penang Island formed part of its territory.  
46 Perak was a state known for its tin mining on the west coast of the Malay Peninsular. Perak has land 
borders with the Malaysian states of Kedah to the north and Penang to the northwest. 





and commercial resources. However, by 1957 when Malaya gained its independence it 
was imminent for them to enter on some type of consociational arrangement (Noh, 2012). 
In exploiting Malaya’s low-cost resources, the British government did not take into 
account the path susceptible to the nature of policy decisions and any long-term 
repercussions. It had produced in the present-day recognition of ethnicity with economic 
enterprise and geographical area. After achieving independence, there was a divergence 
between commercial and political hegemony of two major classes, one comprising the 
Malay political elites and bureaucrats who enjoyed political prestige but lacked any 
commercial base and financial backing, whilst the other were the Chinese entrepreneurs 
who had a commercial base but lacked the necessary political clout (Hashim, 1995). 
As mentioned earlier, the education policy under the colonial rule did not benefit the rural 
populace which consisted of the majority Malay and Indian descendants. State funded 
secondary schools and tertiary education were only accessible in the urban areas and used 
English as a medium of instruction, while education for the Malay was channelled 
towards fishing and farming.  
4.2.3. Post-Colonial Development (1957-1969)  
Following independence, the new regime introduced a development program specifically 
designed for significant economic expansion while maintaining a predominantly laissez-
faire economic strategy. They carried out strong attempts to enhance the export sector by 
promoting new essential commodities and the manufacturing industry while broadening 
the existing tin and rubber industries. The newly independent Malaysia then identified 
economic progress as the advancement of the contemporary urban region. The modern 
region, manufacturing goods and services were thought to draw a stream of people from 
traditional rural territories. 
However, the improvement in the economy also came with its challenges as the 
government’s pledge to a laissez-faire policy with minimal direct state interference 
favoured the more traditional business considerations, which merged and further 
reinforced the Chinese entrepreneurs. Even though the Malays led the government and 




was not as anticipated and was relatively low (Hashim, 1994). The government’s effort, 
10 years post-independence only saw a slight improvement in the Malay’s participation 
in the economy, which was measured by the share ownership in publicly listed companies 
i.e. only 1.9% share-holdings as compared to 22.5% and 86.7% holding the Chinese and 
foreigners, respectively (Malaysia 1973: 83). Real household incomes for the lower 
income group for all races had declined by 13% after independence up to 1970.  
Hashim (1995) discovered that the income disparity between the common Malay and 
Chinese households was growing, which brought about the notion that any gains of 
progress were being unequally distributed. The Malays initially believed that 
Independence would mean a restoration of their appropriate place in Malaysia’s socio-
economic order. However, when their assumptions remained unrealised as the economy 
prospered, the Malays began developing a strong objection to government policies. On 
the other hand, the non-Malays were starting to resist any government efforts to promote 
Malay political domination and economic interest. Additionally, the less privileged non-
Malays attributed the decrease of their economic stand on state policies that favour the 
Malays. 
The rising hostility and antagonistic views increased ethnic polarisation during the weeks 
preceding the general election in 1969. The increased uneasiness and cynicism of the 
Malays towards the wealthier Chinese climaxed in the violent ethnic riot of 13 May 1969. 
The supposedly congenial coexistence of multi-ethnic community was merely masking 
the now deeply rooted communal cleavages (Hashim, 1995). 
4.2.4.  Legitimising the NEP 
The policymakers were aware of the growing tension and the presence of the Chinese and 
Malay polarisation during the planning stage of the NEP, but trusted that economic 
expansion could iron out the issue of inter-ethnic resentment. Accordingly, they did not 
dedicate concern to the issue of disparity. However, the divergence between prosperity 
and poverty had been widened and finally steered to the Malay infuriation in the shape of 
post-election ethnic riot in 1969 (Milne, 1976). The NEP was implemented after the 1969 
riot, which was triggered by the extent of poverty and widening income between two 




The NEP was believed to be one of the steps chosen by the authority to meet the intentions 
of national unification, and to enhance the relative livelihood of Malays, thus anticipating 
to ward off similar potential outbursts of disturbance. Milne (1976)’s analysis on the NEP 
was not only were its foundations political, but it also had overwhelming political 
ramifications. Its formulation, its implementation and the way in which various ethnic 
groups perceived it, all expressed themselves in political forms (Milne, 1976). The NEP 
had a two-pronged objective of “eliminating poverty and restructuring society to ensure 
economic and social fairness for the less fortunate ethnic community in Malaysia" (Rasiah 
and Shari, 2001). It has been claimed that the NEP is based on one of the most essential 
principles of fairness, and its implementation had set the foundation for a modern 
Malaysian society for all races (Pramanik, 2002).  
i) The NEP was drawn to cover a twenty-year outlook for the period of 1971-90 and 
subdivided into smaller four detailed 5-year Malaysian Plans: 
ii) The Second Malaysian Plan (1971-1975) 
iii) The Third Malaysian Plan (1976-80) 
iv) The Fourth Malaysian Plan (1981-1985) 
v) The Fifth Malaysian Plan (1986-90)  
4.2.5. The Second Malaysian Plan (“2MP”) 
The 2MP saw the beginning of the NEP with an overriding objective of national unity, a 
result of the government’s dramatic response to the 1969 ethnic riot (Malaysia, 1971; 
Lim, 1986). The 2MP’s poverty eradication programme was to increase the access for the 
poor to property, capital and education as well as other public facilities. The focus of 2MP 
was to find the most effective way of reducing the occurrence of absolute poverty, unlike 
the previous First Malaysia Plan (1965-1970) which had ignored this and was only 
designed to promote economic expansion via focusing on the import-substitution trades 
and export (Malaysia, 1970; Md. Mansur, 2000). The 2MP was drafted as the first 
program in the sequence of the NEP series and accorded utmost importance to a more 
even dissemination of income and affluence among the public (Malaysia, 1971; Lim, 
1986). The 2MP as the introduction to the NEP was intended to accomplish the target via 




i) The first prong was aimed at curtailing and ultimately ensuring that Malaysians, 
regardless of ethnic group, be free of poverty; 
ii) The second prong was aimed at accelerating the process of restructuring 
Malaysian society to correct economic imbalance, to reduce and eventually 
eliminate the identification of race with economic function”\. (Malaysia, 1971).  
This process required the rejuvenation of rural communities, a swift and improvement of 
urban projects and at all stages of the processes, so that Bumiputera communities would 
turn into full participants in all facets of the monetary activity of the country. The NEP 
was centred on a rapidly growing economy, and that in the execution of the strategy "the 
Government will assure that no specific group will encounter any loss or suffer any sense 
of destitution" (Malaysia, 1971). In the application of the 2MP, the Malaysian 
government chose to be more forceful and led the project in lessening the economic gap 
between the Bumiputera and the non-Bumiputera, as opposed to the laissez-faire attitude 
of neo-liberalism pre-1970. Foreign trade policies were designed to regulate wholly 
owned foreign entities and to promote joint venture projects with local associates, but the 
government made considerable attempts to draw further foreign investment to fund the 
construction industries (Athukorala, 1998). 
Legal provisions have been modified and many contemporary businesses have been 
created during the 2MP period. The Investment Incentive Act (1968) stated that the NEP 
guidelines for the supervision of offshore finance were given solely to companies having 
pioneer status, which produced complications in reaching desired ownership quota and 
employment objectives of the NEP (World Bank, 2004). This was because the guidelines 
covered only a limited fraction of companies engaging in business in Malaysia, merely 
about 10% of the total. In 1971, this Act was modified to urge Bumiputera’s involvement 
in other sectors than agriculture, such as manufacturing or business (World Bank, 2017c). 
In addition, institutions were established or restructured to either inspect or enforce 
implementation of the NEP (Md. Mansur, 2000).   
4.2.6. The Third Malaysian Plan (“3MP”) 
The 3MP was the second 5-year plan in the series of the NEP and its primary aims were 




to streamline society via economic growth instead of redistributive approach. The 
difference between 2MP and 3MP is that under 3MP, the private sector especially with 
exports and corporate investment was expected to boost the economic growth, while the 
2MP relied on public expenditure and investment for the economic growth (Malaysia, 
1976; Lim, 1986). 
4.2.7. The Fourth Malaysian Plan (“4MP”) 
The 4MP was a continuation of the 2MP and 3MP, but the plan was concentrated to the 
expansion of heavy industry to utilise Malaysia’s natural gas. Since capital investment in 
heavy industries required substantial amount of funds over a long gestation phase, the 
government set-up a public-owned company, the Heavy Industry Corporation of 
Malaysia (HICOM) to direct public funds into these projects, as domestic private funds 
were unable to manage these ventures (Malaysia, 1981). Since Malaysia was faced with 
low economic growth during the early 1980s due to the global recession, public sector 
spending was restrained and the Industrial Coordination Act (ICA 1984) was amended in 
1984 to relax the prevailing economic policies. The amended ICA 1984 permitted foreign 
investors 30% equity ownership and up to 80 % if they export a minimum 20% of their 
manufactured products (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). 
4.3 The Fifth Malaysia Plan (“5MP”)  
The 5MP was mainly on preserving the general objectives, whilst giving emphasis to the 
industrial sector. The 5MP was to improve investment by providing incentives for 
investment in tourism, manufacturing and agriculture (Malaysia, 1986). Consequently, 
the Incentives Act (1971) was repealed and superseded by a new act in 1986. Under the 
improved Promotion of Investment Act (PIA 1986), pioneer status companies were 
allowed a 5-year tax holiday, regardless of the investment stage (Malaysia, 1986). 
Additionally, the pioneer status length was stretched to 10 years on a case-by-case basis 




4.4 Legacies of the NEP 
The NEP’s core foundation was to balance the scale between economic development and 
nationwide acceptance. The Panic of 1997 had caused the policy decision-makers to 
critically reassess Mahathir’s economic policy structure as the NEP’s core objectives 
were still the main aspiration surrounding the policy responses (Lee, 2004). NEP’s core 
objectives were to lessen the wealth inequality among the 3 major ethnic groups, i.e. the 
Bumiputera, Chinese and Indian, with the underprivileged majority Bumiputera given 
special attention. However, during the early days of implementation of the NEP, its 
legitimacy was hardly questioned due to the political and social repercussions, even when 
some NEP processes had adversely effects to the economic progress (Milne, 1976). 
Mahathir had also launched the ‘Look East’ policy to emulate the work culture and 
economic progress of the East Asian countries, especially Japan and Korea, countries 
which were more similar to Malaysia in terms of social and political welfare as compared 
to the Western European nations.  
In 1985, Malaysia was hit by a recession with a soft 10% contraction and continued for 
one year. However, it was deepened by the declining export products, particularly tin, 
rubber, petroleum and palm oil. Hence, there was restricted scope for monetary 
development because the government had excessively invested in heavy industrial 
ventures via its public-owned HICOM. Consequently, the Mahathir administration 
changed its efforts to attract non-Bumiputera and foreign investors. Two liberal policies 
were introduced to encourage investment from overseas investors via the PIA 1986 and 
the ICA 1984 was amended to support funds from non-Bumiputera investors. These 
policies eased the restrictions on employment terms and ownership that were initially 
intended to support the Bumiputera’s stake in the economy, especially in the 
manufacturing sector (Jomo, 2003). 
Even though the Malaysian government had gradually embarked into more liberal polices 
akin to the Washington consensus but the government still did not abandon the NEP. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that Mahathir instigated these policies not to revamp 
the NEP framework but to withstand the economic recession. Given this, it is rational to 
imply that his policy modification were pragmatic and a not directly influenced by 




Snodgrass (1995) noted in his work that liberalisation was a reaction to overcome the 
short-term setback of the recession in 1986, but due to its success the liberal policies 
morphed into the basis for a lengthened development strategy. Although Mahathir was a 
prominent advocate of hard work, better efficiency, and resourcefulness while 
condemning grants, he is barely a coherent free market economist. He is more resonant 
of President Roosevelt, elected to office in the Depression and pitching about 
pragmatically to find a possible remedy (Snodgrass, 1995).   
One of NEP’s initial manifesto was to scale back uneconomical public companies to 
reduce the cost of public funding. This goal was not entirely achieved. The principal cause 
was that the deregulation and industry-oriented restructurings try to avoid from intruding 
on Bumiputera’s interest in the market. Quite the opposite, a key requirement for 
privatisation exercises was that they must correspond to NEP purposes i.e. the 
Bumiputera’s economic well-being should be improved in the development (Jomo, 
2004b). In fact, during the period of privatisation (1986-1989) 8 mega projects were 
awarded to Bumiputera entrepreneurs and ironically, the policy offered the commercial 
and monetary foundation for cronyism, as prominent Bumiputera policymakers awarded 
government deals to their protégés (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). 
4.5 Liberalisation of Malaysian policies 
When Mahathir was elected to office in 1981, he vouched that the government was to 
sponsor developments of a heavy industrial segment, but was shortly confronted with the 
global economy downturn. Even challenged by escalating economic difficulty, Mahathir 
persevered in his effort to create the national car (Proton car), steel (Perwaja Steel) and 
cement (Perak-Hanjong Cement) companies. For the period between 1981 to 1984, 
Malaysia ran a hefty budget and caused a deficit in its balance of payments, with the 
anticipation that the global commodity prices would rise and rectify the situation.   
However, the anticipated price rise did not occur and overdue fiscal adjustments were 
made and regulations overseeing private investments were relaxed in 1986. This 
liberalisation act had exempted various companies from the required local ownership and 
other affirmative action obligations, which was initially imposed by the NEP. The 




inflows from the Northeast to Southeast Asia stimulated by a rise in wage and exchange 
rate realignments. Since 1987, economic growth had been near 9% per annum, leading to 
yet unfamiliar prosperity, full employment48, and considerable immigration from 
bordering countries (Snodgrass, 1995; Farooqi, 2010).  
Gradually in the early 1990s, liberal politicians had undertaken more liberal policies and 
although there was no visible demarcation of a policy swing, they incorporated some 
characteristics of neoliberalism whether explicitly or implicitly. Two core policies, being 
extensions of the NEP i.e. the National Development Policy and Mahathir’s Vision 2020 
had outlined nine tasks to be dealt by the government before Malaysia can achieve its 
goal of becoming a developed nation by 2020. Three of these tasks were akin to neo-
liberalisation-with-industrialization as it’s a paradigm shift from a fading Keynesian 
developmentalism and an emergent Washington Consensus. 
Due to political reasons, from time to time Mahathir adopts non-liberal policies such as 
control on capital, despite being challenged by the more liberal policy makers at the MoF 
and BNM. The slight shift in the direction towards neoliberal economic concepts were 
both driven by political deliberations and economic motivations (Lee, 2004). Even though 
Bumiputera entrepreneurs were safeguarded and financially supported by the NEP, some 
criticised that the support and grants were still inadequate to achieve the primary objective 
of 30% stake of the economy. However, Mahathir discarded the complaint and thought 
that Bumiputera entrepreneurs were too reliant on government facilitations instead of 
attempting to improve technology and increase productivity. Mahathir highlighted in his 
speech in Kuala Lumpur titled “The Way Forward” (Mahathir, 1991), “While all these 
socio-economic programmes were being carried out, the Government had also to ensure 
that economic growth would not be retarded. Indeed the NEP could not have been 
implemented if there was no growth, for it was premised on the expansion of the 
economic cake and not on redistribution of existing wealth.”  
Another key argument to support commercial liberalisation is that it creates competition 
and a competitive environment will bring in new technology and skills and consequently 
 




improving the quality of manufactured products. Hence, the developing countries can 
enhance their export potential (Jomo, 2001a).  
4.5.1. Financial Liberalisation 
Prior to introducing the NEP, most banks were controlled and managed by foreigners and 
Chinese entrepreneurs. After the establishment of NEP, measures were undertaken to 
raise more Malay capitalists by setting up commercial banks and to urge them to give 
credits to Bumiputera entreprenuers. Consequently, the Malay-owned banks 
progressively improved in number during the 1970s. At that time, foreign banks were 
bound with stricter controls. “From 1983, foreign banks could not set-up new local office 
or branches in Malaysia. A foreign firms must follow the ‘60/40 borrowing guideline’, 
that compelled the foreign companies to fund at least 60% of their loans with Malaysian 
banks” (Malaysia, 1971, 1976). Furthermore, “foreign stake in banks were capped at 30%. 
Consequently, the percentage of foreign bank’s share of bank deposits was reduced to 
circa 30% from a high of 70% over a period of about 10 years, from 1980s to 1990s” 
(Athukorala, 2001). 
However, the NEP resulted in moral hazard as certain banks were considered as “piggy 
banks” by certain Malay politicians patronising Bumiputera companies. This moral 
hazard was reassessed during the recession in the 1980s. For instance, Bank Bumiputera 
Malaysia Berhad (BBMB49), a bank established with the aim to offer business loans to 
Bumiputera entrepreneurs. However, proper credit valuation process were surpassed as 
political positions took higher priority. BBMB’s NPLs ballooned and the bank was bailed 
out twice by the Malaysian government during the recession in the late 1980s based on 
the grounds that the failure of a large bank would hurt the Malaysian financial markets. 
Given this incident, BNM had decided to liberalise the banking sector to the allow Malay-
owned banks to withstand market forces and promote competition. Accordingly in 1991, 
BNM had abolished the restrictions on the base lending rate (BLR) to promote 
competition among banks. Concurrently, the market regulation and supervision 
 




frameworks were also tightened, by introducing  a two-tier structure in 1994 (Gomez and 
Jomo, 1999).  
Financial markets liberalisation became more radical in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The parliament passed the Banking and Financial Institutions Act (BAFIA) to govern the 
banking system, while Malaysian firms can only trade at the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE) as KLSE broke away from Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES) in 
January 1990. In 1992, the Securities Act was passed to enable the establishment of a new 
Securities Commission (SC), which took over role of stock market regulation and 
supervision from the Capital Issues Committee (CIC), previously managed by BNM 
(Malaysia, 1986; BNM, 1998b).  
“Foreign investor could increase their equity in domestic brokerage firms to 49%. An 
international offshore financial centre was also launched in Labuan IOFC50 in October 
1990 to promote Malaysia as a financial hub in Southeast Asia” (BNM, 1998a, 1999c). 
The primary aim of the Labuan was to draw interest in international investors for setting 
up offices away from their home country. The Labuan Offshore Financial Services 
Authority (LOFSA) was established in February 1996 for offshore banks to be governed 
by a more relaxed system (BNM, 1999c). This also resulted in another moral hazard as 
several Malaysian financial companies tapped into the more relaxed offshore centre to 
evade regulations. For instance, USD800 million loans by Malaysian commercial banks 
to Renong51 and Hottick Investments (Hong Kong) was overlooked for a long time as 
Labuan was outside the supervision of BNM (Pura, 1998). 






 Removing regulation on interest rate of fixed deposits 






50 Labuan is an island, northwestern Borneo in the South China Sea. In 1990 the island was declared a tax 
haven by the Malaysian government as the first step toward developing it into an offshore financial centre 
(https://www.britannica.com/place/Labuan). 







 Lifting administrative control on all deposit rates of 
finance companies and fixed deposit rates (exceeding 
one-year maturity) of commercial banks 
 Freeing interest rates for deposits of 12 months and 
less and prime lending rates of commercial banks 
 Introducing new interest rate system to boost 
competition 














 The Banking Act - setting the legal and financial 
requirements for compliance by banking institutions 
 New provision of the Central Bank of Malaysia 
Ordinance of 1958 to resolve NPLs 
 The Bank and Financial Institution Act (BAFIA) - 
increasing minimum amount for capital funds (foreign 
banks should meet higher minimum capital adequacy 
ratio than domestic ones) 
 Establishment of the Securities Commission as a 
















 Transition to an IMF article VIII country52 
 Replacing the pound sterling with the US dollar in 
defining the exchange rate parity of the Ringgit 
 Establishing the Labuan Offshore Financial Service 
Authority (LOFSA) 








Source: Drawn from UN Economic and Social Commission as adapted in Lee (2004) 
 
Generally, Malaysia’s move towards financial liberalisation was steady and prudent 
(Yusof et al., 1995), as illustrated by Table 4.2 above. Malaysia’s pragmatic approached 
was to ensure minimum exposure to huge short-term foreign currency debts compared. 
By the end of 1997, Malaysia’s debt was approximately 160% of its GDP, but the bulk 
of the debt was Ringgit debts, not  foreign currency, unlike its neighbours (Lee, 2004). 
 
52 IMF Article VIII provides in Sections 2 and 3 that members shall not impose or engage in certain 
measures, namely restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international 
transactions, discriminatory currency arrangements, or multiple currency practices, without the 




Short term capital flows were reduced by BNM’ prudential regulations and preference of 
FDIs, explained below: 
I. BNM’s prudential regulations to reduce foreign currency-denominated loans by 
domestic companies. High loan growth in the 1990s, and exposure to stock 
markets and property created bubbles. BNM could deal with the drawback by 
selecting pre-emptive actions by making improvements in credit allocation and 
firming up of the prudential controls, especially on loans to share margins and real 
estates. Additionally, the Tier-1 minimum capital requirement for banks was 
raised in compliance with the Basel Accord (BNM, 1998a, 1999c). 
II. The Malaysian authorities preferred FDI rather than portfolio investment as 
portfolio investment are regarded as more unpredictable than FDI. During the 
early 1990s, FDI amounted to 70% of the foreign capital inflows and 8.7% of the 
GDP (Athukorala, 2000). 
The Ringgit Malaysia was initially pegged to the GBP under a currency board system 
since the late 1960s. In 1967, it was switched to a more flexible system and in 1972, the 
GBP was substituted by the US Dollar. However, after the demise of the Bretton Woods 
system in the same year, the Ringgit was no longer pegged to the US Dollar. The Ringgit 
was fixed to a traded-weighted basket of currencies and the regulated floating rate regime 
had effectively stabilised the exchange rate.  
Since its independence in 1957, Malaysia’s cross-border transactions had remained 
liberal. Malaysia was very much an open economy and had consistently adopted a method 
to economic progress that comprised the liberalisation of capital flows. The government 
carried out an initial phase of liberalisation on the foreign exchange regulations after 
adopting IMF’s Article VIII obligations53 in November 1968. Thereafter, the Ringgit was 
floated in 1973, adding extra measures to liberalise the capital account controls between 
1986-87 and again in 1994–96 after periodic reviews of the exchange control regulations.  
 
53 Following more developed Asian countries like Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore, Malaysia was the 4th 




Beginning in the late 1980s, capital account liberalisation was increased by taking gradual 
steps of the deregulation of the financial structure. Major reforms were aimed at a steady 
interest rates liberalisation, credit controls cutbacks, and heightening of competition and 
effectiveness in the system. Considerable effort was made to intensify the financial 
markets, i.e. the enhancement of the regulatory and legal system, improving the 
monitoring processes and updating the regulations to tackle prudential matters. This 
included classification of loans and non-performing loans, requirements on provisioning 
and disclosure, clarifying the parameters on large exposures, bank liquidity position as 
well as capital adequacy. 
In comparison with other Southeast Asia countries, Malaysia had managed a reasonably 
liberal system of cross-border transactions. Its path to liberalisation was distinct from 
other Southeast Asia countries due of its unique importance on social aspirations together 
with economic progress and there was fundamental consensus among political front-
runners that social aspirations of the NEP was not abandoned. The Mahathir 
administration realised that liberalisation had potential in-depth ramifications for a 
country that centred its doctrine on ethnic unity. His pseudo-egalitarian administration 
could not be substantiated if he failed to protect the NEP. However, the financial crisis 
had driven the government to reassess its relaxed approach towards capital account 
liberalisation. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The period between 1957 to 1996 is important as it sets the tone for Malaysia’s political 
and economic nature in the years to come. The chapter has reiterated a consistent 
development policy with a strong objective in improving the social and economic 
imbalance between the multi-ethnic groups in Malaysia. It has showed that in managing 
the expectations of Malaysia’s two major communities and its own expectations, the post-
independence administration employed policies that created self-reinforcing institutions 
that led to the formation of two autonomous communities with exclusive sets of 
institutions.  
In managing the Malay expectations, the chapter has described how the NEP and 




Malay capacity and create a repertoire of Malay-based institutions. Even though the NEP 
to a certain extent achieved its objective of poverty eradication, portrayed by the analysis 
of Table 4.3 below, it had also created some moral hazard in turning Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs to be too reliant on government support (Mahathir, 2010). 
Table 4.3:  Poverty eradication in Peninsular Malaysia under the NEP (1970-90) 
Ethnic group Percentage of households below the poverty line (%) 
 Year 1970 Year 1990 
Bumiputera 65.0 20.8 
Chinese 26.0 5.7 
Indian 39.0 8.0 
Other 44.8 18.0 
Total 49.0 15.0 
Source: Government of Malaysia (1991, p. 46)  
No two countries are really similar in all matters, as each country will have to plan its 
own core development philosophy, policies and plans. The Malaysian government would 
have had a full comprehension of the challenges facing the country and its people and 
would take the appropriate actions to address them in a relevant, pragmatic and politically 
tolerable manner. The protection of NEP would have not been in favour of other ethnic 
minorities, especially the Chinese, as they did not directly benefit from it. However, they 
did not reject it totally as they were conscious of the possible implications based on their 
knowledge of Malaysia’s history. Malaysia had to persevere with the selected philosophy, 
policies and plans but be pragmatic and adaptable so that the policies will remain relevant 
and suitable to fluctuating environments.  
In summary, a country must have the wisdom and willingness to act independently and 
in its own interest, especially in the light of a financial crisis. The Panic of 1997 if not 
managed with caution, taking into consideration all aspects of the country’s 
circumstances, rather than just its financial well-being may turn into an intense socio-





However, critics of the NEP had argued that without the NEP, Malaysia may have 
achieved better economic growth. This argument is probably correct but would have come 
at the cost of social divergence and worsened the income disparity. Indonesia is a country 
similar to Malaysia in terms of its demography during the 1990s but was the only country 
that did not recover from the Panic of 1997 as the intervention from IMF had ignored the 





CHAPTER 5:  RESTRUCTURING OF FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
“If the debtor is in a difficulty, grant him time till it is easy for him to 
repay. But if you remit it by way of charity, that is best for you if you 
only knew” 
(Quran, 2:280) 
“The 1997–98 Asian financial crisis was a major turning point for 
macroeconomic management and financial sector policy in Malaysia. It 
triggered a series of deep macro-financial reforms in Malaysia that have 
transformed the country’s financial system into a resilient, diversified 
and sound one 20 years later” 
The World Bank (2017b) 
5. Introduction  
Since a financial crisis would have a significant impact in the social and economic well-
being of the country, Malaysia’s NEAC had responded immediately by initiating actions 
to maintain the financial market stability. After the Panic of 1997 hit Thailand, the NEAC 
believed that it was crucial for Malaysia to maintain financial stability that it had enjoyed 
over the last two decades. A stable financial market is when savings are allocated 
efficiently to investment opportunities. This will ensure that available resources are 
allocated efficiently towards promoting economic expansion and development (BNM, 
1998b). The Panic of 1997 had put Malaysia on the edge of a potentially great recession, 
and the whole of the country’s economy registered a negative growth rate of 7.5% in 
1998, the per capita income contracted by more than 1.8% in 1998, and the KLSE 
composite index dropped by 44.9% during the period from 1 July 1997 to 31 December 
1997 (Azmi and Razak, 2014). The NEAC had decided that it was crucial to implement 
strategies to promptly restore trust and confidence to strengthen the financial sector. 
Malaysia’s immediate response was to sanction the short selling of blue-chip shares and 





This chapter, divided into three parts, will study the financial market reform initiatives as 
one of the main policy responses in achieving financial market stability as proposed by 
the NEAC. The first part of this chapter will briefly examine the financial market 
performance in Malaysia before the Panic of 1997, and then it will analyse the 
management of debt from an Islamic perspective. It will also study the rationale behind 
the NEAC’s decision and the process of undertaking this strategy in stabilising the 
financial market in Malaysia. The second part of this chapter will study in detail the 
establishment of the three special purpose government agencies that was set up to 
undertake this special task of policy implementation i.e. Danaharta, Danamodal and the 
CDRC. And finally, the third part of this chapter will analyse briefly the financial system 
reforms that were undertaken by the other crisis-affected countries in the Southeast Asia, 
namely Indonesia, Thailand and Korea54 as a comparative review. This analysis is crucial 
as a comparative review of the financial system reforms in these countries were part of 
IMF’s conditions for the financial aid that it had provided. The analysis will summarise 
the similarities and differences of the financial system reforms approaches undertaken by 
these countries and their impact on the economic and social well-being of the countries. 
The pre-crisis economic conditions in the Southeast Asia countries including Malaysia, 
had aggravated the effects of the Panic of 1997 via rapid economic expansion in the 
1990s. The economic expansion had enabled financial institutions to increase their loan 
growth substantially, comfortably making provision for losses and expanding their capital 
bases. During these years of high economic prosperity, there were increasing credits to 
fund economically unsound investments and other inadequate lending activities i.e. 
connected lending, high exposure to single customers, and excessively high sectoral loans 
concentration. Teo (2000, p. 14) stated that when the impact of the Crisis eroded 
companies’ repayment capacity, the financial sector was suddenly faced with sharply 
increasing NPLs, loan-loss provisioning requirements, eroding collateral values and 
deteriorating capital bases. 
 
54 Similar to Malaysia, both Indonesia and Thailand are also NIEs of the HPAEs. Korea is a North East 
Asia HPAEs as categorised by the East Asian Miracle report by the World Bank (Chapter 2). Korea is the 




5.1 Malaysia’s financial market performance prior to the Panic of 1997 
This section examines the performance of the Malaysian financial sector during the period 
prior to the Panic of 1997, specifically after the recession in 1985/86 up to 1997/8. It will 
focus on the commercial banking sector as commercial banks distinctly dominate the 
financial sector as it holds 74% of total assets at the end of 1998 as compared to other 
financial institutions.  
Table 5.1: Commercial banks (including foreign banks) - Key performance 
indicators  
Source: BNM (1994, 1999) as adapted in Dogan and Fausten (2003). 
Note:  
Except for the first four and last rows all figures are in RM million, pegged exchange rate of RM3.8 per 
USD  
1 From BNM Annual Report 2000.                                      
2 At financial year ends. 
3 Includes Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad.                             
4 At calendar year ends. 
5 Net NPL: Gross NPL− (interest-in-suspense) – (specific provisions for doubtful and bad debts).  
6 1996 figures. 
7 When a loan is classified as NPL, interest income is not recognised until it is realised on a cash basis.  
8 Bad debt provisions consist of special and general provisions. General provision is made to cover possible 




The commercial banking sector underwent significant growth even though the total 
number of commercial banks declined slightly from 38 to 35 (Table 5.1). The aggregate 
data shows that networks had nearly doubled, the number ATMs increased threefold, and 
substantial increase in the number of employees and total assets. According to a study by 
Dogan and Fausten (2003), commercial banks showed that the financial outcome from 
the 1985/6 recession had resulted in net NPL of 17.8% of the commercial banks’ total 
loans by the end of 1988. Rapid economic improvement during 1990–1996 boosted 
earnings and improved debt servicing by the banks’ customers. Pre-tax profits increased 
seven-fold during the economic recovery phase from RM679 million (USD178.7 million) 
to RM4.8 billion (USD1.26 billion), while the NPL ratio declined to 1.9%. The rapid 
banking expansion continued until the Panic of 1997 hit the Malaysian economy.  
The initial policy response on 24-25 March 1998 initiated by Finance Minister Anwar 
had dramatically reversed the improvement on the NPL ratio. One of the immediate 
measures to be adopted by the financial institutions was to bring loan classification 
standards to international best practices, i.e. the current classification of 6 months for NPL 
to 3 months. Other stricter measures were also implemented, such as expanding capital 
adequacy framework to incorporate market risk, reducing single customer limit from 30% 
to 25% of capital funds and more intensive and rigorous supervision including conducting 
monthly stress tests on individual banking institutions (NEAC, 1998). This was a 
prerequisite for Malaysia to accept a RM1 billion (USD263 million) loan from the World 
Bank for social and poverty-related projects, with the aim that the structural reform in the 
financial sector should include more transparency and disclosure for banks and 
companies (NEAC, 1998). 
Consequently, the NPL ratio had tripled the point it had reached the previous 3 years to 
5.9% (Table 5.1). The sector suffered an aggregate pre-tax loss of RM657.9 million 
(USD173.1 million), which indicated an RM5.5 billion (USD1.45 billion) reversal over 
three years, and a reduction of roughly 200% from the already low level at the onset of 
the decade. Some advancements towards financial liberalisation were carried out during 
the early 1990s, most notably BNM’s removal of controls over interest rates i.e. in 
February 1991, banks were allowed to set their own deposit and lending rates (Dogan and 
Fausten, 2003, p. 207). Other reforms involved the “scope of investment of commercial 




suspension of interest on NPLs and provisioning for bad and doubtful debts; guidelines 
for minimum audit standards for internal auditors of financial institutions and duties and 
responsibilities of directors of financial institutions” (BNM, 1999c). Concurrently, certain 
quantitative lending directives that relates to the NEP remained in effect. Malaysian 
commercial banks and finance companies were compelled to allocate a particular amount 
of credit to priority sectors including the Bumiputera business community of Malays, 
small and medium-sized companies, and prospective homebuyers from lower middle-
income groups (Randhawa, 2011). The mandated priority lending requirements had to be 
met by financial institutions as a group (BNM, 1999c).  
5.2 Management of Debt in Islam 
The fundamental principle of any framework that deals with distressed debt is the effort 
taken to fulfil the obligation itself. The Quran makes specific mention that debt obligation 
must be repaid as well as the appropriate treatment for dealing with debtors who are in 
financial difficulty. The most direct example of this principle is in the opening verse of 
the surah Al-Maidah,55 ‘Oh, ye who believe! Fulfil your obligations’ (Quran,5:1). The 
word obligation or Aqad in arabic originated from the root word for "knot" or "tie”. Aqad 
also means a promise or a binding contract, which is the essential foundation for the law 
of contracts in Islam. Similar convictions were revealed in other verses in the Quran and 
Islamic scholars indicated that the Aqad or contract in Islam is equivalent to the legal 
principle Pacta sunt servanda56, Latin for ‘agreements must be honoured’ (Herman, 
2016).  
This notion on the importance of debt repayment is reinforced by the Sunnah where the 
Prophet Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص defends a creditor who had harshly demanded a camel from the 
Prophet, a camel that the Prophet owed him. The creditor’s harshness towards the Prophet 
angered his companions, but the Prophet stated that the creditor had his rights. The 
Prophet then instructed his companions to give the man a better camel, remarking that 
 
55 All English translations of the Qur'an are based on either Yusuf Ali's or Marmaduke Mohammad 
Pickthal's widely used translations. 




"the best among you are those who repay their debts handsomely”57. There were several 
related Hadith on the significance of debt repayments, where the Prophet stated, 
“Procrastination in repaying debts by a wealthy man is injustice”58 and the Prophet also 
mentioned that a martyr will not enter paradise until his debt is paid off (Drew, 2018, p. 
130). 
Furthermore, a collection of Hadiths also paints a daunting picture of the perils of being 
in debt and the failure to repay. In one often repeated narrative in Islamic teachings, the 
Prophet's wife, Aisha, recounts her conversation with the Prophet59 where she asked him 
why he so often seeks God's “refuge . . . from all sins, and from being in debt.” He 
responded, “If a person is in debt, he tells lies when he speaks, and breaks his words when 
he promises.” It was also revealed in the Quran, dishonesty or untrustworthy are 
characteristics that are detested in Islam, “It is most hateful in the sight of Allah that you 
say that which you do not do” (Quran 61:3). In addition, the Prophet Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص had 
warned the people after his time that there will come a day where trustworthiness barely 
exists in business dealings. Trustworthiness is a very critical aspect in day-to-day 
transactions, for it relates to fairness in all aspects of life. However, it is impossible to 
avoid dishonest transactions completely. In a related Hadith, the Prophet Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص 
also said “People are just like camels; out of one hundred, one can hardly find a single 
camel to ride.”60 
In Islam, believers should try their best to fulfil their obligations, trusts and contracts with 
other people, for default will not display good character. As stated in the Quran, one must 
take precaution even when dealing with the people that you trust: “O you who have 
believed, when you contract a debt for a specific term, write it down… bring to witness 
two witnesses from among your men…” (Quran 2:282). Islamic teachings via the Quran 
encourage proper documentation and caution in transactions so that fraudulent and 
unethical dealings will be mitigated. Nonetheless, the Quran also guides the creditors on 
how to deal with distressed debtors: “If the debtor is in difficulty, grant him time till it is 
 
57 A hadith compiled by Sahih Bukhari (38:502) as narrated by Abu Hurairah RA. 
58 A hadith compiled by Sahih Bukhari, (41:585; 37:486) as narrated by Abu Hurairah RA. 
59 A hadith compiled by Sahih Bukhari, 41:582, narrated by Aisha RA.  




easy for him to repay. But if you remit it by way of charity, that is best for you if you only 
knew” (Al-Baqarah 2:280). This verse translates to Islam encouraging debt forgiveness, 
provided there is a sound reason for such an act e.g. layoffs, financial crises and natural 
disasters (Amin, 2017). While voluntary remission is favoured and will be rewarded, the 
decision for the discharge of a debt is left to be decided by the creditors and not made 
mandatory (Herman, 2016). 
In dealing with debt management from a macroeconomic perspective, it is important that 
a crisis-affected country like Malaysia maintains financial market stability to prevent the 
possibility of a banking crisis. Stability can be achieved when there is trust and confidence 
in the financial market. In a corresponding Hadith on state intervention that was narrated 
by Anas ibn Malik61: “Prices rose during the time of the Prophet Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص and the 
People said O Messenger of Allah, prices have shot up, so fix prices for us. He said: Allah 
is the One who fixes prices, the One who withholds, the One who gives lavishly and 
provides, and I hope that when I meet Allah, none of you will have any claim on me for 
an injustice regarding blood or property.” 
Based on the above Hadith, a majority of Islamic scholars are of the opinion that the state 
should not interfere in fixing prices (Drew, 2018, p. 82). However, Islahi (1996, pp. 95–
96) argued an alternative view on the Hadith based on the works of Ibn Taymiyah62 that 
government may only interfere if there is a real need, such as when there is injustice in 
the market or when people’s lives are at risk. 
5.3 The Policy Response – Maintain Financial Stability 
In an economic crisis, stabilisation of the market takes preference over market 
equilibrium, and without a stable environment even the most viable of companies would 
fail (Chellappah, 2001, p. 77). Financial stability is achieved when the financial institution 
 
61 A sound hadith recorded by Ibn Majah in Sunan Abu Daud, Book 23, hadith 3444 (English translation). 
62 Ibn Taymiyah (1263-1328) was a prominent and controversial Syrian thinker, theologian, Hanbali jurist, 
and political figure. His intellectual activities, preaching, and politics resulted in persecution and 
imprisonment. Main doctrine was the supremacy and authoritativeness of the Quran and Sunnah of 




framework operates efficiently and there is confidence in the financial markets. 
Malaysia’s central bank, BNM’s primary objective is to promote a solid and efficient 
Malaysian financial system. A system that can combat negative economic cycles and 
shocks. Therefore, it must take measures in preventing excessive interruptions to the 
existing framework, while preserving significant confidence in the financial system.  
Financial instability and its effects on the economy can be highly disastrous due to its 
contagion or spill-over effects to other parts of the economy (Schwartz, 2002). Hence, it 
is necessary to have a solid and robust fiscal structure to reinforce the dynamic reserves 
allocation and risks dissemination across the economy (BNM, 1998a, p. 5). Financial 
instability can have either monetary or non-monetary causes and may be solely domestic 
or spread among countries. Anna Schwartz (1988, p. 53) cited in (Bordo and Wheelock, 
1998, p. 41) argues that a central bank “that was able to maintain price stability would 
also incidentally minimise the need for lender-of-last-resort intervention”. Financial 
instability, according to Schwartz, has often been caused or made worse by fluctuations 
in the aggregate price level. A monetary policy that maintains price stability would thus 
also promote financial stability. 
One crucial pillar of national cohesion is effective internal financial systems. Weak 
financial systems can destabilise local economies and make them more vulnerable to 
external shocks, despite sound macroeconomic management. Villiger63 (2001, p. 40) 
highlighted that “global instability originates from poorly regulated and often distorted 
financial sectors, lack of transparency and ineffective risk management systems”. Whilst, 
Bordo (1998, p. 44) defined financial crisis as a “banking panic, which is an event 
characterised by widespread depositor runs on banks, leading to a decline in the 
deposit/currency ratio and possibly many bank failures. A banking panic is also 
characterised by contagion, or runs, on solvent banks.”  
The Panic of 1997 had resulted in the collapse in the stock market and significant 
depreciation of the Ringgit, which caused the health of the Malaysian financial system to 
deteriorate. Malaysian traditional lending practices have relied on collateral rather than 
 
63 Minister of Finance, Switzerland delivered a paper on risk and insurance at the 27th General Assembly 




credit assessment or cash flow analysis (Lindgren et al., 2000, p. 14), which made them 
vulnerable to excessive risk-taking and reductions in asset price. The NEAC had 
immediately identified the weaknesses in the Malaysian financial system and narrowed 
the three most important factors that needed to be addressed (Danaharta, 1998a, p. 18): 
i) Rapid credit expansion with unusually high exposure to property and stock 
markets;  
ii) Substantial short-term domestic debts; and  
iii) Increasing NPLs.  
The NEAC had established 3 distinct agencies to sort out the problem of the NPLs and 
shortage of capital. The plan also involved financial and corporate sector restructuring 
that would hasten the pace at which market confidence and robust economic growth were 
restored.  
1) Danaharta, an asset management company (AMC) wholly owned by the Malaysian 
government via the MoF. Danaharta was created to acquire NPLs at current market 
price from the troubled banks (Chotigeat and Lin, 2001, p. 54). 
2) Danamodal, a special purpose agency owned by BNM was set up with 2 objectives. 
First, to carry out the task of recapitalising the financial institutions by providing 
interim financing. Second, to facilitate the consolidation and rationalisation of 
financial institutions via mergers and acquisition (Majid, 1999, pp. 2–3); and  
3) CDRC, a committee under BNM was formed in August 1998 to facilitate discussions 
between borrowers and financial institutions to enable voluntary restructuring of debts 
to realise a greater collective benefit. (Azman, 2003, p. 3).   
The roles of Danaharta, Danamodal, and CDRC (hereafter defined as the AMC 
Framework) complemented one another and they were separately governed by their 
respective operational frameworks. A Steering Committee was set up to regulate the 
AMC with BNM’s governor as the chair (Danaharta, 2005). This was an important pre-
emptive measure by the NEAC in the stabilisation and strengthening of the financial 
system. The quick rationalisation of Malaysia’s economy was to ensure that the risk of 





Figure 5.1: The Financial Institutions Reform Framework 
 
Source: Danaharta (1998a, p. 18) 
In a crisis-affected economy like Malaysia, a critical factor for a successful strategy for 
sustainable recovery and economic growth is a cost-effective financial and corporate 
sector restructuring. The planned economic recovery could fail with an unhealthy 
financial system and an insufficient supply of credit. Lenders will not consider a 
potentially viable corporate that is afflicted by a financial crisis without the intercession 
of a corporate debt restructuring. The NEAC believed that a combination of sound 
macroeconomic management and reforms is required to strengthen the financial system 
and corporate governance in Malaysia. 
The Panic of 1997 had caused serious financial problems for many companies in 
Malaysia. This led to many borrowers not being able to service their loans. Consequently, 
banks and finance companies recorded high levels of NPLs (Gabriel and Parameswaran, 
1998). As an initial policy response by Anwar, banks and financial institutions tightened 
their lending policies. They were also forced to switch their focus to recuperating the 
growing NPLs on their books, rather than loan growth. The bank’s tight lending policy 
had deprived good businesses from getting fresh funds that were much needed to generate 
economic activities. The negative impact on the economy had pushed the Malaysian 
government to consider improving rescue mechanisms and resulted in the NEAC’s 
primary focus to control the rising numbers of NPLs and other effects of the Panic of 




to buy NPLs from financial institutions and Danamodal to carry out recapitalising the 
financial institution64 (Danaharta, 2005). 
5.3.1. The AMC Continuum  
So far, similar SPVs that have been created globally to tackle the problems of NFLs 
stemming from banking crises can be roughly classified into three categories: 
i) At one end, there are rapid disposition agencies which dispose of assets within a 
limited timeframe, generally at fire-sale prices, and will often have mandatory 
acquisition powers. For example, the Resolution Trust Corporation of the United 
States, that was established in response to the banking crisis in the 1980s (Peiser 
and Wang, 2002) and the Financial Restructuring Authority of Thailand, which 
was set-up to deal with assets of 56 finance companies (Montreevat, 2003).  
ii) While on the other end, there are warehousing agencies, which typically acquire 
the NPLs of the financial system and warehouse these assets, with minimum effort 
put in to capitalize on the gain of the assets. Such an operation would typically 
wait for the market to restore before initiating the disposal of its assets. But in 
reality, the market may never fully recuperate, as it is burdened by anxieties about 
the overhung assets placed in the agency’s portfolio (Danaharta, 1999b). 
iii) Lastly, in between the two extreme are the AMCs which are actively involved in 
the management of its assets and will undertake to maximise the revival value 
before disposing of the assets (Schäfer and Zimmermann, 2009). An outstanding 
and successfully implemented AMC was Securum65 of Sweden Asset 
Management Company (AMC).  
 
64 Dana in the Malay language means Fund, Harta means assets or properties and Modal means Capital, 
translated to English, Danaharta and Danamodal means Assets & Property Funds and Capital Funds, 
respectively.   
65 The Swedish approach to the banking crisis by transferring troubled debt to specialised asset management 
companies. Wholly owned by the State, Securum’s “board and management was given a great deal of 
freedom in shaping the company’s policies. Moreover, the board was dominated by experts, with 





In summary, the standard asset management continuum indicates the rapid asset 
disposition type of AMCs on one extreme and the warehousing type of AMCs on the 
other extreme (Danaharta, 1999a, p. 62). Malaysia had followed the more market-
oriented technique in handling the NPLs, which lie in the heart of the continuum (Figure 
5.2).  
Figure 5.2: The AMC Continuum 
 
Source: Danaharta Final Report (2005) 
The NEAC’s choice to follow the Securum model was due to “Securum being a hugely 
successful AMC as it was able to keep the cost of the bail-out below 2% of GDP, and was 
able to return about 58% of its initial equity back to the government” (Danaharta, 1999a, 
p. 62). Initially, it was estimated that it would take up to 15 years for Securum to take 
care of all these assets, but it took slightly over 5 years to complete its job (Englund, 
2015). Based on the study by Shäffer & Zimmerman (2009, p. 219), realistically, it is 
usually assumed that an AMC will produce a loss in the end. However, this can be more 
readily compensated if these losses remain low by an appreciation in value in other areas. 
For instance, through the increased in value of the managed or foreclosed assets. 
Therefore, certain prerequisites needed to be fulfilled for the government to have a good 
chance of recouping its investment in the AMC (Schäfer and Zimmermann, 2009, p. 219):  
(i) toxic assets were acquired from the bank at a cheap price;  
(ii) active management of these assets is possible; 
(iii) financial experts with specific know-how of such assets;  
(iv) time is available; and 
(v) a clear governance structure has been implemented. 
AMCs are basically a cost mitigation scheme intended to safeguard the legitimacy of a 




more costly and harmful for the country (Danaharta, 2005). Other countries such as 
Indonesia, Thailand and Korea had diverging issues affecting them and selected different 
methods of implementing their restructuring. For example, in Thailand the bankruptcy 
and foreclosure laws are comparatively weaker (Montreevat, 2003) as well as the sheer 
size of the loan’s portfolio (in terms of the number of accounts). It was therefore more 
sensible for them to dispose the assets via auction. It would have been administratively 
challenging to manage such assets as small loans including hire purchase contracts and 
residential mortgages formed a significant amount of the assets. 
On the other hand, Korea’s  KAMCO had taken the ‘rapid disposal approach’ (Figure 
5.2) in dealing with the non-performing assets (Kang, 2009), although their problems are 
more manufacturing-inclined rather than property-related as is the case in Malaysia. In 
Indonesia where the structure of the financial system is more delicate, the government 
required an all-encompassing agency such as IBRA to facilitate and implement the 
restructuring process. According to Terada-Hagiwara and Pasadilla (2005), no two asset 
management companies are and can be alike, due to the different circumstances and 
governance framework which exist in each region. A study to ascertain which method is 
the most ideal would be an ineffective exercise, but it is helpful to analyse the various 
approaches by each country and to pick out lessons from their experiences.  
5.3.2. Danaharta: NPL resolution 
The MoF formed Danaharta on 20 June 1998 as a state-owned company set-up under the 
Companies Act 1965 and wholly owned by the Ministry of Finance Incorporated. It was 
a pre-emptive measure to avoid the threat of a banking crisis in Malaysia. The primary 
aim of Danaharta was to recuperate the Malaysian financial sector by managing the rising 
level of NPLs and maximising their recovery value. The Malaysian government had 
funded Danaharta, a common practice of AMCs around the world and guaranteed 
Danaharta’s borrowings. Danaharta also established two wholly owned specific purpose 
subsidiaries to manage the NPLs of Sime Bank Group and Bank Bumiputera Group on 
behalf of BNM. BNM paid fees for their services and in turn, all recovery proceeds were 
to be transferred back to BNM (Danaharta, 2005). Danaharta also created other 




divided by assets class such as properties, leisure, and manufacturing (Danaharta, 1998a). 
This allowed for specific expertise to address similar assets and stay focus on their task. 
The Malaysian government via MoF and BNM provided the initial funding to Danaharta 
and Danamodal and stood behind the issuance of approximately RM13.2 billion 
(USD3.47 billion)66, which came from 3 sources (Danaharta, 2004b, 2005, p. 20): 
i) Bonds issued to the selling banking of RM8.2 billion (USD2.16 billion) 
ii) Malaysian government contribution of RM3 billion (USD0.79 billion) and  
iii) Malaysian government loans of RM2 billion (USD526 million). 
The effect of the financial turmoil, as reported by BNM (1998), was evident by the 
increase of NPLs in the first half of 1997 from RM1.43 billion (USD380 million) to 
RM10.14 billion (USD2.67 billion) in the second half of 1997 (3.6% and 5.7% of total 
loans, respectively). In its initial year, Danaharta had acquired RM8.11 billion (USD2.13 
billion) gross value of NPLs, from 37 financial institutions, which was approximately 
25% of the banking system’s NPL (Danaharta, 1998a). It had also in the same year, 
acquired assets under management for a further RM11.62 billion (USD23.06 billion) 
relating to the Sime Bank Group, bringing the total under Danaharta’s care to RM19.73 
billion (USD5.37 billion) (Danaharta, 1998a). 
Danaharta had concluded its initial carve-out of NPLs by end-June 1999, immediately 
after its formation and acquisition phases. Its chairman stated in its Annual Report 
(Danaharta, 2000) that by March 2000, a secondary carve-out exercise was completed 
with no further acquisition exercise carried out to be considered. Based on its Annual 
Report for the year ended 2000 (Danaharta, 2000, p. 23), Danaharta had approximately 
RM47.49 billion (USD12.5 billion) of NPLs at gross value by December 2000. This 
consisted of RM20.39 billion of NPLs acquired from financial institutions (“FIs”) 
together and RM27.10 billion from the Sime Bank Group and Bank Bumiputera Group, 
the NPLs managed by Danaharta’s subsidiaries67. Upon the completion of the two NPLs 
 
66 Translated at USD1:RM3.80, the rate of the Ringgit Malaysia was pegged as a policy response in 
stabilising the Malaysian currency. 
67   Danaharta had set-up 2 wholly owned subsidiaries to manage the assets of Sime Bank Bhd and Bank 




carving-out exercise in the year 2000, Danaharta was able to focus on managing and 
resolving the NPLs in its portfolio.  
Danaharta’s task was to acquire the NPLs from the banks so that it would allow the banks 
to focus on their principal business of supplying credit. The aspirations of Danaharta were 
two-fold (Danaharta 2005): 
(i) To permit the banks to focus on lending to support the economic improvement by 
eliminating the distraction of managing of NPLs; and  
(ii) To maximise the recovery rate of the NPLs in its portfolio.  
Danaharta commenced its operations by buying NPLs within 3 months of the notice of 
its conception in 1998. This was done via a special mechanism where the banks disposed 
their NPLs at an agreed fair market value to Danaharta. The mechanism is essential 
because Danaharta was established as a pre-emptive measure to avoid a banking crisis. 
Accordingly, a carrot and stick method was used as it did not have compulsory acquisition 
rights (Danaharta, 1998a). Danaharta would offer the selling banks a surplus sharing 
structure where any excess by Danaharta from the disposal less its acquisition cost was 
distributed between the selling bank and Danaharta on sharing basis of 80:20, 
respectively. 
5.3.3. The Legislative Framework 
After establishing Danaharta’s targets, NEAC realised that it was a challenge to achieve 
those targets if Danaharta was not given the appropriate mechanisms, especially to 
encounter the anticipated legal disputes in the acquisition and restructuring of the NPLs. 
Danaharta needed to be provided with the necessary authority to drive its operations easily 
and quickly. The solution was to draft a new law that would provide the framework for 
Danaharta’s operations, especially the special powers to undertake its given tasks. 
 
RM0.75billion (USD0.20billion) were injected into the banks, respectively, to meet the minimum capital 




The parliament urgently passed a new legislation in August 1998, that provided the 
configuration for Danaharta to launch its challenging mission. The statute was called the 
Pengurusan Danaharta National Berhad Act 1997 (the Danaharta Act) that had enabled 
Danaharta to function as prophesied by the NEAC and as evidence that Malaysian 
government had given its full statutory backing. Whilst enjoying special rights to enforce 
its function adequately, it provided Danaharta with enhanced flexibility concerning its 
business and financial activities (Azmi and Razak, 2014, p. 385). Azmi (2014) stated that 
the Danaharta Act reflected “the Government’s desire for Danaharta to operate along 
commercial lines with the key principle to adopt a market-driven approach, regardless of 
the fact that it was a government-owned entity”.  
The NEAC knew that it had to set up Danaharta at a surprising pace because the faster it 
could carry out its mission, the better for the economy. It was incorporated as a company, 
rather than a government agency to ensure the flexibility and minimised any red-tapes. In 
addition, being a company supported the notion that commercial principles were followed 
wherever feasible, for example, cost minimisation and maximisation of the recovered 
value. It was a unique organisation in many aspects. Even though Danaharta was a 
statutory company, it was given exceptional rights to deal with NPLs when the Danaharta 
Act was enforced on 1 September 1998. 
The Danaharta Act basically sets out Danaharta's principal aim to acquire, manage, 
finance and dispose of assets and liabilities of troubled banks. The Danaharta Act gives 
Danaharta three special powers (Danaharta, 2005): 
1. The power to buy assets via statutory vesting – this is critical to allow Danaharta to 
buy the assets with the certitude of title; 
2. The power to take on special administrators to administer the activities of distressed 
companies; and 
3. The capability to quickly dispose of foreclosed assets. 
These included the requirement to disclose conflicts of interests and obligations of 
secrecy. Danaharta's Memorandum of Association described its powers and regulated 




facilitated efficiency, commercial viability, and effectiveness of Danaharta’s operations. 
Statutory vesting allowed Danaharta to acquire the required title to assets based on a 
defined set of obligations without unjustifiably disrupting the interests of other lenders 
(Danaharta Act 1998). However, in 2000, modifications to the Danaharta Act were 
brought in by the Pengurusan Danaharta National Berhad (Amendment) Act 2000, which 
refined existing provisions of the Danaharta Act by eradicating any doubt about its 
assumed effect and to overcome practical complications that emerged after Danaharta 
began operations (Azmi and Razak, 2014, p. 385). 
The refinements were required to clarify the ambiguities that came up when the Danaharta 
began its operations and to iron out further issues, especially those linked to statutory 
vesting and special administrators. The special administrators offered a much-needed 
choice for maximising value, with capable expertise to the turnaround of distressed 
companies. Otherwise, the banks would increasingly look to winding up and holders of 
collaterals will rush to administer their securities, which would unquestionably bring 
down weakened enterprises and ultimately lessen the value of the assets to the very 
minimum (Danaharta Act 1998). 
As time was of essence, the Malaysian government passed the new legislation fairly 
quickly. Even though existing laws were sufficient to allow Danaharta to do its work, 
they would normally involve time-consuming legal proceedings. Since Danaharta must 
relieve the banking system of its mounting NPLs to stop a systemic catastrophe within a 
given period, it was under immense pressure to act. The contagion impact of the Panic of 
1997 had caused the financial industry to be confronted with an alarming escalation of 
NPLs. Administratively, it was a challenge to deal with the possibility of thousands of 
NPLs within a short period. The NEAC knew that the quicker Danaharta could fulfil and 
complete its given special task, the greater the benefits to the economy and taxpayers. 
The NEAC had to ensure that the Danaharta Act would enable Danaharta to carry out its 
operational activities expeditiously and minimise the risk of any court proceedings.  
5.3.4. Statutory Vesting 
Statutory vesting as prescribed in the Danaharta Act essentially allowed Danaharta to 




interest and enjoy the same arrangement as the vendor bank, subject to registered interests 
and disclosed claims. For instance, if the vendor bank had a first charge over property as 
security for the loan, Danaharta will likewise have the same first charge over the property. 
Additionally, if a second charge had been registered over the property by another bank, 
this second charge would continue to exist without any change in preference (Danaharta, 
2005). Another task of Danaharta was to deal with the NPLs of financial institutions that 
were also newly acquired by the BNM. For example, the Sime Bank Group was acquired 
by BNM as part of the restructuring plan. For this purpose, Danaharta had formed a 
wholly owned subsidiary, Danaharta Managers Sdn Bhd, with the sole purpose of dealing 
with the NPLs belonging to the Sime Bank Group, on behalf of BNM.  
Another crucial feature of the Danaharta Act is its Section 72, which basically restricts 
the awarding of any injunction against Danaharta. It is to ensure that Danaharta does not 
encounter an unwarranted setback, as delays cost money and would invariably burden the 
taxpayer. However, the Danaharta Act does not prohibit an aggrieved party from suing 
Danaharta and receiving compensation. It is worth noting that the agreement to declare 
Section 72 void does not mean that Danaharta cannot perform its duty. It can work as 
other powers remain intact (Danaharta, 2002, p. 11). 
5.3.5. The Operations of Danaharta 
Danaharta was set up as a flat organisation structure but designed to be flexible to 
accommodate the different phases of its life (Figure 5.3). Flexibility in the structure is 
vital, as the scope of work and focus will transform through the various phases of its 
development. During the initial stage, the soul of Danaharta rests in its operations unit 
that was integrated and supported by six auxiliary Departments (Danaharta, 1998a, p. 20). 
The operations unit managed loan recovery and supervision and launched its loan 
acquisition exercise in late August 1998 . 
 
The preliminary acquisition method was to do business with all banks on a first-come, 
first-served basis. Gradually, this was replaced by a more structured method declared on 
6 October 1998, which prioritised the purchase of NPLs according to the different 
categories and loan types. Typically the priority in its loan acquisition exercise would be 




i) The viable loans will be restructured; 
ii) Non-viable loans, the assets attached as collateral (involving the sale of the 
collateral or the business) will be restructured; 
iii) All foreign loans were disposed of.  
Figure 5.3: Management of NPLs 
Source: Danaharta (1998a, p. 37) 
 
It also looked at the strength of the banks in its approach, priority given to the frail banks 
(specifically those undergoing recapitalisation assistance from Danamodal) before 
dealing with the stronger institutions. The weaker banks are easier and faster to deal with 
due to their financial conditions. 
5.3.6. Loan Restructuring Guidelines 
The NPLs were carefully assessed for its viability and if a loan was identified as viable, 
Danaharta would apply restructuring approaches such as the rescheduling of loans and/or 
debt-equity conversions. In this regard, Danaharta had developed a series of 
comprehensive guidelines to facilitate it in the overhauling of viable loans (Danaharta, 
1999c, p. 4). The following objectives were also considered in drawing up the guidelines 




i) To maximise the overall revival rate and interests to Danaharta; 
ii) To minimise the engagement with taxpayers’ fund; 
iii) To provide adequate treatment of all shareholders; and 
iv) To utilise where appropriate Danaharta’s special powers to leverage and benefit 
the financial system in its entirety. 
Danaharta only accepts loans above RM5 million (USD1.6 million) to retain effectiveness 
in dealing with its asset resolution function, and this covered more than 70% of the total 
countrywide NPLs (Fung et al., 2004). The restriction on size and age of the NPL 
accounts applied by Danaharta as its guidelines had contributed to the broad quality of its 
acquired assets and improved its recovery performance. These guidelines were aimed to 
improve lucidity in Danaharta’s operation while concurrently providing the borrowers 
and their advisors with a basis for a workout plan. Loan restructuring proposals advocated 
by Danaharta must adhere to these guidelines and detailed rationale must be given for 
deviations from these guidelines (Danaharta, 1999b, p. 18). As mentioned earlier, 
Danaharta also managed whole NPLs portfolios of entire banks, which were acquired by 
BNM. Separate subsidiaries were specifically set up for this purpose to ring-fence these 
NPLs portfolios from the NPLs acquired directly by Danaharta. 
During its lifetime, Danaharta incorporated several subsidiaries to prepare for subsequent 
tasks in administering the acquired assets. Danaharta’s subsidiaries were each expected 
to have a distinct principal activity such as property development, hotel, recreation assets 
and manufacturing assets. This provided for pools of talents to be developed to focus on 
assets of the same characteristic (Danaharta, 1998a, p. 16). For instance,  a Property 
Division was set up in 1999 with the task of managing Danaharta’s property assets from 
the anticipated foreclosure exercises (Danaharta, 1998a, p. 20).  
5.3.7. Sufficient Funds 
For most AMC, funding issues will usually have important implications on their 
operations, loss-sharing among funders, and bond market development (Fung et al., 2004, 
p. 28). As the appointed national AMC, Danaharta must be able to raise enough funds to 




AMCs are expected to be loss making, henceforth, the concern of dividing the loss among 
the fund’s providers would be a concern. However, this issue is less significant in 
Danaharta’s case since its operations are entirely funded by the government, either 
directly or via guarantee. 
A cost-effective way of financing the AMC is via the national budget or via issuing of 
tradable government securities or bonds. This has the added benefit of boosting bond 
market expansion by raising the capital market liquidity (McCauley, 2003). However, the 
affected Asian countries chose to maintain their debt obligation off-balance sheet and 
instead preferred to guarantee the bonds issued by the AMC. Fund raising via guarantee 
approach is more costly than direct government bonds and do not contribute much in the 
local bond market development because they are either non-tradable or only with limited 
liquidity (Fung et al., 2004). Gabriel and Parameswaran’s (1999) interview with 
Danaharta's managing director revealed that the estimated funding requirement of RM15 
billion68 (USD3.95 billion) is sufficient due to several factors.   
i) The bad loans of 2 banks that amounted to RM14 billion69 (USD3.68 billion) were 
not part of the loan to be acquired as they fall under exclusive arrangements with 
BNM, where Danaharta were only to manage the loans; 
ii) Malaysia's financial system was strong enough to tolerate an NPL level of up to 
9%, therefore not all the bad loans in the system needed to be removed; 
iii) The acquisition of NPLs were market driven as NPLs were bought at market value 
at a discount of 40 to 50%; and 
iv) The funding required by Danaharta were revolving as some assets were disposed 
as part of its operation. 
Moreover, Danaharta was compelled to minimise costs as much as possible through 
leverage since it had only a capital base of RM1.5 billion (USD0.39 billion) in a system 
with RM70 billion (USD18.42 billion) worth of NPLs. Special powers were given to 
Danaharta under the Danaharta Act, where it did not have to take out the entire loan before 
 
68 Estimated based on maximum anticipated NPLs of 20 to 25 percent 
69 The loans of Sime Bank (RM7 billion) and Bank Bumiputera (RM7 billion) were acquired by BNM and 




restructuring them. The leverage power of Danaharta, which sets it further apart from 
other AMCs, means that there is no minimum threshold which needs to be satisfied before 
it can invoke the administrative powers (Gabriel and Parameswaran, 1998).   
5.4 Danamodal: Capitals and Mergers 
During the Panic of 1997, banks that were saddled with sizeable NPLs became financially 
weakened and eventually under-capitalised. A substantial number of the afflicted banks 
was at the risk of breaching the prudential banking limits. Danamodal was incorporated 
in August 1998, two months after the setting up of Danaharta. It was established as a 
special-purpose vehicle with the task of recapitalising financial institutions with capital 
adequacy ratios (CAR)70 below 9% (Kawai, 2000). Danamodal was assigned by the 
NEAC to carry out two primary tasks: 
i) Recapitalisation of the weak and failing banks in the industry - Danamodal was to 
provide provisional funds to facilitate the banks in satisfying their capital 
adequacy requirements. Danamodal’s capital injections were in the form of equity 
and/or hybrid instruments; and  
ii) Facilitation on the consolidation and rationalisation of the financial system.   
Danamodal was established as a limited liability company and a wholly owned subsidiary 
of BNM, with a defined lifespan of 5 years. Danamodal's funding requirement was 
initially estimated at RM16 billion (USD4.2 billion) with BNM providing an initial seed 
capital of RM1.5 billion (USD0.39 billion). The balance was derived from issuance of 
exchangeable bonds with a participation of domestic and foreign institutional investors 
and multilateral agencies (Bacha, 1998). After only 1 year of operation, Danamodal with 
total funding of RM11 billion71 (USD2.9 billion) infused fresh capital of RM6.2 billion 
(USD1.63 billion) into financial institutions that in the aggregate represented roughly 
one-fifth of industry assets (IMF, 1999b, p. 65).  
 
70 Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) is the “ratio of a bank’s capital in relation to its risk weighted assets and 
current liabilities. It is decided by central banks and bank regulators to prevent commercial banks from 
taking excess leverage and becoming insolvent in the process” (BNM, 2018).  




5.4.1. First task: Recapitalisation 
For a period of 5 years, Danamodal injected RM7.6 billion into 10 financial institutions 
affected by the financial crisis (Fung et al., 2004, p. 36). The capital infusion was 
structured as a debt that can be converted to share capital called the exchangeable 
subordinated capital loans (ESCLs). Additionally, Danamodal had signed definitive 
agreements with 9 of the 10 banks for the conversion of ESCLs into permanent Tier 1 
and/or Tier 2 capital72 (BNM, 1999). The capital injection, which equals to approximately 
14% of the entire Tier 1 capital of the banking sector at the onset of 1998, had helped 
improve the CAR of the banking system to 12.3% at the end of April 1999 (Kawai, 2000, 
p. 148). The improvement of the CAR was supplemented by absorption of losses by 
shareholders through reduced shareholding in the institutions, change in the composition 
of the boards of directors and/or transformation in management (Zainal-Abidin, 2000). 
Danamodal’s recapitalisation exercise had safeguarded the frail banks from breaking the 
prudential banking limits and ensured that the banking sector continued to operate as a 
lending vehicle to corporations and individuals (Azmi and Razak, 2014, p. 383). Having 
the improved capital position coupled with operational restructuring, financial institutions 
were steered into a better financial standing and were able to focus on providing finance 
to businesses that could lead to  Malaysia’s economic revival (Azmi and Razak, 2014, p. 
383).  
5.4.2. Second task: Bank Mergers 
The plan for bank mergers had been long advocated by BNM, even prior to the Crisis, 
but was not well accepted by the banking industry. Given that BNM had a stake in the 
recapitalised banks via Danamodal, this had enabled the central bank to carry out its plan 
of the financial industry consolidation and initiated its original plan of bank mergers. 
Based on statistics collected by the World Bank (2017a, p. 24), there were more than 77 
 
72 The Basel Committee classifies “bank capital identifying 3 different levels: Tier 1 capital, Tier 2 capital, 
and Tier 3 capital. They are characterised by increasing degree of liquidity and decreasing degree of 
redemption priority and ensure the coverage of financial losses, i.e., the bank survival. Tier 1 capital 
identifies the main components of equity capital: shares, unavailable balance sheet reserves, and 
shareholders’ retained earnings, accrued over the life of the bank. It represents the amount of capital that 




banks prior to the Panic of 1997. Furthermore, it was in the interest of the central bank to 
encourage banks to merge and form larger, more viable units to enable them to compete 
in an increasingly liberalised global financial system. At that time, existing institutions 
did not have the resources to compete with their regional peers or provide a wide array of 
products and services.  
Following the Panic of 1997, BNM had put in place a set of policies which facilitated the 
financial sector consolidation leading to the number of financial institutions reduced from 
77 to 44. The financial institutions merger was carried out throughout 1999 and continued 
well into 2003, whereas the banking sector had progressed into 10 stronger well-
capitalised domestic banking groups (World Bank, 2017b). The capital adequacy of the 
banking system improved subsequently, and the NPL declined. The statutory reserve 
requirement was reduced in several rounds from 13.5% in February 1998 to 4% by 
September 14, 1998 (Hood, 1999, p. 8).  
The restructuring of the banking sector resulted in more resilient well-capitalised banks 
which are owned by institutions rather than individual shareholders. Nonetheless, 
Danamodal's endeavours during this stage of financial instability also led certain quarters 
to the conviction that the company was utilised to bail out ailing banking institutions 
(Jomo, 2006). However, the argument by Jomo (2003) of Danamodal being a rescue 
vehicle was refuted by analysing the restrictive structure of Danamodal itself. BNM had 
only 3 representatives on the board of Danamodal, despite the provision of a seed capital 
of RM1.5 billion (USD0.39 billion). The other members of the board were from the 
private sectors, apart from a nominee from the Ministry of Finance. There were also some 
representatives of the international investment community. In addition, the company also 
published regular financial statements for transparency and kept the public informed of 
its activities. Danamodal was therefore a pre-emptive measure to facilitate the banking 
sector's rationalisation and avoid a banking crisis, rather than an emergency rescue 
mission (Business Times; Kuala Lumpur, 1998).  
5.5 BNM’s role 
The amount of BNM’s exposure to the potential banking crisis was restricted to its capital 




Danamodal had managed to receive nearly 100 percent returns on its investments by the 
end of 2001, mainly via the consolidation of banking institutions (Fung et al., 2004, p. 
36). Danamodal had also appointed their representatives in the recapitalised banks to 
ensure that these banks were managed prudently and efficiently as well as to introduce 
changes that would strengthen these institutions. (Zainal-Abidin, 2000). 
The real benefits of Danamodal’s establishment towards the domestic banking sector 
were only realised at the end of its tenure. When Danamodal finally disposed of its 
interests in Malaysia's banking systems, the banking sector become healthier, resilient 
and better prepared to face the international banking giants (IMF, 1999b). At the time of 
winding up in 2003, Danamodal had redeemed its entire RM11 billion (USD2.89 billion) 
5-year bonds (ESCLs) on 21 October 2003 and had remaining assets of RM2.2 billion 
(USD580 million) (BNM, 2003a, p. 108). Danamodal was wound down on 31 December 
2003, five years after its establishment in 1998. The government via the Danamodal 
successfully advocated the mergers of banks rather than the closures or sale to foreign 
entities, and tightly orchestrated Malaysia’s financial sector restructuring program 
(Kawai, 2001). Danamodal has managed to recover its entire capital investment through 
the gradual divestment via the banking sector rationalisation exercise. (BNM, 2003b). 
BNM formulated the Financial Sector Masterplan (FSMP) in 2001 to align the 
development of the financial sector to that of the economy (BNM, 2001). The main 
objective of the FSMP according to BNM’s report (2001c) is “to develop a more resilient, 
competitive and dynamic financial system with best practices, that supports and 
contributes positively to the growth of the economy throughout the economic cycle, and 
has a core of strong and forward looking domestic financial institutions that are more 
technology driven and ready to face the challenges of liberalisation and globalisation” 
(Lee, Tuck and Koay, 2011). In short, the underlying purpose of BNM’s FSMP was to 
promote financial stability.   
5.6 CDRC: The Mediator  
The last piece of the NEAC’s AMC Framework was the CDRC, which was set up in 
August 1998 to aid voluntary restructuring of corporate debt outside the courts through 




CDRC took on the role as a secretariat, which supervised and facilitated negotiations 
between the creditors and debtors. It acted as a mediator between the companies and their 
lenders in reaching a viable debt restructuring arrangement.  
In an economic downturn, the banks’ immediate response may be to precipitate the 
liquidation of viable companies to get their money back as soon as possible, due to a high 
level of stress in the economic system. However, this is not necessarily the best course of 
action for the economy. Hence, the CDRC was established to steer the restructuring of 
corporate debts to avoid the reckless winding up of viable businesses. 
Corporate restructuring via CDRC is important, as it can in the long run preserve the 
productive capacities of viable companies which contribute positively to the nation's 
GDP. In order to pre-empt liquidation of the company, which has far-reaching adverse 
affects both financial and social, the borrowers seek to renegotiate with their lenders 
regarding modification of the terms of the loan (Jessica, 2012).   
5.6.1. CDRC's modus operandi 
For the companies that have applied for CDRC’s assistance, independent advisors were 
appointed and granted 60 days to draft a restructuring scheme. The proposals were 
examined by the CDRC on its viability, whether it is justifiable to the financiers and 
companies’ shareholders. The proposal was to be enforced only when all parties 
conceded. They were principally debt voluntary workouts between the borrowers and 
creditors with the CDRC giving input on the exercise. Voluntarily corporate debt 
restructuring is the most desirable option to legal actions as highlighted by Gray (1999) 
as cited in Azman (2003, p. 3). This approach is cost effective and brings in the most 
desirable results as compared to alternative methods such as enforcement or liquidation 
proceedings. 
The CDRC would determine if it is feasible for the proposal to raise some capital. The 
proposal might also require the approval of certain authorities such as the Securities 
Commission, BNM, the Foreign Investment Committee or the Kuala Lumpur Stock 




restructuring process and assisted in liaising with the relevant authorities to facilitate fund 
raising. It would act in the national interest when determining the viability of a company. 
The Committee essentially needed to determine whether the business involved was 
critical and viable in the context of the general economy and whether it was in the public’s 
interest to be sustained. As a check and balance, the independent consultants only 
assessed the viability of the business from a purely financial angle. The financial viability 
was a very important consideration because otherwise, the company would have to be 
liquidated. Other considerations included the social impact of liquidation and whether the 
business was of strategic value to the nation. However, if a company was not 
commercially viable but served some national interest, the Steering Committee of CDRC 
was consulted. The matter would be analysed from both a micro and macro point of view 
while considering other non-financial affects to the country. 
Generally, CDRC anticipated the bankers to concede to the restructuring schemes because 
loan recovery would be maximised as compared to liquidation processes where the values 
may not be so easily realised. However, given a deadlock situation where the bankers 
were not willing to participate in the restructuring of the company, the CDRC would 
solicit out an amenable third party such as Danaharta to acquire the NPLs. 
The NEAC was of the view that under conditions of financial calamity, liquidations 
would mean that the bank would not be able to recover the full amount owed to them. 
Furthermore, liquidations would highly likely put an end to strategic assets that could 
contribute to the national economy. Therefore, CDRC’s objective was to provide the 
platform and expertise to facilitate the smooth restructuring of a company. It aimed to 
advise the affected financiers to consider the long-term benefits rather than short term 
profit gain. Proposals were made on a voluntary basis and initiatives were set in place to 
ensure that all avenues were made accessible to aid viable businesses to rehabilitate their 
debt commitments (Azman and Muthalib, 2003). 
Fundamentally, the underlying purpose of the CDRC’s mediation was to ascertain that 
both the borrowers and creditors work out reasonable debt restructuring schemes without 




critical financial conditions had sought legal protection under Section 17673 of the 
Companies Act 1965, rather than explore alternative options such as debt restructuring 
(Ariff and Abubakar, 2003). The formation of the CDRC debt-restructuring framework 
together with the Creditor Committees, which included bank representatives, was to work 
out how the debts would be restructured. These are but a few instances of the efforts 
initiated to hinder the failure of what was deemed strategic businesses (Ariff and 
Abubakar, 1999, p. 7). 
5.6.2. Challenges faced by CDRC 
Loan mismatched - borrowed short to fund its long-term projects 
It was reported that most of the applications to the CDRC consisting of loans that were 
mismatched (Rajandram, 1999). In a continuously liquid capital market, such a mismatch 
is still viable and acceptable; however, in an economic meltdown loans mismatched 
would have negative consequences. Given such, the CDRC would attempt to remedy the 
problem by finding ways and means of converting short-term bank borrowings into 
longer-term funding. This could take the form of conversion into equity or longer-term 
bond issues.  
  
 
73 Under section 176 of the Companies Act 1965 (now repealed), “a company in financial distress can only 
restructure by a scheme of arrangement (Malaysia, 1965). The use of the scheme of arrangement became 
synonymous with corporate rescue measures in the 1997 financial crisis in Malaysia when financially 
distressed companies frequently used the restraining order provisions in section 176 to secure extended 
judicial protection from creditor actions. The application for a restraining order became open to abuse by 
companies without any viable proposal for a scheme of arrangement, whether by way of a deferred payment 
plan or a compromise.  Section 176 also allowed the existing management to continue in management 





Lack of corporate governance in the non-financial sector 
The Crisis had exposed the lack of corporate governance in the non-financial sector. 
Many conglomerates took on high-risk projects and were over-borrowed, over-extended 
and over diversified, thereby becoming vulnerable to shocks (Shanmugam, 2000). 
Management transformation of the affected companies 
The modus operandi of the CDRC was based on the London approach, a flexible 
framework which enables banks and debtors to agree on a debt workout (Smith, 1996). 
Similarly, the CDRC acted in the capacity as advisor via an advisory committee. Only 
shareholders of the company could vote for the changes to the management if they were 
not happy with it (Gradinaru, 2009). The creditors could typically request on either board 
representation or a representative into the company. The CDRC would advise either the 
shareholders or creditors if such remedial action needed to be undertaken. 
5.6.3. Restricted power as a mediator 
Up until 2000, the CDRC had received a total of 67 applications, and of these, only 19 
debt restructuring schemes were resolved. This represented approximately 28% of the 
total cases. The slow progress of the work of the CDRC can be attributed to two factors: 
(i) The CDRC was merely a mediating entity that facilitated negotiations between 
borrowers and lenders. It bore no statutory right to impose any debt-restructuring 
solutions. This was unlike Danaharta, which had extensive rights because it was set 
up by an act of parliament, while Danamodal had none (Southeast Asian Affairs; 
Singapore, 2000). 
(ii) Reaching solutions to debt restructuring was challenging due to the fact that all 
creditors must concur to the restructuring scheme. Banks were hesitant to settle the 
debt without full compensation. Negotiations have then been lengthy because even 
a single opposition from one creditor could threaten the entire restructuring process 




Given this, the NEAC had responded that from 1 August 2001, Danaharta and the CDRC 
were to have a common chairman so that efforts by both parties could be closely 
coordinated (Danaharta, 2001). It resulted in quicker resolution of CDRC cases as the 
special powers of Danaharta was capitalised where necessary. On 31 July 2002, CDRC 
was officially dissolved, having dealt with 47 cases with a total debt of about RM44 
billion (USD11.58billion) (Danaharta, 2002, p. 11), which represented approximately 
65% of the total cases under the committee. The CDRC was revisited in 2009 and turned 
into an informal corporate rescue work-out agency. This was a pre-emptive move against 
any possible upsurge in NPLs anticipated after the global financial crisis (Azmi and 
Razak, 2014, pp. 382–383). 
5.7 The Final Score Card: review of similar frameworks 
Malaysia had five options available in handling with corporate sector’s financial distress, 
stretching from the extreme outright liquidation, to a mutually agreed debt restructuring 
and reorganisation of the company (Thillainathan, 1998, pp. 181–184). The five options 
were:  
i) winding up under the Companies Act 1965, where the provisions under 
liquidation are extensive and provide a logical basis for winding-up; 
ii) engaging in a scheme of arrangement and reconstruction under the Companies 
Act which deals with rehabilitation of companies as a growing concern; 
iii) debt restructuring under CDRC; 
iv) sale of the firms’ loans by financial institutions to Danaharta; and 
v) restructuring of small borrowers by individual debt workout. 
The first two options were spelled out in the Companies Act 1965 but the remaining 
options only emerged as a response to the Panic of 1997. In the best interest of the country, 
NEAC had sought to minimise the likelihood of the first two options by setting up the 
AMC Framework. The Panic of 1997 had brought about distinct policy responses from 
the afflicted countries in the region. The three IMF-assisted Asian countries, namely 
Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea initiated the bank restructuring programmes which 




to Danaharta. Countries such as China and Japan have too set up structures to deal with 
their NPLs problem. However, the operational structure, modus operandi and statutory 
structure of these agencies were different from those of Danaharta (Danaharta, 1999a, p. 
56).  
As a non-profit special purpose company, Danaharta’s objectives were to alleviate NPL 
pressure and maximise revival values and not profit-oriented. In addition, Danaharta 
progressed through its life-cycle very quickly as it had a finite life. The objectives in each 
stage of its development were different. Specialised key performance index (KPIs) had to 
be pieced together to gauge the work and effort, both from a quantity and quality 
perspective. These KPIs were designed to drive the organisation to reach its key targets. 
Over time, different KPIs came into play with some overlapping between phases and each 
KPI had an assigned benchmark. Based on a study by Fung et al. (2004, p. 41), Danaharta 
had almost resolved its entire portfolio of acquired assets within four years of its 
establishment and were able to meet or exceed the benchmarks set for all of its KPIs 
(Danaharta, 2005). 
It is important to foster market discipline in AMCs and a simple method is by exerting a 
significant level of transparency. The AMCs in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand 
disclosed their activities by publishing annual reports with financial statements. Some 
AMCs go to greater extent in displaying transparency by instituting internal audit panels 
as well as having external audits carried out by independent auditors. For example, 
Korea’s KAMCO and Thailand’s TAMC released annual reports audited by an 
international accounting firm, Indonesia’s IBRA provided monthly reports, which 
disclosed data on asset revivals and other activities, whilst Danaharta produced an 





Table 5.2: Analysis of key indicators and policy responses in 4 Asian countries  
Malaysia 
  







 IBRA i) FRA 
ii) Thai AMCs 
i) Korean Deposit 
Insurance 
Corporation  
ii) KAMCO  
Latest NPL 
ratio (% of 
total loans) 
6.6% (Dec 1999) 
(Malaysia reports NPLs 
on a net basis while the 
others report on a gross 
basis) 
57.0% (Dec 1998) 38.5 % (Dec 1999) 8.2% (Sep 1999) 
IMF 
Assistance 






 2 banks merged with 
stronger banks 
 66 banks closed 
 4 state banks merged 
 4 banks taken over by 
IBRA 
 56 finance companies 
nationalised 
 2 banks nationalised 
 5 banks closed 
 2 banks nationalised 
Approach  Danaharta removes 
NPLs 
 Danamodal recapitalises 
banks 
 CDRC facilitates 
corporate debt 
restructuring 
 IBRA handles 
restructuring and 





 FRA disposed assets of 
closed financial 
companies via auction 
 Thai AMC acts as the 
bidder of last resort 
 10 banks (public-owned 
and private) have set up 
their own AMCs 
 Korean Deposit 
Insurance Corporation 
recapitalises the banks 








Indonesia Thailand Korea 
Sunset 
 
2005 2004 2011 None 
Special 
Powers 
Yes Yes  Yes None 
Acquisition Loans worth more than 
RM5 million 
No preselection Loans worth more than 
BT5 million 
No preselection but 
KAMCO had discretion 
on what assets to acquire 
 
Pricing Market value with profit 
sharing of 80:20 in favour 
of the FIs 
Zero value but 
government shouldered 
any bank losses 
 
Market value with profit-
sharing 




 Use of special 
administrators for 
different type of assets 
 Use of foreign expertise 
 Corporate loans via 
auction, direct sale, 
asset-bond swap 
 Commercial loan via 
outsourced management 
and collection 
 Small loans via 
settlement 
 Divestment of bank 
shares 
 Auctions, direct sale, 
debit rescheduling  
 Settlement 
 Outsourcing of 
management of assets to 
Thai entities 
Extensive use of foreign 












The BIS’s analysis on the success of AMCs in Southeast Asia was summarised in the 
Danaharta Annual Report (2003, p. 104) and (McCauley, 2003). The paper examined 
various key factors that led to the successful operation of the AMCs and these key factors 
are mapped to Malaysia’s AMC Framework:  
Table 5.3: Analysis by the Bank of International Settlement (BIS) 
 Key factors as presented by BIS  Malaysia’s AMC Framework 
1.  
Strong political will: An essential starting position 
for any successful AMC is a strong political 
advocacy on the part of the government to address 
NPLs in the system. However, an AMC should work 
independent of political intervention and be given 
enough autonomy. 
Danaharta, Danamodal and CDRC 
were professionally run without 
any political intervention. Support 
was only given via funding and 
legislative requirements. 
2.  
Explicit government financial assistance: The 
state should finance the AMC's activities directly 
through its budget. If an AMC were to issue its own 
bonds or borrow funds, an explicit government 
guarantee is required to enhance the financial 
positions of the banks and the AMC. 
Funding was from the Malaysian 
government by way of direct 
lending, equity contribution or 
guarantee.  
3.  
Supportive legal framework: An adequate legal 
system including insolvency and foreclosure laws to 
support the AMC. The AMC should also be accorded 
certain statutory rights that allow the AMC to deal 
with its assets expeditiously and to obtain a higher 
revival rate. 
A new legislation was passed for 
this purpose that gave Danaharta 
special powers to execute its 
duties. 
4.  
Efficient market situation: Smooth-operating 
capital markets facilitate asset transactions, while 
permitting foreign investors to acquire assets from 
the AMC will further boost up asset disposal, 
specifically when the domestic capital market is not 
so well established. 
The Malaysian government via the 
Securities Commission and BNM 
worked on developing the 
Financial Sector Masterplan 2001-
2010.  
5.  
Clear AMC mandate: The AMC must have well-
defined targets and clear-cut policies for its 
operation, such as the types of assets to be acquired 
and the resolution methods it can employ. It should 
concentrate on asset transactions and not be unduly 
hampered by large corporate restructuring. 
The three agencies were given 
clear distinct mandates, but their 




 Key factors as presented by BIS  Malaysia’s AMC Framework 
6.  
Well defined AMC life: Generally, the life of an 
AMC should be determined upfront to avoid it from 
hoarding on the acquired assets for a lengthy 
duration, for fear of realising large losses on 
disposal. Nevertheless, the life span should also be 
reasonable enough for an AMC to have enough time 
to deal with the assets under its management. 
All three agencies had different 
predetermined life: 
Danaharta – 7.5 years 
Danamodal – 5 years 
CDRC – 5 years 
7.  
Adequate governance: The AMC should have a 
solid internal control system and effective external 
oversight and be verified periodically by an 
independent accounting firm. 
Danaharta published 6 monthly 
operations reports for 
transparency.  
8.  
Good transparency: The AMC should periodically 
publish the audited results of its operations in a form 
that can be clearly appreciated by the public and the 
market. 
The annual reports and operational 




Speedy resolution: The AMC should plan for 
immediate disposal of acquired assets. Waiting for 
an economic turnaround to enhance recovery often 
leads to slower resolution proceeding and greater 
losses. 
Danaharta’s approach was only to 
restructure viable assets, while 
non-viable assets are disposed 
immediately. 
10.  
Realistic asset pricing: Normally, assets should be 
handed over to an AMC at market-based prices, 
specifically for privately controlled banks. 
Appropriate stimuli, such as option-like profit/loss 
sharing arrangements, or enforcements would help 
facilitate such asset transfers. 
Danaharta had acquired the NPLs 
at the current market price with 
profit sharing of 80:20 in favour of 
the banks. 
Source: (BNM, 1997, 1998a; Danaharta, 1998a, 1999a, 2003, 2005; McCauley, 2003; Fung et 
al., 2004) 
Even at the early stages of its operations, Danaharta had gained global recognition, 
manifested by the fact that Danaharta has progressively become the subject matter of 
research by academics and economists globally. Since inception until its wind up in 2005, 
regional NPL resolution companies or foreign state officials had requested for official 
study visits to Danaharta for closer examination and understanding of Danaharta’s 
concepts and techniques. Multilateral firms like the World Bank and IMF had paid 




operandi. At one stage, Danaharta hosted a contingent of 40 Members of Parliament from 
Indonesia and even officials from the United States Treasury (Danaharta, 2000, 2005).  
Pomerlano (2009) as cited in Randhawa (2011) noted that a well-coordinated effort 
between Malaysia’s three agencies culminated in their successful dismantling after they 
had fulfilled their agenda. CDRC was wrapped up in 2002, Danamodal in 2003 and 
Danaharta wound down at the end of 2005. These institutions were created to deal with 
various aspects of the Panic of 1997 and had managed to successfully complete their 
mandate. The immediate cost of the bailout to the Treasury was less than 5% of the GDP 
(Randhawa, 2011, p. 397). The AMC Framework had successfully addressed the 
concerns of the NEAC, i.e. resolved NPL problems, rationalised the banking system and 
encouraged corporate restructuring (Zainuddin, 1999).  
5.8 Conclusion 
The restructuring efforts and structural reforms carried out by the AMC framework after 
the Panic of 1997, have strengthened the structure of banking system and achieved the 
objective of the NERP of financial market stability. Amongst the efforts was the bank and 
financial institution merger and consolidation scheme that was initiated in 1999 and 
concluded in 2000. The consolidation scheme was successful in strengthening the 
fragmented domestic banking sector (Danaharta, 2004a, p. 109). 
The guiding principle for the NEAC’s policy response was based on the best interest of 
the country or Ummah. Mahathir being the executive chairman of the NEAC was a 
forceful advocate in implementing the NERP without any financial aid from the IMF, as 
he truly believed that any policy intervention from the IMF would result in the reversal 
of the NEP. However, the Bumiputera entrepreneurs and their political sponsors to a 
certain did manage to exercise political pressure on the restructuring activities and 






CHAPTER 6: MANAGING CAPITAL CONTROL 
 
“Malaysia has experienced the globalisation of capital and we were 
nearly destroyed by it. Fortunately, we were able to develop our own 
methods to defend ourselves and rebuild our economy. We know that 
our success may be short-lived but we are not going to allow ourselves 
to be sold ideas, ideologies and slogans without carefully examining 
them. If we find the slightest suspicion that another agenda is being 
promoted we will fight tooth and nail to defend our country and the 
prosperity of our people.” 
Mahathir Mohamad (2000b) 
 
6. Introduction 
This first part of this chapter explains the events that led to the decision on the policy in 
response to the Panic of 1997. It examines the rationale based on historical events that 
took place that led the Malaysian policy makers in employing unconventional policies. It 
then analyses why other Asian countries, such as Korea, Thailand and Indonesia, had 
carried out orthodox policies, in contrast to Malaysia’s response. In terms of 
macroeconomic stability, these countries stood to a pro-cyclical policy while Malaysia 
followed a counter-cyclical policy and the utmost distinction is in its foreign policy. 
Malaysia had enforced capital controls with a fixed exchange rate regime, whilst the rest 
of the affected Asian countries relaxed their capital account controls towards a floating 
regime. 
Malaysia is a country that consists of parliamentary democracy and a constitutional 
monarchy, which means policies are passed through parliament and assented by the 
monarch. However, Mahathir’s authoritarian leadership style had managed to dictate 




of the Mahathir years,  draw attention to his constantly growing authoritarian powers.74  
Mahathir had systematically eradicated sources of dispute, whether within the party, 
among the monarchs or within the judiciary system. Mahathir turned parliament into 
somewhat of an irrelevancy by making some of the most important policy announcements 
outside of the parliament. He also eroded the functions of the cabinet as well as ministerial 
bureaucracy by elevating the roles of unelected bodies of his handpicked appointees such 
as the members of the NEAC. Hilley’s (2001) comprehensive study of Malaysian politics 
argues that his 22-year reign also coincided with a notable diversification of legitimacy, 
away from relying on the coercive means of the national state security of 1970s alone into 
one marked by higher levels of consensual, popular support (Hilley, 2001, pp. 75–76). 
This consensual support from Malaysians of different backgrounds was based on the 
economic success as well as his vision for Malaysia’s emerging and more inclusive 
national identity.  
The analysis seeks to uncover the archaeology of Mahathir’s ideas and to link them with 
the parallel processes that eventually contributed to the historically controversial capital 
controls policy. Mahathir (2011) argues that two major historical events led him to steer 
his administration in the establishment of such policy responses:  
i) Malaysia’s experience during the tin trading on the London Metal Exchange (LME) 
and 
ii) Concerns on the impact of the NEP, if IMF’s proposals were accepted and 
implemented. 
6.1 The London Metal Exchange (LME)’s Tin Trading Lessons  
Mahathir just became Prime Minister in 1981 when the price of tin tumbled. Tin was an 
important commodity to Malaysia as it was the world’s largest tin producer since the 
1960s with a share market of 26-33% (World Bank, 1981). Whilst at the other end of the 
spectrum, the United States was the single most significant tin consuming country with a 
share of about 21% of the total world consumption, trailed by Japan with 14% of the share 
 
74 Mahathir was appointed as the Prime Minister on 16 July 1981 and stayed in office for 22 years, resigning 




(World Bank, 1981). As the dominant consumer, the United States clearly opposed any 
export controls and favoured large buffer stock as an alternative. However, it left itself 
open to the charge of inconsistency by opposing compulsory consumer contributions to 
the buffer stock while refusing to make a voluntary contribution itself (McFadden, 1986). 
McFadden (1986) further highlighted that the U.S. confrontationist strategy was largely 
responsible for widening the gap between producing and consuming countries. As the 
member of the International Tin Council75 (ITC), the United States worked consistently 
to limit official increases in the price range to levels at which the ceiling was almost 
always below the market price. This strategy eliminated the possibility of export controls 
or buffer stock purchases because under ITC rules, price support mechanisms were not 
allowed when the market price was above the official ceiling (Lowe, Warbrick and 
Cheyne, 1987).  
In June 1981, Malaysia had attempted to increase the price of tin, under the guidance of 
commodity trader Marc Richie.76 Richie had advised Mahathir to set up a subsidiary 
company owned by a government agency to handle the concealed purchases of tin futures 
on the LME. These covert purchases were funded by Malaysian banks and designed to 
further support international prices for the metal, which were being depressed 
continuously by the US trade terms, a global recession, tin recycling and its aluminium 
substitution. Just when Malaysia's purchases of future contracts and physical tin looked 
to be succeeding, the LME changed its delivery rules, letting short sellers off the hook, 
resulting in a sudden drop in tin prices of about 20%. As a result, Malaysia experienced 
nearly RM600 million (USD260 million)77 loss in the tin trade on the LME (The New 
York Times, 1982). The LME experience was a lesson for Malaysia and had made a 
significant impact on Mahathir’s foreign policy outlook. Mahathir (2011) believed that 
 
75 ITC is a cartel administered by the 23 members of the Sixth International Tin Agreement (ITA) which 
was intended to run for five years from 1 July 1982. Under the Agreement, the ITC was authorised to 
establish a buffer stock of tin operated by the Buffer Stock Manager (BSM), and to require producing 
members to impose export controls on tin (World Bank, 1981). 
 
76 Marc Richie was later discovered by Mahathir to be a controversial trader and known as the "king of 
commodities". In the 1980s he was accused of tax evasion, fraud, as well as illegal trade with Iran and fled 
to Switzerland. Mr Richie remained on the FBI's Most Wanted List for almost two decades, narrowly 
escaping capture in Finland, Germany, Britain and Jamaica (BBC News, 2013) . 
 




the LME allowed speculation and short selling, which gave rise to gambling and 
deliberate manipulation. The experience also created a scandalous impact in the Mahathir 
administration and perpetually altered his sentiments towards Western nations.  
Mahathir (2011) explains that he had become sceptical of any individual or organisation 
from Western countries and doubted their true intentions. He became pro-Japan more than 
any other Southeast Asia leader in terms of foreign policy, where he had originated the 
‘Look East’ policy as well as ‘East Asian Economic Caucus’ (EAEC). Mahathir believes 
that Malaysia and Japan have more similarities in their culture and pushed for the Look 
East policy in pursuit of Japan’s industrialisation policies and structure. Additionally, the 
EAEC was meant at forming a Japan-led regional economic alliances to deal with other 
more advanced western economic alliance, such as the EU and NAFTA.  
6.2 The potential effects of IMF intervention on the NEP 
In Malaysia, the income disparity connecting the Muslim Malays and the minority 
Chinese was the primary cause of social and political disputes. It was one of the major 
aspects that policy makers had to seriously consider. Bumiputera78 was about 60% of the 
overall population, but the wealth and economy were dominated by the Chinese. The 13 
May 1969 ethnic riots had terrified political leaders and they collectively agreed that the 
economic disparity between the ethnic groups was a destabilising element. Consequently, 
a political coalition consisting of multi-ethnic political parties achieved an understanding 
that non-Malays should accept policies in favour of Malays to prevent further ethnic 
conflicts. The non-Malays had deemed it as an insurance in safeguarding them a protected 
business environment. The NEP gave special preference to the Malays in order to reach 
an equitable economic development among the various ethnic groups with the objective 
in narrowing the gap of the inter-ethnic income inequality. 
In his speech in Northbrook, USA on 1 September 2000 titled "Malaysia's Experience - 
Lessons for the Ummah" (Mahathir, 2000a), he clarified that “In the case of Malaysia, the 
Ringgit is devalued by 20%...this means is that we have lost 20 percent of the purchasing 
 




power of whatever money we have. The poor have become poorer and there are now more 
poor people in Malaysia.. We implemented a number of measures to contain the 
downturn, but all these measures failed… Calling in the IMF would have been a disaster 
for the Ummah, as the NEP policies are not in keeping with the IMF’s idea of free 
unfettered competition ... ”  
There was an undeniable pressure between the NEP conventions and neoliberalism, one 
which upheld the balance between ethnic fairness and economic progress versus one that 
promotes economic performance. Due to this mounting pressure, the policymakers had 
split into two teams i.e. Mahathir’s team versus his deputy, Anwar who was also the 
Finance Minister. While Anwar’s allies which included leaders from BNM and the 
Treasury favoured the conformist policy measures, Mahathir’s disciples stood by the 
doctrine of the NEP.  
However, it was the consortium of Bumiputera business owners that eventually swayed 
the stroke of the pendulum towards the NEP. The consortium had exceedingly defied 
Anwar’s policies as the policies resulted in the termination of mega projects and 
escalating interest rates, which had damaging effects on their business ventures. 
Naturally, Mahathir capitalised on this dissatisfaction to preserve his political power and 
to prevent bankruptcy proceedings for some of his cohorts. In spite of this, it appeared to 
the public that Mahathir and Anwar had a good relationship as both leaders dismissed any 
conflict between them as a groundless rumour. This perception was further validated 
when Mahathir appointed Anwar as the acting Prime Minister and the stand-in UMNO 
president when he took a 2-month leave abroad in 1997, convincing the public of Anwar’s 
succession (Chin, 2000). 
Even though Mahathir had blamed the financial crisis on external sources, the Panic of 
1997 had raised considerable questions over the measures of the Washington consensus. 
Anwar’s policies had heightened the strain between the country’s economic performance 
and social aspiration of the communities. Undeniably the contagion effect of the Thai 
crisis led the Ringgit into a downward spiral, and hedge fund managers initiated a streak 
of speculative attacks on Malaysia’s Ringgit in hope of a massive devaluation. 
Accordingly, interest rates for the offshore Ringgit escalated higher than the internal 




and severe financial pressure. Mahathir’s strong criticism against hedge funds managers 
indicated a potential policy shift when he blamed George Soros of attacking and 
disrupting the currency markets during his speech in Hong Kong. Mahathir argued that 
“The currency traders have become rich, very very rich through making other people 
poorer...And when they are annoyed, they can reduce us to basket cases... They will 
determine we prosper or don’t... Currency trading is unnecessary, unproductive and 
immoral. It should be stopped. It should be made illegal... If trade is to grow, then 
currency values must be linked to the economic performance of the countries concerned” 
(Mahathir, 1997a). 
Control on capital accounts were tipped as a policy option in early 1998, but not all policy 
makers supported them. The BNM governor and his deputy had opposed the policy as 
they were worried that it would cut off Malaysia from the global finance community. Due 
to their disagreement, it took several months in the implementation of the capitals control 
as the central bank’s role was crucial in carrying out this policy (The New York Times, 
1998). Doraisami (2005b) claims that the implementation of the NEP in 1970 and the 
drive for liberalisation and privatisation were critical factors in influencing the decision 
for capital control implementation in managing the Panic of 1997. Her study focus on the 
political economy of capital flows and capital control in Malaysia and argues that the 
ultimate goal of the NEP must be uphold at any cost. NEP is aimed at fostering national 
unity via eradication of poverty and to restructure society in order to eliminate the 
identification of race with economic function and geographic location. When the Panic 
of 1997 began in Thailand, Malaysia’s economic fundamentals were relatively strong in 
comparison to its neighbouring countries. External forces and currency speculators were 
identified as the cause of the Panic of 1997.  
Additional measures were introduced mid-1998 by Malaysian authorities, including the 
monetary and fiscal policy. Stemming from the concern of the escalating crisis in the 
financial market, the central bank cut down the statutory rate and the 2-month Kuala 
Lumpur interbank rate. Two debt resolution agencies, a national fund and an asset 
management company were established to recapitalise ailing banks and absorbed bad 
debts. Doraisami (2005b) argues that the corporate restructuring undertaken as part of the 
crisis management had political implications for the elite ruling party, UMNO. She 




this weakened the position of the incumbent Prime Minister, as the President of UMNO. 
Doraisami concludes that the decision for capital controls as a crisis resolution strategy 
was likely to be centred on political pragmatism rather than economic necessity. On the 
other hand, Yasin (1994) argues that the Islamisation strategy to a certain extent 
contributed to Malaysia’s economic development and the creation of two important 
Islamic institutions: the first Islamic bank and a Pilgrimage Fund. Yasin examines the 
role of Shariah or Islamic law on the policy making the effects of the economic 
development of Malaysia from the historical event in 1969 that sparked the formulation 
of the NEP, up to the pinnacle of Malaysia’s economic development in 1993.  
The argument by Yasin (1994) is supported by Pramanik (2002) demonstrating the link 
between progress and Islam, rejecting the worldview misconceptions created by Western 
scholars on the compatibility between Islam and development, using Malaysia as a case 
study. Malaysia’s establishment of the NEP had a two-pronged objective of eliminating 
poverty and restructuring society to ensure economic and social fairness for the less 
fortunate ethnic community in Malaysia. Pramanik argues that the NEP is based on one 
of the most essential principles of fairness and its implementation had set the foundation 
for a modern Malaysian society for all races. However, Pramanik (2002) also highlights 
that the NEP had a number of drawbacks. Pramanik and Gomez and Jomo (1998a; 1999; 
2004b) suggest ‘that implementation of NEP hindered economic growth’. They argue that 
if Malaysia’s economic growth was not hampered by NEP, the economic standing and 
social welfare of the underprivileged race would have been elevated to a higher level. But 
their arguments lack the support of any empirical evidence. Similar to Yasin (1994), 
Pramanik (2002) concluded that the successful implementation of NEP enabled the 
country to achieve rapid growth as it had given the majority Malaysia population the 
opportunity to progress and attain the goal of sustaining a quality life, raising future 
offspring, safeguarding individual faith and enjoying rewards of individual efforts. The 
success of the NEP is evident through the establishment of supporting institutions for the 





Table 6.1:  Mean monthly household income by ethnic group and stratum, 
Peninsular Malaysia, 1970–2002 (RM)   
 1970 1973 1976 1979 1984 1987 1990 1995 1999 2002 
Total 423 502 566 669 792 760 1,167 2,020 2,472 3,011 
Bumiputera (B) 276 335 380 475 616 614 940 1,604 1,984 2,376 
Chinese (C) 632 739 866 906 1,086 1,012 1,631 2,890 3,456 4,279 
Indian (I) 478 565 592 730 791 771 1,209 2,140 2,702 3,044 
Other 1,304 1,798 1,395 1,816 1,775 2,043 955 1,284 1,371 2,165 
Urban (U) 687 789 913 942 1,114 1,039 1,617 2,589 3,103 3,652 
Rural (R) 321 374 431 531 596 604 951 1,326 1,718 1,729 
Disparity ratio 
(C/B) 2.29 2.21 2.28 1.91 1.76 1.65 1.74 1.80 1.74 1.80 
Disparity ratio 
(I/B) 
1.73 1.69 1.56 1.54 1.28 1.26 1.29 1.33 1.36 1.28 
Disparity ratio 
(U/R) 
2.14 2.11 2.12 1.77 1.87 1.72 1.70 1.95 1.81 2.11 
Note:  The figures shown for 1970 to 1987 are in constant 1978 prices, and the figures shown for 
1990 to 1999 are in constant 1990 prices.  
Source:  Government of Malaysia 1981, 1989, 1996, 2001b, 2003 as adapted in Jomo (2004b) 
 
6.3 Financial Developments before the Panic of 1997 
The Malaysian financial system has exhibited many features of the ‘Anglo-Saxon model’, 
being a former British colony and greatly influenced by financial trends in the U.S. and 
U.K, restricting banking activities to accepting deposits, granting loans and other 
specified banking activities. Banks in Malaysia are kept at arm’s length from involvement 
in corporate governance and management. Shares held by a commercial bank in 
manufacturing companies should not exceed 10% of the paid-up capital and reserves of 
5% of a foreign bank’s net working funds, whichever is lower (BNM, 1999c).  
Malaysian banks also tend to be conservative, mainly extending loans on the basis of 
collateral, rather than project viability. ‘These policies … impose on industry a similarly 
cautious and short-term view of investment, profitability and profit allocation and inhibit 
long-term or high-risk industrial investment’ (Hing, 1987). The lack of any motivation 




reason for the limited development of the country’s manufacturing proficiencies, 
especially in non-resource-based export-oriented  industries (Jomo, 1998b). Export-
oriented manufacturing only accounted for a minor percentage of total outstanding loans 
given by commercial banks. There is minimal indication of any financial strategy serving 
as an important tool of industrial policy in Malaysia, apart from export credit and some 
relatively minor financial institutions (Jomo, 1998b). Just over 25% of Malaysian 
commercial bank financing goes to manufacturing, agriculture, mining and other 
productive activities, and the percentage is likely to be even smaller with foreign 
borrowings, most of which have been collateralised with assets such as real property and 
stocks. Hence, despite considerable government intervention in the financial sector, more 
than 70% of bank loans in Malaysia were not for productive investments in 
manufacturing, agriculture and mining, but for other purposes, especially real property 
and share purchases and consumption credit (Jomo, 1998b). 
In the mid-90s, just before the Panic of 1997, BNM began trying to consolidate Malaysian 
banks, in anticipation of further financial liberalisation an introduced a new 2-tier 
regulatory system in December 1994. The new system sought to provide incentives for 
smaller banks to consider recapitalisation or a merger exercise. Banks must have an equity 
base of at least RM500 million (USD131 million) to qualify for tier-one status79. The 
origins of the Panic of 1997 can be tracked to fragmentary and inappropriately sequenced 
liberalisation of the Malaysian financial system; after all, ‘in a deregulated, liberal 
environment, banks are prone to speculate or lend excessively in areas such as in real 
estate, stocks or commodities’ (Park, 1996). Prudent regulation by the government is 
necessary to help maintain a balance between the competitive efficiency of markets and 
the safety of the banking system (Islam and Chowdhury, 1993). Appropriately planned 
deregulation as well as persistent regulation of the capital account to restrain exit may 
have been able to alleviate some damaging excesses which contributed to the recent 
financial crises in Malaysia and Southeast Asia (Randhawa, 2011). 
 
79 Tier-one banks have the exclusive privilege to handle certain lucrative kinds of transactions denied to 




The International Finance Corporation (IFC), a World Bank subsidiary had promoted the 
stock markets globally, which resulted in the increasing significance of equity finance 
and stock markets in the Southeast Asia region, especially in Malaysia, with its British 
colonial heritage (Jomo, 1998b). The successful promotion by IFC had been accompanied 
by considerable financial disintermediation from the banking system to the securities 
markets, particularly in the bull-run years of the early 1990s. In June 1995, the Finance 
Minister announced a package of incentives to attract foreign fund managers to Malaysia, 
thus further liberalising the capital market for foreign financial institutions (Athukorala, 
1998). This promotion had made the Malaysian economy more susceptible to both global 
macro-economic instabilities and capital flight, and made the tasks of currency exchange 
and inflation control more challenging (Jomo, 2001a).  
Malaysia's economic condition preceding to the Panic of 1997 appeared strong in many 
respects. Its macroeconomic indicators had shown strong growth with the declining 
current account deficit (Berg, 1999). The banking sector appeared robust, with projected 
NPLs decreasing from 20% of total loans in 1990 to under 4% in 1996 (BNM, 1999c). 
Berg’s analysis for the IMF report (1999) showed that the capital adequacy ratios in the 
banking system appeared high, while the supervisory and regulatory framework was 
generally deemed strong. Additionally, there was little dependence on foreign capital, 
particularly, short-term flows, with strict controls on short-term borrowing, net foreign 
exchange positions of banks, and off-balance-sheet activities.  
Nonetheless, there were some important warning signs as the current account deficit was 
in excess of 5% of GDP, exports had decelerated, in large part due to falling foreign 
demand and some real appreciation of the Malaysia Ringgit, though also because of 
increased competitive pressures from China (Wade, 1998b). However, domestic credit 
growth remained sound, particularly in the consumption and property sectors. While 
property prices were fairly stable, there were concerns that a coming surge of supply could 
depress prices, particularly in an economic downturn. After the Thai devaluation, the 
Ringgit came under strong pressure and was floated, after brief interest rate defenses and 




6.4 The Panic of 1997 
After the involuntary devaluation of Thailand’s baht on 2 July 1997, the credit crisis 
spread quickly through the region. There was a sudden collapse in the confidence in the 
Asian currencies worsened by dramatic devaluation (Jomo, 1998). As a result, overseas 
lenders withdrew their short-term loans and the affected countries were not able to roll 
over their debt. On 11 August 1997, the IMF unveiled a rescue package for Thailand 
worth more than USD17 billion and approved another bailout package worth USD3.9 
billion just 9 days later (Wade, 1998a). As the Panic of 1997 intensified, earlier 
commendation for the economic strategies of the region were no longer applaud - the 
“miracle” framework in Southeast and East Asia, repeatedly inscribed as models, was 
criticised for all the turmoil. “The attachment to the family becomes nepotism. The 
importance of personal relationships rather than formal legality becomes cronyism. 
Consensus becomes wheel-greasing and corrupt politics. Conservatism and respect for 
authority become rigidity and an inability to innovate. Much-vaunted educational 
achievements become rote-learning and a refusal to question those in authority” (The 
Economist; London, 1998). 
Another factor is the dismantling of capital controls in the process of the deregulation of 
the Asian economies. Even though the Asian countries had been reluctant to dismantle 
capital controls, in the 1990s these controls where lessened in order to increase the 
efficiency of the financial system and welcome financialisation. According to Wade 
(1998a) financialisation was unveiled in Southeast Asia when the IMF and World Bank 
had urged the Asian governments to liberalise their financial system through the 1990s, 
including their external capital account, which allowed domestic agents to raise funds via 
the foreign markets while it also permitted access to the domestic markets by foreign 
agents.  
This view was supported by Jomo (1998) and Wade (2003), who viewed that the Panic 
of 1997 was induced by IMF’s encouragement of Southeast Asia’s financial markets to 
open up to large inflows of bank borrowings and portfolio investments, which later 
flowed out even more rapidly, causing the currency collapses and financial panics that 
brought the region down. Wade, Jomo and Ariyoshi (1998; 2000; 2001a) argued that 




have insufficient understanding of the international financial markets. Wade et al. (1998) 
further stated that with the wisdom of hindsight, the increased efficiency by the lowering 
of interest rates for domestic borrowers, was at the expense of intensifying instability and 
escalating volatility. In addition, Asian countries economic policy makers miscalculated 
the perils of global financial markets and were distracted by their accomplishments with 
industrial products. Cheap short-term debts were utilised to fund long-term investments.  
The Panic of 1997 had resulted in severe hardship to most people in Malaysia. Not only 
had it reduced the demand for labour but also increased the rate of unemployment as well 
as lower wages. This Crisis prompted the government to introduce a reform programme, 
which aimed to mitigate the impact of the economic slowdown on low-income groups. 
Specifically, the government maintained a high level of spending on health, education 
and improved quality of human resources (World Bank, 2017c).  
6.5 Early Policy Responses 
An early series of policy measures by the Mahathir administration were adopted to deal 
with the financial crisis and stabilise the economy. The 1998 Budget contained measures 
to reduce the current account deficit, strengthen balance of payments and fiscal account, 
improve competitiveness, and increase monetary and financial stability. The 1998 Budget 
announced on 17 October 1997 encompassed the following measures: 
i) Reduction of Federal Government expenditure by 2%, deferment of mega 
projects, and review of public agencies purchases of foreign goods. 
ii) On the financial aspect, the prudential standards were strengthened with the 
classification of non-performing loans in arrears from six to three months, greater 
financial disclosure by banking institutions, and increasing general provision to 
1.5%. 
iii) The Credit Plan was introduced to limit overall credit growth to 25% by the end 
of 1997 and 15% by the end of 1998. In providing loans, banking institutions were 
to give priority to productive and export-oriented  activities. 
The financial crisis presented Anwar the chance to contest Mahathir’s leadership as there 




same time, President Suharto’s ignominious downfall affected Mahathir’s power because 
there were several resemblances between the two leaders80. This strained relationship 
appeared to emerge when Anwar revealed a distinct economic package on 5 December 
1997 (Johnson, 1998). The policies were as follows: 
i) Reduce the current account deficit to 3% of GNP in 1998. 
ii) Trim Federal Government expenditure by 18% in 1998. 
iii) Stricter criteria for approvals of new reverse investment and defer the 
implementation of non-strategic and non-essential projects. 
iv) More emphasis placed on good corporate governance. 
In February 1998, Anwar announced the additional measures: 
i) BNM’s three-month intervention rate was raised from 10% to 11%. 
ii) The statutory reserve requirement (SRR) reduced by 3.5% of eligible liabilities to 
10%. 
According to Anwar, the additional economic package was needed as the regional 
instability proved to be more protracted than earlier anticipated. Anwar’s policy measures 
were aimed at strengthening economic stability and instilling confidence in the financial 
system. There were concerns about the large current account deficit and high private 
sector debt amounting to 160% of GDP in 1997. Hence, there was a need to prudently 
manage public sector finances while curbing excesses in the private sector.  
The foreign financial community had applauded Anwar’s policy package and the praise 
from managing director of IMF, Michel Camdessus validated Anwar’s policy decision. 
This support reassured Anwar to somewhat distance himself from Mahathir’s initial 
policy responses and Anwar had boldly declared that Malaysia’s quest for progress 
lacking of democracy could promote corruption and cronyism. Anwar’s statement was an 
implied defiance to Mahathir, and Mahathir’s conviction that Malaysia’s progress should 
be accomplished without modification to the current policy framework (Hilley, 2001).  
 




Anwar’s economic package had defied Mahathir politically in two aspects. First, some of 
Mahathir’s mega projects were suspended following tightening of the 1998 Budget, such 
as key infrastructure projects like the Hydro-dam in Bakun, the International Airport in 
the Northern Region, the Kuala Lumpur Linear City, and the second phase of Putrajaya, 
the current administrative hub. Second, it was introduced by BNM and the Treasury, 
without the full blessing from Mahathir. When some initial measures initiated by 
Mahathir fail to work and worsened the financial condition,81 Anwar had taken the 
opportunity to put forward his ideas into the economic policy. His main concern was to 
renew foreign investor assurance, which meant adhering to the IMF-design 
macroeconomic policy. Despite the global recognition of his method, among senior 
policymakers only the BNM governor backed Anwar.  
Even with the validation from IMF, Anwar’s policy proposal was not capable in 
reinforcing any influence of neoliberalism into the government. Firstly, the Bumiputera 
commercial society supported Mahathir’s analysis of the situation as the Bumiputera 
companies anticipated government financial aid as forthcoming. Secondly, Malaysia’s 
financial position was relatively stronger than its neighbours as it short-term foreign loans 
were comparatively smaller. This had made it possible for Malaysia to endure the impact 
of the Panic of 1997 in the first few months since the contagion began, avoiding any 
external funding. Yet, the substantial wave of capital outflows had necessitated the 
Malaysian government to pursue additional financial restructuring.  
Just before the regional currencies crisis, Camdessus had praised the BNM for a well-
managed economy and financial system at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, (New 
Straits Times, 1997), “Malaysia is a good example of a country where the authorities are 
well aware of the challenges of managing the pressures that result from high growth and 
maintaining a sound financial system amid substantial capital flows and a booming 
property market.” Camdessus (1997) also commented that inflation was low and the 
 




Ringgit82 was a strong currency, an indication of a sound economy. However, there were 
still powerful sentiments on the possibility of financial contagion.  
Prior to the Crisis in early May 1997, Mahathir took a 2-month leave as he planned to 
hand over his premiership to Anwar and left his deputy in charge as the acting Prime 
Minister. Anwar was also the Minister of Finance at that time and had frequent meetings 
with the IMF. Based on this knowledge, when the Thai baht was attacked in July 1997, 
Mahathir had asked Anwar to appeal to Camdessus for IMF to intervene on the currency 
trading that was affecting the Asian countries, but no attempt was taken by the IMF. 
Mahathir was unsure if Anwar had relayed his message to the IMF, or whether the IMF 
had ignored their request. Mahathir had also written to the French President, Jacques 
Chirac and British Prime Minister, Tony Blair for support to request the IMF to intercede 
on the currency trading, but to no avail.  
Subsequently, Mahathir had continuously criticised the currency traders for creating 
financial disorder in the Southeast Asia market and IMF for its lack of intervention. The 
first international condemnation was in Hong Kong in September 1997 (as mentioned 
above) and then again in Chile, and with each criticism the Ringgit worsened. Mahathir 
argued that since the reaction was instantaneous, it could not have been market reaction. 
He believed that currency traders had been pushing for the devaluation of the Ringgit. 
Anwar on the other hand was in support of the IMF and its proposed solution. As the 
Finance Minister, he raised interest rates and cut back on government spending. Anwar 
believed that even though Malaysia did not have to borrow from the IMF to settle foreign 
debts, it still had to accept the advice from IMF. Conversely, Mahathir believed that since 
Malaysia’s foreign debt was comparatively small as compared to other crisis-affected 
countries as depicted in Table 6.2, the country could respond to the Panic of 1997 without 
any help from the IMF. 
  
 





Table 6.2: Lending by BIS Reporting Banks - End June 1997 
USD Millions Total Banks Public Sector Private Sector 
Malaysia  28,797      10,486  36% 
      
1,851  7% 
        
16,460  57% 
Indonesia 
   
58,641      12,393  21% 
      
6,506  11% 
        
39,742  68% 
South Korea 
 
103,360      67,290  65% 
      
4,390  4% 
        
31,680  31% 
Philippines 
   
14,112        5,485  39% 
      
1,855  13% 
          
6,772  48% 
Thailand 
   
69,299      26,069  38% 
      
1,968  3% 
        
41,262  60% 
Source: Bank of International Settlement as adapted in Jomo (1998c, p. xv) 
Anwar had agree with IMF and made another bold move to reduce the default payment 
period form 6 months to 3 months before declaring loans as NPL. This resulted in banks 
with a much higher NPLs, while worsening the default rates and consequently slowing 
down the economy83. Disagreements on responses to the Crisis was the beginning of the 
conflict between Mahathir and Anwar, which eventually had a significant impact on the 
political landscape of Malaysia and the subsequent policy responses to the Panic of 1997. 
In opposition to Mahathir, Anwar had suggested that it was improper to attribute the 
reasons of the Panic of 1997 entirely to foreign elements since Malaysia had deficiencies 
in its financial system (Jomo, 2006). Anwar announced the IMF policy proposals in 
December 1997, justifying his approach on economic productivity. Anwar believed this 
method would attain external investor assurance in the short term and strengthen 
institutional structures for better economic improvement in the longer term. However, 
this also entailed the principles of the NEP to be revoked. It is difficult to interpret why 
Anwar accepted the pro-IMF stand because his constituents who were mainly from the 
poor rural region, would be the most badly affected from the adoption of the IMF 
approach. Consequently, “Anwar’s choice portrayed him as pro-West and principally 
with regard to the frameworks of public rhetoric that had previously been formed” (Chin, 
2000). Prior to the Crisis, Anwar had won countrywide fame as a guardian of Muslim 
Malays. He was also known for his strong criticism on Western lifestyle in defence of 
 




Islamic values and culture. Henceforth, the sudden transformation in his support of pro-
Western ideals had exposed his true political ambitions.  
6.6 Developing the Malaysian Alternative Strategy  
It was during his holiday in England that Mahathir first heard the news of the attack on 
the Thai baht. In August 1997, Malaysia had decided to help fund Thailand’s rescue 
package so that Thailand could strengthen its reserves84. Mahathir was convinced at that 
time that the Malaysian finances were sound, as neither the government nor the business 
community needed to borrow much of foreign currencies. Malaysia’s interest rate had 
always been low and foreign currency borrowings would not give Malaysia any 
advantages. At the World Economic Forum in October 1999, he stated, “We believed in 
mid-1997 that we were not like Mexico, not like Thailand. We had no massive foreign 
debts, neither the Government nor the private sector. We had no difficulty whatsoever in 
quickly pledging one billion US Dollar to help Thailand and one billion US Dollar to help 
Indonesia. We believed that our economic fundamentals were exceedingly strong. In fact, 
in the middle of June 1997, Mr Michel Camdessus himself had described in open forum 
and in detail the great fundamental strengths of the Malaysian economy” (Mahathir, 
1999). 
When both the real and financial economy worsened, Mahathir’s government chose to 
adopt an alternative economic policy. This new policy was implemented phase by phase 
and piece by piece as the economy progressed. Despite the differences in opinion, both 
Mahathir and Anwar had agreed to set-up an economic task force, which consisted of 
selected members of the Cabinet, business leaders and economic specialists, to enhance 
disclosure of information of corporations and closer scrutiny for corporate restructuring. 
The task force, known as the NEAC was setup to take over the management of the 
economic crisis. The purpose of the NEAC is to provide “concrete proposals to the 
 
84 The IMF alone would not be able to raise the full amount needed. Prospective bilateral donors, meeting 
in Tokyo on August 11, 1997 chipped in. The IMF contributed USD4 billion, and the government of Japan 
contributed an equivalent amount. The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank pledged USD1.5 
billion and USD1.2 billion, respectively. The governments of Australia, China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and 
Singapore all pledged at the USD1 billion level. Indonesia and the Republic of Korea each pledged USD0.5 




government to halt the deteriorating economic condition and revitalise the country’s 
economy”. The NEAC’s primary task was to draw up the NERP that would steer the 
country out of the Panic of 1997 and towards economic revival. The government via the 
NERP introduced both short and long term tasks to deal in lessening the effect of the 
contagion. 
Specifically, to work on the capital control measures, Mahathir decided that he needed 
someone who understood the global financial system well, with the relevant experience. 
As a result, Mahathir chose Nor Mohamed Yakcop85, because he knew that Nor was the 
head of BNM currency trading operation during BNM’s involvement in the tin trading at 
the LME. The engineer for the capital control policy was Nor, who designed the 
framework and implementation of the policy. Nor was also unconvinced of the “financial 
liberalisation” and believed that neo-liberalism was more effective to industrialised 
countries in the West than developing countries in the East (Raj, 2002), a view that was 
consistent to Mahathir rather than Anwar.86 Nor was later invited to be a member of the 
NEAC.   
NEAC was set up to address the financial crisis situation in Malaysia and consisted of 27 
members with Mahathir as the Chairman.87 Based on the research by Wong (2011), it 
took Mahathir and his unofficial economic advisor, Nor Mohamed eleven months to 
convince the NEAC to accept the NERP. The other members of the NEAC were 
exceedingly sceptical on the success of the plan, particularly on the part of implementing 
the capital controls (Wong, 2011). Throughout the planning stage, Mahathir (2011) was 
insistent on two issues:  
i) That Malaysian businesses should not be allowed to close down to protect jobs; 
and  
 
85 Prior to August 1998, Nor Mohamed Yakcop initially became the unofficial advisor to Mahathir. He was 
then appointed as the special economic adviser to the Prime Minister. 
86 Anwar Ibrahim was the Deputy Prime Minister cum the Finance Minister during the Panic of 1997. 
87 Mahathir also chaired the executive committee of the NEAC, and they met every morning except on 




ii) Malaysia must never go to the IMF. He realised that by accepting IMF’s rescue 
package would mean that Malaysia will have to abandon the NEP, and this may 
have adverse social consequences.  
Originally, Anwar and his Finance Ministry led the management of the Crisis but with 
the creation of the NEAC, the core decision-making authority was transferred to the Prime 
Minister’s Department. Mahathir (2011) mentioned that on the onset of the Crisis, he was 
not familiar with the international monetary system and had sought the advice from his 
financial advisors in the government, mainly from the MoF. Mahathir later discovered 
that the measures undertaken were ineffective as his advisors did not fully understand the 
intricacies of the international financial system. Mahathir also stated in his memoir 
(Mahathir, 2011) that he initially could not figure out how such a large sum of currencies 
could leave Malaysia undetected and how currency traders could physically handle 
billions of Ringgit, and none of his financial advisors could fully explain the situation to 
him. This fact was also another reason for the setting up of the NEAC. 
The NEAC was chaired by Mahathir and comprised several core Ministers, state 
government officials, government agencies business delegates and non-government 
bodies. It functioned and had the authority similar to an emergency cabinet (Khor, 2008). 
It had an executive committee chaired by Mahathir, a secretariat88 and supported by a 
working group of 5 representatives gathered from industry and academia. The formation 
of this strong-powered council with overriding power to handle the Crisis on an 
emergency basis, was a fundamental form of the Malaysian framework of crisis control. 
Ultimately, it was the NEAC that originated an alternative medium-term action plan to 
manage the Crisis, with intensive monitoring of all aspects of the economic condition. 
The executive committee met a few hours daily to collect responses on implementation 
as well as impacts of the action plan (Mahathir, 2011). The NEAC also managed to steer 
clear of the customary protectionism between different Ministries and decisions were 
reached in an organised and efficient manner.  
 
 
88 The secretariat was set up in the Prime Minister’s Office, with an Executive Director and round-the-




The series of the alternative Malaysian plan took several stages:  
1. After NEAC’s formation in January 1998, its executive committee, secretariat and 
working group undertook a comprehensive discussion over several months with 
delegates of various segments, to figure out their issues and receive their opinions and 
policy propositions.  
2. The NERP was drafted and announced on 23 July 1998. The objectives of NERP and 
the proposed measures are summarised in Table 6.4 below, which included a fresh 
approach to fiscal and monetary policy. Its implementation also involved 
organisational concerns, involving restructuring of corporate debt banking sector 
recapitalisation whilst dealing the NPLs. Various actions were carried out from the 
start to the midst of 1998 to repeal the contractionary policies that were initiated in 
the end of 1997.  
3. On 1 September 1998, action plans were revealed by Mahathir on the currency and 
the movement of capital, summarised as below: 
i) Stabilisation of the Ringgit via fixing the exchange rate at RM3.80 to the US 
dollar; 
ii) Prohibiting foreign speculation on the value of the Ringgit and Malaysia stock 
market by regulating the foreign trade and immobilising the external Ringgit 
accounts of non-residents in Malaysia. This was targeted at phasing out the 
Singapore offshore Ringgit market and preventing currency traders from gaining 
access to Ringgit funds; and  
iii) Lessening capital outflows via selective measures of capital controls, as tabulated 





Table 6.3: Selective Exchange Controls during the Panic of 1997 
Source: BNM Annual Report Box 8.5 (1999c, p. 293) 
The controls were confined to short-term capital flows with the purpose of making it 
difficult for short-term portfolio investors to sell their shares and keep the proceeds and 
for hedge fund managers to drive down the currency. No controls were imposed on long 
term commitment to an open trade and investment policy. The policy was created to 
prevent capital outflows instead of capital inflows. 
Mahathir said that when the world turned away from the Bretton Woods fixed exchange 
system, it assumed the floating rate system was a better way to evaluate currencies 
(Stiglitz, Ocampo and Ocampo, 2008) . “But the market is now abused by currency traders 
who regard currencies as commodities which they trade in. They buy and sell currencies 
according to their own system and make profits from it, but they cause poverty and 
damage to whole nations. That is very regressive, and the world is not moving ahead but 





Table 6.3: Summary of Capital and Exchange Control Measures in 1997–9989 
Measure  Motivation 
4 August 1997 - Controls were placed on banks to 
reduce outstanding non-commercial related Ringgit 
offer-side swap contracts to USD2 million per non 
domestic customer   
To delink the offshore Ringgit 
market from its onshore counterpart 
and cut down domestic onshore 
interest rates. 
1 September 1998 – Introduction of a selection of 
exchange control measures: 
 Repatriation of Ringgit offshore funds will require 
BNM approval.  
 Limit on exports and imports of Ringgit.  
 Residents not allowed to give loans non-resident 
banks and stockbroking firms. 
 Residents not allowed to obtain Ringgit loan from 
non-residents. 
 Settlement of all imports and exports to be in 
foreign currency.  
 Domestic banks were not allowed to conduct 
transactions in offer-side swaps with non-resident 
banks.   
 All purchases and sales of Ringgit financial assets 
can only be transacted through authorised 
depository institutions. 
Intended to eliminate the offshore 
Ringgit market and reducing the 
supply of Ringgit for speculations 
1 September 1998 – Introduction of extra measures : 
 Approval requirement for non-residents to convert 
the Ringgit held in external accounts into foreign 
currency, except for purchases of Ringgit assets. 
 A 12-month waiting period for non-residents to 
convert Ringgit proceeds from the sale of 
Malaysian securities held in external accounts. 
 Approval requirement beyond a certain limit for all 
residents to invest abroad in any form. 
Intended to prevent heavy capital 
outflows by residents and non-
residents. 
 




Measure  Motivation 
 A specific limit on exports of foreign currency by 
residents and up to the amount brought into 
Malaysia for nonresidents  
15 February 1999 - The 12-month holding period rule 
for improvement of portfolio investment was 
substituted with exit levy system. 
To encourage new funds/investors 
to the country. 
18 February 1999 and 5 April 1999 - Property 
investments and investors in MESDAQ were exempted 
from the exit levy. 
Exemption of investments that 
resemble FDI. 
Source: Ariyoshi et al. (2000, p. 98). 
6.6.1. The NERP 
The NERP comprised approximately 580 detailed instructions, including broad-ranging 
plans for economic equilibrium and fundamental restructurings while tackling socio-
economic agreements and regions distressed by the Crisis. Launched as a consulting body 
to the cabinet, the NEAC presented the broad framework of crisis control. Its primary 
task was to deliver a thorough framework and the coordination of the relevant ministries 
at the point of execution.  
Table 6.4: Summary of NERP 
Objectives Measures 
Stabilising the Ringgit 
 
 Appropriate Choice of Exchange Rate Regime 
 Reduce Over-Dependence on the US Dollar 
 Increase External Reserves  




 Improve Transparency and Regulatory Environment 
 Establish Rules for Assisting Industries and Companies in 
Trouble 
 Increase Consistency of Policies 
 Adopt Liberal and Market-Based Policies 
 Improve Public Relations 








 Preserve the Integrity of the Banking System 
 Establish Agencies Along the Lines of FDIC/RTC 
 Recapitalise the Banking Sector 
 Monitor Closely Overall Credit Expansion 
 Improve the Capital Market 




 Increase the Quality of Investments 
 Improve the Balance of Payments 
 Maintain a Balanced Public Sector Financial Position 
 Maintain an Appropriate Monetary Policy  
 Maintain Price Stability  
 Increase Labour Competitiveness 
Continuing the equity 
and socioeconomic 
agenda 
 Ameliorate the Hardship from Poverty  
 Address the issues on Bumiputera Equity Ownership  
 Expand Employment Opportunities  
 Meet the Challenge of Expanding Tertiary Education 
 Address the Problem of Graduate Unemployment 
 Control the influx of Foreign Workers 
 Gear up State Corporations to Face the Crisis   
 Revamp Cooperatives and Cooperative Banks  
 Protect the Environment for Sustainable Development 
Restoring adversely 
affected sectors 
 Primary Commodities & Resource-
Based Industries 
 Information Technology & Multimedia 
Super Corridor 
 Insurance and Reinsurance 
 Industrial Development Finance 
Institutions 
 Freight Forwarding 
 
 Infrastructure  
 Manufacturing  
 Transportation 
 Tourism   
 Construction 
 Property 




The setting up of the NEAC from a political standpoint indicated a cause of concern as it 
revealed a widening rift between Mahathir and Anwar. Apart from the appointment of 
Nor as the advisor on capital controls measure, Mahathir had also appointed his close ally 
and former finance minister, Daim Zainuddin90 to play a lead role in the NEAC as its 
director. Daim was considered a politician who was candid in his support for the NEP 
principles. Therefore, Daim was not in favour of Anwar’s pro-IMF policies and argued 
that these policies would weaken the economic position as well as political dominance of 
the Bumiputera. The raising animosity between the NEAC and Ministry of Finance had 
interfered in a cohesive policymaking procedure.  
From a fiscal perspective, Malaysia was cautious, and the economy recorded a 
considerable fiscal surplus for a continuous five years (1992-97). Hence, it was expected 
that the 1998 budget would show a further surplus of 2.7%, which was planned to be 
revealed in October 1997. As Finance Minister, Anwar believed that current account 
deficits must be reduced, and the original plan must be adjusted accordingly. Anwar 
revealed a revised budget proposal in December 1997 to indicate Malaysia’s pledge to a 
comprehensive macroeconomic administration. The 1998 budget featured an 18% cut in 
the fund allocations and as a result key infrastructure projects were either postponed or 
withdrawn, and public sector operational overheads were slashed. The cabinet members 
and senior public servants accepted a voluntary 10% and 3% pay cut respectively, in the 
effort to downsizing of government operations.   
In short, Anwar’s policy proposals was akin to IMF-back package i.e. cuts in government 
spending, deferring of mega projects, controlling capital outflows by increasing interest 
rates, and restructuring the banking sector by enhancing the regulatory framework. 
Retrospectively, the stringent IMF-like standpoint proved to be unsuitable. At that point, 
an aggressive fiscal policy was required to survive an imminent economic downturn. 
Malaysia’s sound financial position could have given ample opportunity for anti-cyclical 
 
90 Daim also acted as a “business consultant to Mahathir when he was the deputy prime minister. He was 
appointed a senator in 1980 and was elected to parliament in 1982. Daim assumed the role of treasurer of 
the UMNO in 1981. In 1984 he was appointed finance minister but continued to act as UMNO treasurer. 
Between 1991 and 1998 Daim was, at his own choice, out of the cabinet. He returned, at Mahathir’s request, 





actions. Anwar only gave in to the conservative viewpoint when Thailand and Korea 
intensified fiscal deficits to finance social protection and restructuring of finance system. 
Some efforts were engaged to reinforce employment mobility proposals to alleviate the 
detrimental impact of economic stagnation. The Employment Act (1955) was revised to 
create further resilience to employment markets in 1998. The Crisis raised the rate of 
unemployment from 2.6% to 3.9% (1997 to 1998). Compared to neighbouring crisis-
affected regions, its social impact on the public was moderate. Firstly, most businesses 
had implemented cutbacks on foreign employees rather than Malaysia citiziens. 
Secondly, temporary salary cuts were favoured to redundancy because the economic 
downturn was thought to be short term and would pass on. Therefore, labour conflict was 
not of primary political consideration.  
The influx of substantial foreign capital in the early 1990 had warnings signal of equity 
and asset bubbles. On hindsight, BNM undertook pre-emptive measures to scale down 
the stress on inflation by introducing ceilings property borrowings and share financing. 
At the initial stage, BNM (BNM, 1999c, 2001b) implemented “a low interest rate strategy 
to safeguard highly geared companies from bankruptcy. Nevertheless, this approach was 
not viable due to the devaluation of the Ringgit and worsening trade deficits”. The 
currency devaluation made it “more challenging for BNM to follow a coherent monetary 
policy”. Prior to the Crisis, the Ringgit was hovering in a tight range between “2.36 and 
2.51 to the USD. In March 1997, this parity became unsteady as the Ringgit devalued to 
an average of 2.57 in July”.  
On 8 July 1997, BNM tried to stabilise the Ringgit by carrying out foreign exchange 
markets intervention. However, BNM gave up the intervention and let the currency 
devalue after losing approximately USD1.5 billion. In January 1998, the currency 
dropped to its deepest point at 4.88 to the USD but gradually improved in April 1998 to 
a level below RM4 i.e. 3.73 to the USD (IMF, 1999a). This discouraging outcome left the 
central bank with no option but to increase interest rates. The market-oriented approach 
caused severe repercussions to the economy. The majority of highly geared companies 
faced financial distress in serving their loan payments as interest had surged. In October 
1997, for instance, Renong was compelled to undertake a debt restructuring exercise. NPL 




fresh control measures that were meant to improve the financial system worsened the 
business entities.  
Considering the circumstances, Mahathir requested for interest rates to be scaled down. 
However, Anwar ignored the Prime Minister’s appeal and instead continued a high 
interest rate strategy on the assumption that any policy reversal would halt organisational 
reform as loss-making companies were allowed access to bank borrowings. The political 
situation in Malaysia had worsened as the dispute between Mahathir and Anwar had gone 
beyond economic policy. Anwar initiated a “campaign against corruption and cronyism 
in May 1998 and was supported by his UMNO youth members. Notwithstanding 
forewarnings from other senior members of UMNO, Anwar’s supporters publicly 
requested that the government curtail cronyism” (Case, 1999). The campaign hit its 
greatest stage at UMNO’s annual general meeting where the Youth Chief at that time, 
condemned the government aid given to the companies owned by Mahathir’s son via the 
national oil company, Petronas (Jomo, 2004a). 
Although the original purpose of Anwar’s campaign was virtuous, the timing was more 
critical. At that stage, President Suharto of Indonesia was pressured to resign amid public 
protests. After Suharto’s stepping down as Indonesia’s longest-serving elected ruler, 
“Mahathir was expected to be concerned that the political uncertainty in a nearby country 
would be spreading to Malaysia” (Backman, 1998). To obtain backing from the business 
society, Mahathir revealed the lists of corporations and their main stakeholders that 
secured favourable contracts in the recent privatisation exercise (Noor, 2001). It exposed 
that both Anwar’s and Mahathir’s allies were included in the list of 300 companies. 
Mahathir highlighted that “the affirmative reaction was created to support Bumiputera 
business. Anwar’s effort to condemn Mahathir was not effective” because his policies did 
not work to halt the economic downturn. On the contrary the economy weakened by a 
7.4% drop of real GDP (Nasution, 2005).   
Senior UMNO leaders also appeared not to support Anwar’s severe policy responses, 
concerned about the upcoming election to be held in April 2000. Thus his confrontation 
with the Mahathir administration aggravated his desolation in UMNO. Mahathir seemed 
to be the clear winner in the tug of war even though his policies were not yet found to be 




loss was considered political rather than hypothetical. He failed to obtain sufficient 
backing to proceed with his policies even though he was backed internationally by the 
IMF. His supporters were gradually driven out from the cabinet, BNM and UMNO. 
In June 1998, Daim’s comeback to the government as a Minister with special functions, 
assigned with the task involving economic development verified the rumour that 
Mahathir had ousted Anwar from his cohort91. In late August, the Governor of the central 
bank and his deputy resigned because of their support of Anwar’s policies (Lopez, 1998). 
It was also generally understood that Mahathir coerced two leading newspaper chief 
editors and a TV3 director92 to resign, as all were considered as Anwar’s allies. The last 
step was to remove Anwar as his Deputy and the Finance Minister in September 1998 
(BBC News, 1998). After Anwar was sacked and the supporters of his policies were 
removed,  policies more akin to the Keynesian approach was immediately introduced. 
Nevertheless, it was difficult to trigger any quick economic recovery. When the capital 
controls was launched, its effect on economic rehabilitation was uncertain (Goad, 1998). 
Capital controls on the positive side had permitted the government to reach monetary 
sovereignty by shielding the economy from foreign pressures. This policy was also abled 
to temporarily insulate Malaysia’s capital market from the global financial players, which 
made it challenging to draw foreign funds to supports its planned structural economic 
reform. 
Anwar had initially resisted a fiscal expansionary budget, but reconsidered the approach 
when the Malaysian economy weakened by 4.8% in 1H 1998. The revised budget 
proposal in March 1998 supported a 2.6% fiscal deficit of GDP and extra funding was 
allotted to social expenditure. The policy reversal resumed into 2H 1998 due to favourable 
external conditions. Additionally, there was demand for an extra funding for financial 
restructuring. An extra budget amounting to RM7.0 billion was issued in July 1998. 
Furthermore, a fund for Infrastructure Development was introduced to promote economic 
activities. Accordingly, the 1998 Budget gave rise to a 3.7% deficit of GDP. 
 
91 Anti-Anwar pamphlets - Fifty Reasons Why Anwar Shouldn’t Be Prime Minister - were widely 
disseminated within the UMNO. 




In terms of monetary policy, Mahathir told the NEAC to look at a low rate of interest 
regime in April 1998. His reason was that highly geared companies will be financially 
distressed and be burdened to serve their debts, rather than focusing on their core 
businesses. At its peak, the interest rate went up to 11% in June 1998 and he appealed to 
the authority to salvage some strategic companies/assets for the national and public 
interest. However, Anwar was steadfast with his austere policy, claiming that low rates 
of interest regime would promote foreign capital inflow, thereby placing further 
downward anxiety on the Ringgit.  
The Mahathir-Anwar dispute turned sour when Singaporean banks began to dispose 
highly profitable Ringgit deposits93. The SRR was cut down from 10% to 8% from July 
1998, as per Table 6.5 below. Despite the adjustment of monetary policy over the previous 
months, the scope for easing had been substantially constrained by concerns for possible 
exchange rate concerns. The imposition of exchange rates and pegging of the Ringgit 
immediately lifted this constraint, allowing quick adjustments instance of the policy 
(IMF, 1999a, p. 16). 
Despite successive interest rate cuts, circulation of money did not increase. Majority of 
the banks were reluctant in giving out loans owing to rigid controls on NPLs. However, 
some controls were softened in September 1998, to promote bank lending. First, the NPL 
classification by banks was reversed back to the initial 6 months, rather than 3 months as 
imposed by Anwar’s policy. Second, banks were no longer obliged to make a 20% 
provision on inferior loans, which had reduced the stress on their balance sheet and 
profitability. Finally, restructured NPLs could be re-categorised as performing loans 
when the instalment payments under the rearranged terms had fulfilled a 6 months period, 
rather than initial requirements of 12 months of uninterrupted instalments. 
  
 
93 Unlike other regional currencies, the Ringgit was significantly traded in the region, particulary in 
Singapore. The substantial onshore-offshore interest rate differential attracted Ringgit funds abroad. While 
Malaysia had, through swap limits, curtailed Ringgit borrowings to finance currency trades, Ringgit funds 
were available from banks in Singapore which offered Ringgit deposit rates as high as 20-30%. While the 





Table 6.5: Changes to BNM Intervention Rate & Statutory Reserve Requirement  
Period  Liquidity  Date Intervention Rate  
(%) 
SRR (%) 














































Source: BNM (1999c, p. 595) 
Subsequently, based on BNM’s report (1999c) the Ringgit exchange rates stabilised in 
the range at RM3.84-3.98 to the USD in the 1st and 2nd quarters of 1998. At this point 
there IMF had pressed the Asian countries to increase rates further. The IMF had proposed 
higher rates primarily because it projected inflation to be considerably greater in the area 
of 10-12%, whilst BNM only expected 7%. An agreement was reached with IMF for 
BNM to withstand lower rates, on the condition that BNM be prepared to increase rates 
immediately if attacked by currency speculators. However, BNM did not undertake this 
action as Malaysia chose to tolerate currency adjustment in July, succeeding the Russia’s 
contagion effect (Stiglitz, 2002) and later enforced exchange regulations. Whereas the 
economic downturn signalled for easing of the monetary position, external exposures on 
the other hand required higher interest rates. While it’s not possible to lower the interest 
rates, Malaysia had agreed to implement alternative steps to lessen lending rates. BNM 
placed RM34 billion in the market and concurrently, the SRR was lowered from 13.5% 
to 8% (BNM, 1999c). The rationale of the SRR reduction was to promote the liquidity 
circulation that had previously been injected into the banking system and to scale down 




the reduction in SRR were balanced by the non-rollover of funds previously provided by 
BNM to banks. 
Due to these actions, money market rates dropped, contributing to a reciprocal contraction 
in lending rates from 21.5% in early February 1998 to 16.3% at the end of February 1998. 
Interest rates were eased three times in August to uphold the economic revival plan. With 
the selective exchange controls, interest rates were reduced further, together with cuts in 
SRR. Table 6.6 indicates that the issues were gradually resolved in 1999 as the economy 
achieved economic improvement in 1999 and 2000. 
Table 6.6: Malaysia - Key Macroeconomic and Financial Indicators  
 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Real GDP growth (annual, %) 5.6 -10.3 6.1 8.3 
Gross national savings (% of GNP) 39.4 41.9 41.1 39.5 
CPI growth (%) 2.9 5.3 2.8 1.6 
Unemployment rate (quarterly, %) 2.5 3.4 3.4 3.1 
Federal Government overall balance (% of GNP) 2.0 -1.9 -3.2 -5.8 
Current account balance {% of GNP) -5.9 13.7 17.1 10.2 
External debt (% of GNP) 64.0 60.2 n.a 50.5 
Net international reserves  
RM billion 













M3 growth (%) 18.5 2.7 8.3 5.0 
3-month interbank rate (%) 8.7 6.5 3.18 3.25 
BLR (commercial banks, %) 10.3 8.0 6.79 6.78 
Banking system loans (annual growth, %) 26.5 1.3 n.a n.a 
RWCR of banking system 10.5 11.8 n.a n.a 
Net NPL of banking system (% of total loans)  
(6-month classification) 
4.7 7.5 n.a n.a 






In Malaysia, IMF’s political influence was not strong due to the force in safeguarding the 
NEP principles. Even though the international players and radical policymakers in the 
MoF and BNM had backed Anwar’s rescue program, it did not manage to overpower 
Mahathir’s authority. Subsequently, Mahathir ousted his Anwar and implemented the 
capital control policy. The policy was not formed to override the full financial 
liberalisation process but rather to curb capital outflows, as there was no restriction placed 
on FDI and the controls on capital outflows were removed gradually.  
The process in the establishment of the capital control policy was a rigorous and 
challenging process and took about 11 months to be developed via 45 discussion papers 
(the “Notes”) and technical meetings nearly every morning during the period (Wong, 
2011). However, there was no evidence of a special Shariah advisor or a Mufti being 
present at such meetings. Based on the review of the Notes, there were no reference made 





CHAPTER 7:  CONCLUSION 
“Islam is a way of life, a practical religion which guides and provides 
for dealing with every aspect of life. Muslims cannot continue to be 
satisfied with vague statements that "Islam is a complete way of life" 
with no attempt to operationalise Islam's eternal ideals in our practical 
day-to-day life. If we say that Islam is for all times, then we must apply 
it to the conditions prevailing in our times.”  
Mahathir (1987a) 
 
Most studies of the Panic of 1997 focus on economic issues such as how the crisis 
originated, why particular countries like Taiwan and Singapore were largely unaffected, 
why some countries turned to the IMF for help while others, like Malaysia, generally did 
not, and how the Crisis affected regional economic cooperation through ASEAN. Even 
when the existing literature deals with the more political aspects to the Panic of 1997, it 
discusses the process of economy i.e. corporate, financial, and labour reform, or it 
addresses the issues of why some countries adopted a neoliberal economic policy regime 
and how successful they were in implementing neoliberal economic policies. In other 
words, the existing literature is primarily oriented towards specific economic policies and 
policy-making process. These literatures pay little attention to the rationale behind the 
policymakers’ decisions, whether it was because of political pragmatism or other 
alternative reasons.  
What was the exact framework of economic policies in Malaysia? What were the cultural 
and other motivations of the policymakers (in implementing the NEP) in response to the 
ethical riot and (in implementing the capital controls policy) in response to the Panic of 
1997? How did the different motivations of the different actors affect the policies in 
Malaysia? How did the underlying principles of Shariah, if any, contribute to the eventual 
decision-making process in response to the Panic of 1997? Were there any alternatives to 
the policy response logic? If so, did they fail? These are questions posed at the beginning 




logic resulted from a historical process and that Malaysia’s policy responses were not an 
engineered act that was manufactured on the eve of its Independence in 1957. Rather, the 
preservation of multi-ethnic unity, a build-up of historical processes had resulted in the 
responses. 
In explaining Malaysia’s policy framework, the cultural motivations of the policymakers 
and the policy response logic, this thesis is sprinkled with terms like “prospects”, 
“processes”, “consolidation”, “intervention” and “institutions.” These terms are linked to 
the theories of path dependence, the self-reinforcement structure and timing. The thesis 
argued that the policy responses, the integration of new actors to the conservation of 
Malay political power, are subjects to a path-dependent process. It also analyses how 
policies such as the NEP, Islamisation and NERP set off social, political, and economic 
processes, which in the long run would prove to be transformative.  
This thesis does not offer the sole explanation of Malaysia’s policy response to the Panic 
of 1997 but to a certain extent, the analysis adds to the repertoire of works that attempt to 
make sense of Malaysia’s policy responses by giving the historical institutionalist 
perspective. I have argued that the attractiveness of the historical institutionalist argument 
lies in its ability to reconcile various works on the policy responses to the Panic of 1997 
and, in the process, help make better sense of Malaysia’s policy responses logic. A 
historical institutional assessment can explain alternative reason to the many subjects in 
Malaysia’s political economy including nationalism, religiosity, affirmative actions, and 
the importance of institutions. The historical institutional line of reasoning can also 
facilitate to justify the importance of multi-ethnic unity via the NEP, and to some extent 
Islamisation in Malaysian politics.  
During the Mahathir years, Malaysia was known to be a strong advocate in promoting the 
Islamic approach locally and internationally. Domestically, Islam had been the strength 
in uniting the Malays in the battle for its independence in 1957. Although Mahathir had 
very little training in the religious sciences, his readiness to engage seriously with Islam 
set him apart from his contemporaries. In the Muslim world, his name resonates as a 
leader willing to question the Western world’s hegemonic affirmation to a singular 




 After Independence, the absolute affinity of ethnicity with religion was such an integral 
element to the Malay thinking that Islam grew to become a crucial constituent factor in 
the constitutional interpretation of a Malay (Yasin, 1994). The Independence Constitution 
defines a Malay as one who "professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay 
language, conforms to Malay custom" (Hashim, Lee and Trindade, 1978). Islam is an 
essential principle in the ethnic affiliation/composition, specifically in a condition that 
calls for the unification of the community. An idealised Islam was also proclaimed as an 
alternative philosophy to the mundane, immediate material interest values proposed by 
the West (Yasin, 1994). To the Malays, Islam has become "the foundation of communal 
identity" (Enloe, 1970, p. 27) and "a principal means of defining ethnic loyalty" (Bakar, 
1984, p. 139).  
I conclude that the concept of globalisation was not to be a concern for the Ummah as 
Islam is pro-globalisation. Despite his anti-West rhetoric gestures, Mahathir is not against 
globalisation as he believed that the ultimate goal of an Islamic nation is the provision of 
universal goods for all people. He is merely against what he and many Muslims 
recognised as the exploitations and transgressions in the current practice of globalisation 
predominantly in the financial markets. The principle of trade and business transactions 
from the Islamic perspective of Southeast Asia Muslims should be just and fair, despite 
the prevailing phenomena of global trade displaying numerous unjust elements, 
especially the rapid growth of financialisation.  
The concept of Shariah and its tradition in Malaysia has consistently been a controversial 
issue, either among the Muslims or non-Muslims. During the colonial rule, the ‘British 
Residential System’ was introduced, and it marked the onset of a secularisation era which 
detached the state from religion (Yasin, 1994). The modern English legal system was 
adopted as the law and regulation in all non-religious facets of life. It was described as 
the only system that was able in bringing about change and economic development. Prior 
to this, the Shariah law had been practiced as a purely religious law in administering the 
state affairs. I argue that an all-embracing Islamic community in Malaysia did not exist, 
although Islam had arrived in Malaya before the British came to rule. 
Post-independence, especially during the Mahathir years, the Islamic law or Shariah was 




maintaining the adapted English legal system. For instance, in the system of Malaysian 
taxation, the Zakat paid on income by a Muslim is considered an allowable deduction 
against the taxable income, so that the practising Muslim paying the Zakat will not be 
‘taxed’ twice. It aims to indicate that Islam is a modest religion capable of adapting to 
change and modern environment. It is also an undertaking to revive the role of Shariah as 
a government policy as it used to be before the colonial rule. Mahathir had introduced the 
Islamisation policy as the “inculcation of Islamic values into the government” in early 
198394. He believed that Islam is a tolerant religion and claimed that “…when Malaysia 
adopted Islamic values and declared itself an Islamic country, there was peace and 
stability and the country developed and grew as never before…” (Mahathir, 2011, p. 478).  
This thesis had described how the NEP and Islamisation policy managed to set off 
processes that facilitated in raising Malay expectations, increase Malay capacity and 
establish a series of Malay-based institutions. Even though the NEP to some extent 
achieved its objective of poverty eradication, Mahathir claimed that it had also created 
some moral hazard in turning Bumiputera entrepreneurs to be rent seekers and too reliant 
on government aid. In essence, a country must have the knowledge and readiness to 
respond independently and in its own interest, specifically in the situation of crisis.  
On the other hand, critics of the NEP had argued that without the NEP, Malaysia may 
have achieved better economic growth. This argument is probably valid but would have 
come at the cost of social divergence and worsened the income disparity. The Panic of 
1997 if not dealt with discretion, considering the country’s factors, may have turned into 
an intense socio-political turmoil as it did in Indonesia. Indonesia is a country similar to 
Malaysia in terms of its demography during the 1990s, but was the only country that did 
not recover from the Panic of 1997 as the IMF’s intervention ignored the non-financial 
elements of the country that had resulted in social and political unrest. 
The thesis examines that banking and corporate reforms carried out under the guidance 
of the NEAC via the NERP to stabilise the Malaysian financial markets. The 
 
94 This policy is popularly know by Malaysian as ‘dasar penerapan nilai-nilai Islam dalam pentadbiran’, 
the rational of introducing this policy was to infuse universally accepted Islamic values into the Malaysian 
civil service in the process of creating a value laden society, rich with moral and ethical values and integrity 




neighbouring countries undertook similar efforts, but with differing results. The AMC 
framework under the NERP had made excellent progress in its debt recovery programme. 
In the five years of its planned operation, Danaharta has resolved all 2,905 loan accounts 
acquired or managed by them. Their projected recovery rate is 57 percent, which is high 
by international standards. The motivation behind this policy response was to prevent a 
banking crisis, which could potentially aggravate the already distressed economic 
condition due to the Panic of 1997.  
I argue that IMF’s political influence was not strong to override the force that was 
protecting the NEP principles. Even though the international players and radical 
policymakers from the MoF and BNM had backed Anwar’s rescue program, it did not 
manage to overpower Mahathir’s authority. With the removal of Anwar, Mahathir 
implemented the capital control policy. The policy was not formed to reverse the full 
financial liberalisation process, but rather to curb capital outflows. As a matter of fact, 
there was no restriction placed on FDI and the controls on capital outflows were removed 
after the economy recovered. In his memoir, Mahathir claimed that “the currency control 
we imposed helped to staunched the bleed caused by the financial crisis… if a large 
number of companies are bankrupted, the devastating results are soon felt by everyone 
and the nation… the idea that inefficient or struggling companies must be closed down is 
the extreme rather than reasonable version of capitalist thinking” (Mahathir, 2011, p. 
770). 
The process in the establishment of the capital control policy by the NEAC was a lengthy 
and challenging process. Even though there was no evidence of a Shariah advisor or Mufti 
being present at such meetings or any references made to Shariah or Islamic principles, 
the guiding principle for the NEAC’s policy response was based on the best interest of 
the country or the Ummah.  
Mahathir being the executive chairperson of the NEAC was a forceful advocate in 
implementing the NERP with no financial aid from the IMF, as he truly believed that any 
policy intervention from the IMF would cause the reversal of the NEP. He argued that 
“calling in the IMF would have been a disaster for the Malaysian ummah, as the NEP 
policies are not in keeping with the IMF's idea of free unfettered competition in which 




leave us independent… with a formula that saved the nation and the Ummah…The most 
important change that the Islamic world has to make is to accept reality and to adjust to 
it without deserting the fundamentals of Islam” (Mahathir, 2000a). The NEP is 
understood by the Malaysian people to be a significant proponent of national unity, and 
“tolerance and moderation is clearly a part of the teachings of Islam. If we ignore these 
teachings, then we will not only be sinning, but we will be depriving ourselves of the 
benefits of Islam” (Mahathir, 1998). 
The NEAC, established as the task force charged with the recovery measures to the Panic 
of 1997, comprises a body of independent advisors which included the State 
representatives95, trade unions, business leaders and think tank heads, but none were from 
any religious group. The setting up the NEAC from the Shariah’s perspective was to reach 
a consensus or Ijma and the use of Ijtihad or independent reasoning in formulating the 
policy responses that will benefit the Ummah. Mahathir (2002b) deliberated that “the 
Quran and the Sunnah will of course be our ultimate guide supported by the application 
of `qiyas' and `ijma`' taking through the process of `Ijtihad'. Muslims believe that Islam 
is the most complete of religions because it governs all aspects of life at all times. In terms 
of trade and financial matters, there is a lot of guidance provided in the Quran and the 
Hadith.”  
Mahathir’s understanding of Islam and Islamic state is backed by Qaradawi’s (1981) 
depiction that an Islamic State is to ascertain justice and the approach can vary with the 
conditions of time, distance and place. Therefore, the “gates of Ijtihad96 are always open 
to Muslims to solve their problem collectively…problems in any nature... including 
hunger, poverty and ills of the society” (Qaradawi, 1981, p. 125). 
During the Mahathir years in the 1980s and 1990s, the Islamisation policy was clearly 
one of the major developments as analysed in detail in Chapter 3. According to Mahathir, 
“the renaissance that Islamic civilisation so greatly required, could be achieved through 
 
95 The State representative included the State Chief Ministers and Menteri Besar, including those from the 
opposition parties. Menteri Besar is the head of government of each of nine states in Malaysia. 




dynamic, contextualized readings of Islam’s founding sources through Ijtihad” 
(Mahathir, 1986, pp. 19–20). Mahathir (1987b) argued that Ijtihad would enable present 
day Muslims to build a framework of ethics to deal with policymaking, economics and 
community to enable them to integrate modernism. Mahathir believed that “the teachings 
of the Prophet Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص were not a straightjacket that should constraint the twentieth 
century Muslim through literalist readings, but a moral-ethical guide whose dynamic 
spirit meant it could be applied to the changing exigencies of time and space” 
(Schottmann, 2018, p. 109). He further debated that a Muslim could determine the 
appropriate decision in whatever new situation he confronted, manoeuvring the 
difficulties of contemporary life at the same time upholding the sacredness of God’s 
commandments as he believes that “Understanding Islam does not only mean the 
capability to explain a hadith, or outline the mechanics of certain rituals or recite the 
verses of the Quran. Understanding Islam also means the capacity to explain and put into 
practice its dynamic and vibrant concepts in contemporary society” (Mahathir, 1984).  
In order to take account to what extent Islam had influenced the decision of the 
policymakers in their policy responses to the Panic of 1997, we need to take Mahathir as 
an astute and modern Islamic political actor. An examination of his articulation of Islam 
provides the needed insights into Mahathir’s Islamic discourse and perhaps explains the 
differing roles of his Islamic view and practice in reshaping the country over the period 
of his administration. The transformative effects of his policy of ‘inculcating government 
with Islamic values’, a policy on the “Islamisation of educational curricula, the banking 
system, public broadcasting content and government protocols” were arguably 
“Mahathir’s most popular policy decisions, earning begrudging kudos even from his most 
ardent critics in the Islamic opposition” (Schottmann, 2018, p. 6). 
From the assessment of this thesis, I argue that Islam had played a vital cultural and 
institutional role in Malaysian politics especially during the Mahathir years, but it cannot 
be explicitly established whether the underlying principles of Shariah were seriously 
deliberated or any Shariah processes were undertaken in formulating these policy 
responses. It would not be an unfounded assumption to consider that the policy responses 
were to a certain degree motivated by Mahathir’s persistence and inclination to engage 




highest level of Malaysian polity, the economy and the international finance system that 
sets him apart from many of his peers in the Muslim world.  
A number of issues that I did not consider in this thesis are worth being pursued for further 
research: 
1) The findings of Chapter 5 provided a summarised analysis on the comparison of the 
financial system restructuring of four countries in South East Asia that was affected 
by the Panic of 1997. Areas for future research may include detailed analysis on 
other Islamic countries to determine whether these countries were guided by any 
underlying Shariah principles, in the restructuring of their financial system.  
2) The Panic of 1997 had only affected countries in South East Asia, of which consist 
of two Islamic countries i.e. Malaysia and Indonesia. Topics for further 
investigation may consist of a detailed comparative study of these two countries as 
they are two policy makers with similar socio-political backgrounds facing a similar 
situation. However, Indonesia had a much slower recovery from the Panic of 1997 
as compared to Malaysia. 
3) Further comparative research should also be extended on other Islamic countries 
outside of South East Asia, so that a more definitive assessment concerning the role 
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Appendix II: Capital and Exchange Control Measures in 1997–99 (cont’d) 
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